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This report is an extraction of results from Fleet Battle Experiment Foxtrot (FBE-F) which 
address Joint Experimentation issues. This introduction describes the extraction process (very 
briefly), the datdinformation structure, and the report format. 
FBE data are at several levels and occur in many forms. 
1. Electronic System Performance Data 
2. Electronic Process Timeline Data 
3. Event Data 
4. Subjective Observations of Events 
5. Subjective Observations of System Performance 
6 .  Subjective Observations of Process Performance 
7. Subjective Observations of Operational Capabilities 
These data are rolled up into various types of information and results, which fall naturally into 
















TTP and CONOPS Evaluations and Recommendations 
Doctrine Evaluations and Recommendations 
Plans and Programs Recommendations 
The results in this report cover B through F. 
An abbreviated description of developing various levels of findings and results from the data 
follows. The basic data are sorted into topical categories that identify operational issues, system, 
scenario, etc. The best way to illustrate this is with a diagram and example: 
POP-UP TEL 
Flat C2 Sensor 
This illustrates (simplistically) how a given datum is cataloged. The concept that was being 
tested during the experiment was Time Critical Targeting, and the effectiveness of a flattened 
Command and Control structure. The particular scenario being used when the datum was 
obtained was prosecuting pop-up TELs, specifically MSEL #7. The datum refers to the sensor 
system. 
The particular sensor datum could be any one of the forms listed above. It could also be any of a 
wide variety of types, such as 
sensor characteristics, sensor control, BDA prioritization, 
information pipeline, digital target folders, etc. 
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The first step in the analysis process is to place data into categories. The next step is to decide 
how one wishes to bin the data. Using the above diagram, a bin could be TCT, flattened C2, 
TELs, and one of the above, such as sensor control. All data that matches this bin is pulled 
together, regardless of form, and synthesized into a finding, or set of findings. These are the 
findings that are presented in the bulk of this report, Sections 3 to 7. 
These findings are related to Joint Experimentation concerns. This is done by correlating each 
set of findings with specific Joint Experimentation Objectives and Initiatives. The correlations 
are indicated in Bold in those Sections, and in a matrix in Appendix B. 
These detailed findings are interesting and have many uses. However, they are normally to 
detailed, and at too low a level, to be reported out of the experimentation or systems engineering 
community. Thus, another step is used to further synthesize these findings into principle results. 
Principal results are presented in Section 1. 
The final step in the Joint Experimentation reporting process is to decide which of these principal 
results will be reported as Joint Lessons Learned. This step is not included in this report. 
This report also contains contextual material. Appendix A is a description of FBE-F. Appendix 
C is the Data Capture Annex from the Experiment Plan. 
. 
2.0 PRINCIPLE FINDINGS 
The principle findings from FBE-F that are pertinent to Joint Experimentation concepts and 
issues are presented here. Each principle point contains a small body of synthesized information. 
The topical areas that make up these points are: 
1. Maritime Access 
2. Sensor Management 
3. ISR Desk Manning and Procedures 
4. ISR Equipment Requirements 
5.  Sensor Information Processing and Targeting 
6. Platform Management of Sensors 
7. Sensor Related CROP Issues 
8. Time Critical Targeting Issues 
9. Time Critical Targeting CROP Issues 
10. Organization Relationships 
1 1. Effects Based Operations 
12. Asymmetric Threat Management 
13. Common Tactical Picture versus CROP for TCT 
14. Parallel Targeting Processes 
15. TCT Information and Fusion 
16. Joint Fires Element Structure 
17. Parallel Operations and Coordination 
There is nothing absolute nor special about this list of topical areas. One could easily utilize a 
different grouping of principle results. The only criterion is that they correspond to Joint 
Experimentation interests. Also, the principle results are not necessarily complete. There is a 
great deal of information in this report that has not been pulled into these results. Another 
analyst could well feel that additional principle points should be generated. Finally, the principle 
findings are not independent. Some could be combined, and how to further refine them depends 
on the joint lessons-learned format that is being built. 
One should remember that this report is for a single FBE. Results important to Joint 
Experimentation occur in all FBEs, and synthesizing results across a number of FBEs is needed 
to gain complete understanding of an issue. For example, Foxtrot focused on a centralized 
process, the Joint Fires Element, while Golf focused on a flattened C2 structure. Comparing the 
results from the two provides much additional information over examining the experiments in 
isolation. In the spirit of this philosophy, a report on Time Critical Strikes and Fires, which 
synthesizes results across all FBEs up to Golf, has been produced. 
It is important to be able to trace synthesized information to the sources. Thus, each of these 
principle findings has an reference to the source material from within this report. To trace to 
more basic material, one must go to the original FBE-F report and also its underlying data. 
MARITIME ACCESS (Sections 5.3.2.3,5.4.2) 
More rapid access to littoral areas is required for future operations. Mine clearing and attendant 
Joint protection of mine clearing forces from threat are key components to success. Concurrent 
operations with organic assets and protection by joint forces were tested. 
Co-location of the Sea Combat Commander (SCC) and the Mine Warfare Commander (MIWC) 
with the Joint Forces Maritime Commander (JFMCC) was effective. The result of this 
collaboration was an integrated Undersea Warfare Plan, coordinated within the fiamework of 
other Naval operations. This collaboration should be formalized. 
Mine clearing requires the creation of a protective zone around mine clearance (MCM) forces. 
Protective forces need to know the location of MCM forces and MCM forces need to know the 
threats, where the protective forces are located, and the status of any engagements. This requires 
increased situational awareness on board MCM forces as well as increased visibility to the 
remainder of the joint force. Current C41 does not support either requirement. 
The vulnerability of MCM forces can be mitigated by integrating fires to shore based threats and 
suppression of asymmetric threats posed by surface craft. Army Attack Aviation (e.g. Apaches) 
appear uniquely fitted to the role of engaging surface threats. To realize this potential many 
essential questions including airborne C2, ability of the Apaches to discriminate between 
fiiendly and hostile targets and crew training require resolution. 
SENSOR MANAGEMENT (Section 4.3.2.1) 
Centralized management of sensors was a focus of experimentation. An Information, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) desk was formed and performed this function within a 
Joint Fires Element (JFE) which provided centralized control of fires. 
The result of having the JFE as an overarching capability was a more rapid fires process than is 
normally obtained by sending less processed sensor information to component commanders. 
The ISR anchor desk provided an important new capability for local collection management, 
making it possible to deal with TCTs more expeditiously. The Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM) 
was a useful tool but it needs to be modified to make it a collection management and execution 
aid. The desk allowed parallel sensor, target location and identification, and weapon target- 
pairing processes. 
The JFE concept improves dynamic response to emerging threats, such as TCTs, through 
centralized management of assets. The time scales of information available to this function need 
to be modified to match the pace of its operation. Examples are a dynamic target list rather than 
an AGM, also an Integrated Tasking Order (ITO) and Modernized Information Data Base 
(MIDB) that are refieshed in time-step response with the tactical situation. 
The JFE needs a complete tactical picture in order to perform its function. This may be beyond 
what would normally be provided by a CROP. For example, JFE needs projected tracks of 
sensors. It also needs cradle-to-grave information about threats, including those which haven’t 
been adequately mensurated nor designated as targets, and the results of BDA. 
Doctrinal changes, such as the inclusion of the J2 and 53 watches in the JFE and improved 
interoperability should be explored. This would allow real-time fusion of current intelligence 
and sensor information. 
ISR DESK MANNING AND PROCEDURES (Sections 4.3.2.2,4.3.2.1 I)  
Because it can be a focal point, considerable attention to ISR desk manning, responsibilities, 
TTPs, etc. are needed. A possible methodology is a sensor plan developed in parallel with the 
IT0 followed by ISR desk managing by exception. 
TTPs are needed for sensor control that are responsive to the dynamic tactical situation. It is 
unclear how control of sensors should change as tactical requirements change. 
The ISR desk needs to manage tactical sensors as organic assets. This requires access to the 
same platform information available to the JFACC and real-time coordination of those 
platform’s assignments. 
Two-way communication between the UAV sensor controller and the ISR desk reduced the 
nomination time-lines, implying an increase in efficiency of TCT prosecution. 
UAV pictures and location data aided targeting but command relationships and control doctrine 
between the ISR desk and the UAV controller need to be defined. 
JFE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS (Sections 4.3.1.1,4.3.2.2) 
The JFE utilized the GISRS-M workstation for sensor information fusion and preparation of 
target folders, PTW+ for target mensuration, and LAWS for weapon-target pairing. 
There were bottlenecks at various points in the targeting process, e.g. GISRS transmission via 
smtp taking 30sec to 1 Omin or three GISRS workstations overwhelming the PTW+ station. This 
indicates that extending this configuration to handle a h l l  tactical area will require careful 
examination of information loads at the choke points. Balancing the number of GISRS-M, 
PTW+, and LAWS terminals and improving their interoperability is required to eliminate 
bottlenecks, especially if the sensorhnformation process becomes more efficient. 
Three ISR stations were planned to receive all of the ISR sources (including live and simulated). 
Processing system performance depended upon the capability of the system to receive sensor 
inputs and add them to the comparisons performed at the next level of the system by LAWS and 
PTW+. An optimal ratio of system components to sensor feed in this integrated systems 
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architecture should limit queuing conflicts so that no TCT is left unserviced due to “bunching 
up” of target nominations. 
Originally three (3) PTW+ units were to be part of the JFE, however only one was employed in 
the experiment. The result was a backlog of sensor target nominations at PTW+. 
Analysis of optimal technology mix should be the focus of additional experimentation. In 
general, in the context of this experiment it seems that the required ratio for system performance 
within TCT dwell times should have been on the order of one ISR desk forwarding target 
nominations to one PTW+. This one to one relationship does not necessarily imply the same 
ratio with respect to LAWS. 
SENSOR INFORMATION PROCESSING AND TARGETING 
The experiment sought to determine what types of information, what quality, and to whom were 
needed for timely TCT operations. These results are independent of the fires system structure. 
(Sections 4.3.1.2,4.3.2.4) 
The full system does not provide sufficient information to do an adequate assessment of target 
location error (TLE), which is necessary for improved targeting. This degree of centralized 
processing requires more information about sensors and platforms than is normally provided. 
Real-time telemetry of this information needs to be provided with imagery. Fusing sensor data 
can require inclusion of this information. 
None of the sensors provided a TLE adequate within the rules of engagement (ROE) to shoot on. 
They all had to go through the PTW+ for precision targeting. This resulted in a stovepipe 
process, a serial one if the target was introduced fiom sensor information. 
Target mensuration is greatly aided by multiple resolution imaging. However, passing full 
images for all possible targets overloads the system. A decision process is needed that restricts 
the amounts of information passed to the fires cell. Several actions could aid this situation: 
Pass hyperlink references to images rather than the images. 
Resolve ambiguity and duplication at the ISR desk before passing nominations. 
Use the Attack Guidance Matrix and forward nominations based on priority. 
Imagery resolution is a critical variable to system performance. Resolution which does not meet 
system parameters (in this case the AGM) required for direct weapon target pairing in LAWS (or 
JCSE) requires further processing by PTW+. Nearly refined images require less processing here 
than those needing extensive mensuration. 
PTW+ can reduce mensuration timelines. However, in addition to low imagery resolution, 
timelines may be adversely impacted by low correlation to Intelligence Products Library (IPL) 
data, or by limited access to IPL. Limited access is typically related to inadequate data storage 
immediately accessible to the PTW+ operator. 
Related to the comment above, the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB) may not contain 
necessary data to construct TCT aimpoints. At issue here are the variable rates at which the 
MIDB may be refieshed at different locations. 
PLATFORM MANAGEMENT OF SENSORS (Section 4.3.2.8) 
Sensor managers on platforms and UAV controllers need to observe sensor output in order to 
provide efficient sensor management and to insure information quality. They also need to be in 
communication with the ISR desk so that real-time coordination between sensor - data, not just 
sensor assignment and location, and information requirements can be accomplished. 
SENSOR RELATER CROP ISSUES (Section 6.4) 
There is a tendency to think of the CROP as supplying only target and platform information. 
Management of sensors so that the fires process can meet TCT timelines requires that the CROP 
contain a variety of sensor information. 
Incorporate a means for generating and displaying ISR collection routes in the ISR situational 
awareness display. 
Immediately pass track reports to operational nodes for “see and avoid” while TCT nomination is 
ongoing. 
ISR needs to know fiom Operations the status of TCT nominations as a driver to collection and 
processing refinement. 
A system and process is needed to distribute all airborne imagery in real-time rather than some 
sensor information processing waiting until aircraft return to the carrier. 
At all stages of the targeting process, there should be available a target managemendstatus 
function that shows priorities, target flows, and situational awareness. 
Need 1 OOmb ethernet minimum for builddistribute CROP. 
The ISR desk needs a real-time CROP containing the following to support the TCT process: 
Video fiom UAV and P-3 
Tactical Data Link information on friendlyhostile force locations 
NITF imagery from tactical, theater, national sources 
TCT nominations 
Uncorrelated near real-time SIGINT information 
JSTARS (APY-6)/GMTI track information 
Cradle-to-grave information on all targets, up to final BDA 
Non actionable targets 
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TIME CRITICAL TARGETING ISSUES (Section 6.3) 
Fixed TCTs can have much of the targeting information prepared in advance. For moving 
targets the task is much lengthier because the interpretation, location, identification and 
mensuration must be established, and the assessment of collateral damage and ROE must be 
performed after the detection of the target. This information is not possible to file ahead of time 
so an electronic target folder must be built before the target can be authorized for attack. 
There may be a long period between when the first sensor is alerted and the actual detection of a 
potential target since Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) is still relatively ineffective. 
Therefore moving or relocatable targets are quite difficult to target within the usual TCT 
thresholds of between 5 minutes and a few hours, almost regardless of the weapon being used. 
For effects-based prioritization, re-tasking of strike platforms, and deconfliction the targeting net 
must include a node with broad understanding of the current status of the operations and with 
authority not only to direct fires but to re-task platforms that are performing lower priority 
missions. This must be a fairly powerful node with quick access to responsible command levels. 
Such a command node must be supported by a good CROP as well as the much more restricted 
targeting net(s) and have extensive intelligence support fiom national sources, probably through 
a Joint Intelligence Center. In a large-scale joint or coalition operation this node will have to 
have be at the JTF level and have the commanders personal blessing because of the necessity of 
intervening in on-going missions in order to respond to TCT as well as high priority for 
intelligence collection and sensor management. 
One of the demands for responsive intelligence collection and interpretation is that for any type 
of TCT target and weapon it is important that BDA be obtained in order to decide when to stop 
firing. Because TCT are so important, re-strike will be necessary until confirmation that the 
desired effect on the target has been reached. The planning of BDA should occur with every fire 
mission pairing. Otherwise it is likely that the BDA will be delayed, useful information for 
restrike decisions will not be provided, and many weapons will be wasted. 
TIME CRITICAL TARGETING CROP ISSUES (Section 6.3) 
The CROP did not provide adequate information support for targeting of TCTs. There are 
problems with latency, completeness, and accuracy. A Land Attack TCT CROP, if it were to 
exist, should have additional information, such as: 
Sensor data: sensor location, target location error, footprint and pointing data 
Full TADIL information and track history for each target 
Imagery: video from UAV with telemetry info and NITF images 
Related near-real time SIGINT and possibly COMINT, MASINT 
GMTI track (JSTARS) info and position location info (tags) concerning targets 
Information concerning the firing status of fiiendly units 
Representation of the priority of the targets 
Confirmation of authority to fire 
The CROP may not practically provide all necessary targeting information. A combination of 
IPB and dynamic targeting folders, direct sensor- weapon threads and perhaps some specific 
targeting nets is likely to be crafted for specific land attack scenarios rather than a general 
purpose broadcast of all targeting information. The reasons for this, in general, is that the 
targeting information is specialized by type of weapon and is often restricted in its releasability / 
dissemination both for classification and simply because of geographical relevance and 
sensitivity. 
The authorization for attack of some potential targets and use of some of the weapons is likely to 
be reserved to specific levels of command which may desire to limit visibility into their 
operations, for security and other considerations. 
ORGANIZATION RELATIONSHIPS (Section 7.1) 
The role of the Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting (GAT) ashore was to coordinate JFMCC 
efforts with the JFE, represent the JFMCC at the ECB and the JTCB and in all other domains. A 
liaison officer fiom JFMCC was assigned. (GAT) set up ashore did not overcome a command 
and planning barrier which resulted from concerns by the JFE that although they were working 
with the GAT, in actuality they were speaking to the JFMCC. In other words, the GAT ashore 
carried the weight of the JFMCC. This was potentially a good situation except in the condition in 
which the GAT was not adequately linked to the JFMCC’s intentions and concerns. There is 
evidence that this was the case early in the experiment, but that the situation improved as the 
experiment and connectivity continued. 
Improved connectivity was noted between days 3 and 4, producing a potential for JFMCCIJFE 
coordination which shifted perceived responsibility of the JFMCC GAT ashore directly to the 
JFMCC. This resulted in a very close coupling between JFMCC and his warfare commanders, 
and the planning and execution planning cycle being conducted ashore in the JFEEires cell. 
This is evidence of synchronization, and of organizational learning. This also highlights that the 
GAT role need not be institutionalized throughout the life of the operation, but be phased in and 
out of the ops as the organizations involved develop the competencies to engage strategic and 
tactical problems in a distributed environment. 
EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS (Section 8.3) 
The integration of effects based operations (EBO) was not effective largely due to a lack of 
common understanding of EBO, a common language and failure to adequately define the 
requirements for detailed, continuous commander’s guidance. Organizationally future JFEs must 
include a feedback loop, a method of evaluating actions or potential actions effects (particularly 
those directed at reason and belief) and a construct to employ non-kinetic effects. 
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FBE Foxtrot explored processes related to the tactical level of “effects-based targeting.” The 
JFE organization was defined to implement this concept. Effects at operational and strategic 
levels will likewise require congruent organizations, and associated doctrine and TTPs, if EBO is 
to be implemented. Synchronization between the levels requires exploration. 
Sensor management of battle-space and national assets in FBE Foxtrot did not include adequate 
real-time BDA, essential to associating effects between tactical and operational levels. Inclusion 
of this system element will require additional asset management control by the JFE, and likely 
increase the number of sensors and associated C4I. 
The battle-space must be understood as a complex and dynamic system. In order to implement 
EBO it will be necessary for “planning” to identify expecteddesired primary and secondary 
effects. Both levels of effects should be presented and promulgated in a document such as the 
IT0 as guidance for an effects control board. Such planning guidance should also include 
directed flexibility, such as “if this effect is accomplished then that change in operations is 
implied,” which is really a sophisticated prioritization scheme that is effects based. 
ASSYMETIZIC THREAT MANAGEMENT (F report) 
The encompassing nature of NBC Defense and the extensive requirements that this would have 
placed on the CJTF could overwhelm the warfighting capability of the stafK The experiment 
illuminated the extent of the demands of maintaining a coalition, ensuring host nation support, 
evacuation of US nationals and the burden of conducting operations in an NBC environment. 
COMMON TACTICAL PICTURE VERSUS CROP FOR TCT (Section 6.3) 
The information requirements for a successful Joint Fires Element clearly go far beyond the 
current capability of the CROP. The CROP is first of all a situational awareness tool. As such it 
must cover a broad area such as a theatre and is literally a picture in order to enhance 
comprehension. It therefore has a limited level of detail and less than instantaneous latency. It is 
ajoint and often a coalition service that must be available to those with only Secret clearance or 
often even less. 
PARALLEL TARGETING PROCESSES (Section 6.3) 
In the case of a moving or relocatable TCT with short thresholds, the only hope for successful 
execution is that an imaging sensor is under the control of (or in direct support of with very good 
connectivity ) the JFE fires planners (LAWS in Foxtrot). In Foxtrot a simulated UAV was 
available to the GISRS-M operators and the UAV sensor display was available locally. It was 
therefore possible to locate, with some degree of accuracy, and to identify the TCT. Because 
LAWS had sporadic information on status of friendly firers, it could begin to assess firing 
options while the target was being mensurated and a reasonably rapid firing assignment that was 
likely to be feasible could be made. 
Authorization of higher levels was not necessary in Foxtrot simulations and firers were supposed 
to report back via LAWS when performing the simulated execution. Thus the firing loop could 
conceivably be closed in a reasonably short period. In effect the Video from the UAV plus its 
controls became a targeting net supporting LAWS. 
TCT INFORMATION AND FUSION (Section 6.3) 
The information to support TCT targeting and weapon assignment depends upon the 
combination of target type and weapon type that are being paired. Although having all the 
information necessary for targeting (all types of weapons might facilitate the most efficient 
pairing of weapons and targets) for TCT, it is much more important to be able to quickly make a 
feasible pairing with the information in hand than to wait for all information on which to base an 
optimal choice. 
From the sensor standpoint, often TCT sensor provides some kind of imagery: video from a 
UAV, national SAR or EO imagery. This generally allows rapid identification and reasonably 
accurate location but may require mensuration. Other times the TCT sensor is only an IR launch 
warning or SIGINT event or KUMINT / MASINT report. It is anticipated that JSTARS like 
capabilities will provide TCT over land and that distributed ground / water sensors will also 
provide detection (and identification in some cases). GeneralIy a fusion of this infomation or 
correlation with imagery is necessary before the target location and identification will reach 
acceptable completeness for attack. 
JOINT FIRES ELEMENT STRUCTURE (Section 6.2, 7.2) 
The concept of a Joint Fires Element (JFE) was perhaps the most promising innovation in 
Foxtrot. It consisted of a sensor grid (ISR cell with feeds from national , theatre and organic 
sensors) supported by a GISRS-M terminal, an information grid (targeting cell with MIDB target 
data base) supported by a PTW+ terminal and an engagement grid (fires coordinator) supported 
by a network of LAWS terminals. In particular GISRS-M provided an important new capability 
for local collection management that makes it possible to deal with Time Critical Targets (TCT) 
much more expeditiously when combined with LAWS and the PTW+. Connectivity to the UAV 
controller was particularly important in tracking of moving TCTs. 
The concept of an Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM), borrowed from the US Army, was explored 
to aid in EBO and in reducing the timeline for TCT. This is a promising concept but depends 
upon accurate capability to estimate target location error and system response time as well as a 
stable assessment of target priorities . Additional testing and doctrinal development is needed as 
well as Joint interoperability. TCT suffered from lack of visibility by all participants into the 
status of Blue response since a sample showed that only about half of TCT designated targets 
were attacked. 
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The AGM was usefir1 to the GISRS-M operators but adaptation to a collection planning and 
execution aid is desired. Doctrinal changes such as the integration of the 5-2 and 5-3 watches and 
improved interoperability should be explored. Balancing the number of PTW+, LAWS and 
GISRS-M terminals and improving their interoperability is required to eliminate bottlenecks 
when they are not co-located as they were in Foxtrot. 
Because Foxtrot focused on the non-aviation resources to respond to TCTs, there was a 
perception of the need for a Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting cell (GAT), or set of 
processes, that would ensure that the JFEs actions to pursue TCTs are in accordance with the 
commander’s guidance, do not conflict with other uses of the Naval resources, and strike an 
appropriate, not simply a feasible, set of targets, i.e. the GAT processes. For example, it would 
be desirable to have an authority to approve the assignments by the LAWS operators of weapons 
to targets (or at least someone at a higher level to discuss the issues that might be involved in a 
timely manner). A GAT cell, if it existed and had doctrinally defined functions and authority, 
could provide such support. The guidance, apportionment and targeting processes have 
traditionally focused on pre-planned operations and the ATO. When TCTs become important 
and the AT0 is impacted, there is no current approved doctrine for how this is to be handled. [In 
fact the Joint doctrine status board reports that the development of Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures (TTP) for Time Sensitive Targets is being separated from the draft publication JP 3- 
60 Doctrine for Joint Targeting as JP 3-60.1 JTTP for TST.] 
PARALLEL OPERATIONS AND COORDINATION (Sections 5.3.2.1 , 5.3.2.2) 
Although co-locating the MIWC with the FMCC and Sea Component Commander (SCC) on 
the same platform is contrary to network centric operations, centralizing the decision making 
process did provide opportunities to observe the interaction at various staff levels across this 
continuum. Close interaction between these key decision-makers was important and productive 
for parallel MIW/AS W operations. 
Hence, it is important for the MIWC and SCC to cultivate a relationship and share relevant 
information at the Warfighter commander level so that each maintains the appropriate situational 
awareness. 
An effective C2 process between warfare commanders similar to the structure exercised during 
FBE-F is important for information exchange and cross-pollination of the two disciplines. 
Although a common operational picture should be tailored to each commanders need, in a 
decentralized environment, it would be beneficial during parallel operations, for the SCC to 
access the MIW picture and for the MIWC to access the ASW/USW picture so that each is 
cognizant of the complete battlespace. 
Without robust distributed collaborative planning tools, decentralizing the decision-making is a 
difficult task. A common operational picture (COP) plus the effective C2 process established 
between the MIWC and SCC staffs enhanced the relationship of the two organizations. Also, 
situating both MIW and SCC staff watch-standers in close proximity enhanced the utility of the 
common situational awareness and provided an environment for dynamic information sharing. 
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In the organizational structure implemented for the experiment, the MIWC was positioned to 
identi@ requirements and advise the JFMCC on the critical MIW related local battle space 
issues. MIW is a time consuming warfare area, especially early in the conflict. Hence, the 
MCM force in JMAC must be able to conduct operations in parallel with the JFMCC campaign 
pIan to gain control of the seas. It is important that the MIWC help focus JFMCC attention to 
the various phases of this critical operation. 
Of equal importance throughout the developing scenario was the role of the SCC, who was 
primarily focussed on situational analysis and providing the JFMCC with information required 
for AS W/US W decision making. The organizational structure during this experiment created a 
dynamic that encouraged a continuous interaction between the MIWC and SCC that proved to be 
quite beneficial. With both working as subordinate warfare commanders to the JFMCC, the 
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3.0 JOINT EXPERIMENTATION OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES 
The following are the Experimentation Objectives, their hypotheses, and the Issues that were 
addressed by Fleet Battle Experiment Foxtrot. Data was not obtained for all of the all of the 
Issues. Those Issues for which data were gathered will be shown in the individual Objectives 
sections. 
3.1 E01- ATTACK OPERATIONS AGAINST CRITICAL MOBILE TARGETS 
Hypothesis: IF we can detect, engage, and destroy critical mobile and time sensitive targets, 
THEN we can protect the joint force against increasingly lethal conventional weapons and 
weapons of mass effects, achieve a significant combat power advantage over the adversary, and 
limit conflict escalation. 
Issue 1. What degree of confidence is required (or acceptable) by a JFC to automatically identify 
and attack critical mobile targets? 
Issue 2. What is the most appropriate C2 structure to satisfy the time restrictions posed by 
attacking critical mobile targets? 
Issue 4. Will the interaction of future sensors and sensor exploitation technologies, future 
command and control technologies, and future weapon systems contribute to an effective attack 
operations system? 
Issue 5. Can systems be designed to provide dynamic tasking and re-tasking of rapid, long- 
range, accurate and flexible air, land, and sea engagement systems? 
3.2 E03 - RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS 
Hypothesis: IF a highly deployable, lethal, agile, survivable, and supportable force can conduct a 
deep operational strike against the enemy’s operational center of gravity, THEN we can coerce 
our opponent into conceding without having to conduct a protracted campaign. 
Issue 1. What are the information requirements available to the JFC? 
Issue 2. What are the information generating assets available to the JFC? 
Issue 4. How is the information for the JTF managed, coordinated, and distributed? 
Issue 5. Were Critical Information Requirements (CIR) identified for the JTF? 
Issue 6.  How quickly were CIRs passed? 
Issue 7. How were the CIRs filtered so the CJTF only received info critical to decision making? 
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Issue 8. What planning, decision, and execution support tools were used by the JTF staff! 
Issue 9. How did planning tool technology speed the execution of the plan? 
Issue 10. What percentage of the JTF was comprised of standing forces and augmentees? 
Issue 1 1. How did the time required for assimilation of augmentees affect the JTF’s ability to 
conduct operations? 
Issue 12. Beyond current doctrine, how should the JTD be organized for combat operations and 
for the best C2? 
Issue 13. What was the capability of the JTF? What capability was required beyond current 
doctrine? 
Issue 14. How does the JTF best conduct rapid decisive operations? (Were enemy’s coastal 
defense centers of gravity identifieuattacked?) 
3.3 E05 - COMMON RELEVANT OPERATIONAL PICTURE 
Hypothesis: IF we have a common relevant operational picture in readily understandable, 
scalable, filterable, and interactive format, THEN we can compress the decision cycle, react 
more quickly to high-tempo operational requirements, and limit risk. 
Issue 1. Did the CROP enable improved synchronization of Joint operations? 
.Issue 2. Is the information in the CROP accuratehemredassured and available in the time 
required by the user? 
Issue 4. Did the CROP enable rapid, highly informed decisions? 
Issue 5. How should information be presented to the commanders in order to provide them with 
the greatest degree of battlespace awareness possible while also focusing them on those critical 
areas that require their immediate attention and action? 
Issue 6. How will confidence or the estimated degree of accuracy be represented in the CROP? 
Issue 7. How will the conflicting information be adjudicated? 
Issue 8. How will near-real-time information on the adversary and the environment be fused 
with baseline information from interactive databases and with own friendly force information? 
Issue 9. Is GCCS being used to generate a common picture? 
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4.0 ATTACK OPERATIONS AGAINST CRITICAL MOBILE TARGETS 
There is not a one-to-one correspondence between Joint Experimentation objectives and Fleet 
Battle Experiment initiatives. The overlap is considerable, but a given objective will have 
correspondence to more than one initiative, and vice versa. Thus, there is some arbitrariness as 
to how the FBE results are correlated with Joint Experimentation concerns. In the first three 
results sections we describe which Joint Experimentation initiatives are addressed then present 
the pertinent Foxtrot results. Each of the Foxtrot results sections contains a code showing the 
Joint Experimentation initiatives which they address, directly or indirectly. An example of a 
code is E03-1,4. This means Joint Experimentation Objective 3, initiatives 1 and 4. In an 
appendix there is a matrix which shows the FBE-F to Joint Experimentation correspondence for 
the full report. 
4.1 RELATIONSHIP TO TIME CRITICAL TARGETS 
Essentially, critical mobile targets are a subset of time-critical targets. Out of this very broad 
topic, FBE-F focused on using a centralized process, a Joint Fires Element (JFE), to manage the 
time-critical targets process. Thus, the results presented here are appropriate mainly to this 
centralized process. The immediate following is a description of the JFE process. 
FBE Foxtrot was based largely on a principle of centralized processing to support concurrent and 
in-stride operations by joint warfare commanders and their specific forces. A Joint Strike and 
Joint Fires Element were central components of this structure and a demonstration of a set of 
capabizities necessary to the conduct of Joint Maritime Access and Control. 
Capabilities in this portion of FBE-F were hierarchical. These capabilities could be decomposed 
into a capability to conduct deliberate planning in support of an Integrated Tasking Order (ITO) 
by coordinating a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) with component 
requirements (USN, USA, USAF) and Joint Warfare Commanders such as the Joint Forces 
Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) and the Joint Forces Land Component Commander 
(JFLCC), each of which had their own internal processing capability to define their deliberate 
targeting needs. At a similar level, a capability to conduct specific targeting missions against 
Time Critical Targets required a separate capability, but one highly coupled to the “processing 
engine” of deliberate strike. 





Define system and organization requirements for conduct of Time Critical Targeting. 
Explore capability of Enhanced TLAM operations. 
Explore use of Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) to support JMAC and Joint 
Fires. 
Examine construction and implementation of a Digital Fires Network in the Arabian Gulf 
( W .  
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Additional initiatives that were specific for the Joint Fires Element: 
Define requirements that enable a Joint Fires Element to work directly for the JTF, 
emphasizing Naval Surface Fires Support (NSFS) to prosecute deliberate (ITO) strike 
and TCT’s. 
Produce aimpoints of requisite quality for JFE prosecution from sensor events. 
Determine system and processing requirements to localize, identify and prosecute TCT’s. 
Explore requirements for establishing a Joint Fires Network as part of the Digital Fires 
Network. 
Improve capabilities to coordinate and synchronize TCT and deliberate targeting 
processes between the JFE and the Joint Strike cell. 
Experiment with simulations of future weapons systems and munitions by providing 
excursions within the battle problem. 
Assumptions made in execution of operations were that information would be resident in theater 
and not available through reachback (with exception of MIW change detect experiment), that 
real theater sensors and weapons (2005) would be used, and that many of the events would be 
simulation driven. 
The following were specific JFE questions of interest: 
Did the JFE perform TCT sensing, target pairing and mission assessment within the TCT 
“dwell time?’ 
Did the JFE concept enhance performance of parallel operations necessary to Joint 
Maritime Access Control? 
Does JFE enhance concurrent ASW and MIW operations, as well as multi-mission 
tasking (e.g., organic ASWMIW)? 
How does a JFE organization impact coordination of Joint Assets for maritime 
operations? 
What results are indicated between the deliberate IT0 planning processes and conduct of 
dynamic TCT missions? 
Is the JFE organizationally sensitive to system conflict and degradation? Is the JFE 
capable of self-organization in a time-sensitive environment? 
Was requisite information available to decision makers at LAWS to make timely and 
reasonable decisions? 
What impact did GISRS-M have on the sensor management related to reduction in TCT 
decision making time? 
How was information made available to higher authority as required? 
What feedback mechanisms were employed throughout the JFE system? 
Were changes to the TLAM process (MDS 4.X) useful in improving TLAM 
responsiveness? 
4.1.1 Joint Fires Element Svstem DescriDtion 
The following are short component descriptions with regard to how data were collected, 
processed and distributed within the JFE (Operations) system. The figure provides a simplified 
block diagram of the key JFE components: + 
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Sensor Grid: combined tactical (UAV, TARPS CD, LANTIRN, AIP P-3, SOF, SIGINT), theater 
(e.g., U-2 EO/SAR, RC-135 SIGINT and AWACS) and national (TENCAP) sensor inputs to 
GISRS-M. These feeds included imagery files of varying resolution and size. 
FBE-Foxtrot tested centralized management of sensors and sensor information. Sensors are a 
crucial component in the effort to rapidly prosecute time critical targets, and to achieve and 
maintain situational awareness. Success may depend on having coordinated management of 
organic sensors and of the information from organic and inorganic sensors, and tactical input to 
inorganic sensor management. 
This portion of the experiment was designed to test tactical sensor capabilities, centralized 
management of those sensors, fusing information from tactical sensors and national assets, rapid 
information processing, distributing results for fires decisions, and ensuring assessment of fires 
decisions for conformity with commander’s intent. Central to the approach is the visibility of 
ISR to Operations and the ability to accomplish dynamic ISR change based on operations 
I execution. 
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FBE-F tested an ISR anchor desk within a Joint Fires Effects Cell, received information from 
tactical and national sensors, and passed target information to a fires decision system in the Fires 
Cell. The ISR Desk was supported by the GISRS-M system. Fires decisions were supported by 
PTW+ for developing target coordinates and LAWS for weapon-target pairing. These three 
systems were components of the “sensor grid”, “information grid”, and “decision grid”, 
respectively. The tactical sensors used were TAWS-CD, P-3 sensor suite, and simulated UAV. 
GISRS-M; where a sensed event was noted and became a nominated target, or “target- 
nom.” This was both a technological and a human interaction with sensor feeds. Three 
ISR desks were manned. Operators at each desk made decisions to name any potential 
sensed event as a target nomination. This data was conveyed over the Global 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (Maritime) system (GISRS-M) 
constructed as a sub-initiative for this experiment. 
Modernized Intelligence Data-Base (MIDB) provided a portion of electronic comparison 
for nomination processes and for target mensuration. 
Target Prioritization List contributed the results of an effects-based targeting process in 
the Effects Coordination Board (ECB) to the ISR desks. 
Attack Guidance Matrix defined system Target Location Error (TLE) requirements for 
nominated targets prior to being paired with a weapon system in LAWS. 
Precision Targeting Workstation (PTW+) was the point at which mensuration of 
nominated targets (TCT’s) was conducted. Nominated targets were compared to MIDB 
and Attack Guidance Matrix for determination of target image and aimpoint quality prior 
to being pushed to LAWS. If the nomination did not meet system requirements an 
operator would then use PTW+ tools to make comparisons to the various C5F and Strike 
Intelligence libraries for further imagery support. The product of this effort was a 
mensurated target with aimpoint quality that could be used in pairing a weapon system to 
the nominated target in LAWS. 
Land Attack Warfare System (LAWS) performed final weapon to target pairing (WTP) 
of mensurated or otherwise validated nominated targets. At this point the nominated 
targets were considered to be targets for fire missions. LAWS output produced a WTP, 
fire mission and inventory of weapons as they were used (engagement grid). 
Joint Continuous Strike Environment (JCSE), an ACTD (?) was provided similar 
information as LAWS, in a parallel feed. The output of JCSE was not used for further 
system processing (i.e., no fire missions were produced from JCSE processing). 
JFE System Inputs: 
Synthetic Theater of War (STOW) provided simulated targets, weapon systems, sensor 
inputs of sensed targets, and force movements (geo-translation of potential conflict areas, 
MIW and ASW operations areas) to GISRS-M (and then to LAWS). (Did GCCS-M play 
any role here?). 
Integrated Tasking Order (ITO); was produced through a long-range planning process 
and fed into LAWS after JFMCC, JFACC review. 
Effects Management process produced the Target Prioritization list described above, as 
part of the IT0 planning process. 
20 
4.2 JOINT EXPERIMENTATION ISSUES ADDRESSED BY FBE-F 
Each issue is repeated here in italics, followed by a description of why they are addressed or not. 
Again, note that the experiment did not deal directly with these issues. The results that are 
presented are those which are pertinent to the issues. 
Issue 1. What degree of confidence is required (or acceptable) by a JFC to automatically 
identzfi and attack critical mobile targets? The experiment did not test this issue. It focused on 
the activities within the JFE. 
Issue 2. What is the most appropriate C2 structure to satisJL the time restrictions posed by 
attacking critical mobile targets? This experiment focused on a centralized C2 structure. The 
results here address that structure. Conclusions about which structure is most appropriate will 
need to be developed by comparison of results from more than one experiment. 
Issue 4. Will the interaction of future sensors and sensor exploitation technologies, Jicture 
command and control technologies, and fiture weapon systems contribute to an eflective attack 
operations system? The experiment addresses several aspects of this issue. The JFE utilized an 
ISR desk for sensor management. The experiment tested the utility of that desk. Results were 
obtained on sensor configuration and sensor information. 
Issue 5. Can systems be designed to provide dynamic tasking and re-tasking of rapid, Eong- 
range, accurate andJexible air, land, and sea engagement systems? The experiment tested 
tasking and re-tasking of sensors. Several results on sensor management are presented. 
4.3 RESULTS 
All results presented in this section and the sections that follow have the following format: 
Type of results by title 
Joint Experimentation Objectives and Issues they address 
Detailed content of the results 
This means that a given set of results can apply to more than one Objective or Issue, e.g. a result 
on sensor management could apply to both Attack Operations Against Critical Mobile Targets 
and Common Relevant Operating Picture, would appear in only one of them, but have reference 
to the other. In this way it is easy to correlate results and issues without having to present the 
same results several times. 
4.3.1 Time Critical Targeting Processing: 
A parallel, distributed processing system was envisioned (Appendix By FBE Foxtrot EXPLAN, 
C.3.10.3 and C. APP 3. TAB A). 
4.3. I .  I Configuration Issues 
Three ISR stations were planned to receive all of the ISR sources (including live and simulated). 
Processing system performance depended upon the capability of the system to receive sensor 
E01-2,3,4,5 
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inputs and add them to the comparisons performed at the next level of the system by LAWS and 
PTW+. An optimal ratio of system components to sensor feed in this integrated systems 
architecture should limit queuing conflicts so that no TCT is left unserviced due to “bunching 
up” of target nominations. 
Originally three (3) PTW+ units were to be part of the JFE, however only one was employed in 
the experiment. The result was a backlog of sensor target nominations at PTW+. 
Analysis of optimal technology mix should be the focus of additional experimentation. In 
general, in the context of this experiment it seems that the required ratio for system performance 
within TCT dwell times should have been on the order of one ISR desk forwarding target 
nominations to one PTW+. This one to one relationship does not necessarily imply the same 
ratio with respect to LAWS. 
Queuing of sensor feeds at ISR desks is ambiguous from experiment data. This relationship will 
depend upon the numbers and type of sensors, target distribution and type per unit area and C3 
organization supporting sensor management. 
4.3.1.2 TCT Processing Issues Related to JFE System Components 
E01-2,3,4,5 E03-2,3,7 E05-2 
Imagery-based targeting from tactical reconnaissance assets (TARPS-CD, LANTIRN, 
TARPS-DI, P-3 AIP) requires a standardized imagery format. 
Imagery resolution is a critical variable to system performance. Resolution which does 
not meet system parameters (in this case the Attack Guidance Matrix) required for direct 
weapon target pairing in LAWS (or JCSE) requires further processing by PTW+. Nearly 
refined images require less processing here than those needing extensive mensuration. 
PTW+ can reduce mensuration timelines. However, in addition to low imagery 
resolution, timelines may be adversely impacted by low correlation to Intelligence 
Products Library (IPL) data, or by limited access to IPL. Limited access is typically 
related to inadequate data storage immediately accessible to the PTW+ operator. 
Related to the comment above, the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB) may not 
contain necessary data to construct TCT aimpoints. At issue here are the variable rates at 
which the MIDB may be refreshed at different locations. 
LAWS specific processing issues: 
Capabilities related to messaging include a requirement for the operator to keep the 
“incoming log” open at all times for added situational awareness, and to maintain the 
display of a broadcast message while also activating other windows. 
A protocol needs to be developed so that multiple LAWS nodes can provide mensurated 
target information for further processing in PTW+. In this FBE there was ambiguity 
when one 
LAWS unit (e.g., aboard the CV) would need to push a target nomination to the LAWS 
station in the JFE. 
There were instances in which BDA reported over GSIRS-M were designated as random 
Targets in LAWS: There needs to be a distinction between BDA reports and potential 
targets, which should also include a means to couple the BDA to a specific LAWS 
target. 
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4.3. I .  3 
LAWS was modified to support in FBE-F the management of TLAM engagements. The 
principal characteristics of that capability include the following: 
Summary of TLAM Enhancements and Impact 
E01-2,3,4,5 E03-2,3,7 E05-2 
1. TLAM Mission Manager. The Mission Coordination: TLAM list displays, in a single line 
for each mission, the status of all TLAM, TTLAM and LASM missions prosecuted, or in the 
process of prosecution, by all platforms. Double clicking a mission in this display provided 
the detailed mission data. Using the add function the LAWS operator can enter the data for 
creation of a new mission in the TLAM Mission manager. A mission can also be created in 
LAWS by importing an Indigo or LSP message 
2. TLAM routes. A request for a TLAM route is automatically generated and transmitted to the 
LPMP with the Mission Planning request tool. LAWS accepts and stores the returned route 
information. 
3. Fire Commands. LAWS can generate an Indigo message. 
4. Inventory Status. The weapons inventory menu provided several ways of looking at the 
weapons inventory of all the platforms in the experiment. In particular, the Ships option in 
the weapons inventory menu provides a pictorial display of the status of each VLS cell on a 
platform. 
5. Inventory Update. LAWS, on receipt of a TIR or Indigo Firing Report message 
automatically updated VLS cell inventories. 
4.3.2 Sensor Management in the JFE Process 
The following figure shows the components of what we refer to as the “sensor system”, (or 
“sensor grid”) which includes sensors, sensor information, sensor management, and fused sensor 
information. LAWS, which is outside of this system is also shown because it is the recipient of 
target nomination data. Reference can be made to the JFE cell diagram to see the position of this 
system within the JFE. We do not show all of the individual components of the sensor system, 
rather agglomerate into function blocks for efficiency of results presentation. 
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SENSOR PLATFORM A sensor is mounted on a platform. 
The platform "pilot" may be able to 
Control the sensor. 
Control ______-_- 
Data sent from the platform can 
Contain status communications. 
ISR desk control of sensors is via 
G I s R ~ - ~ ' ; " " " " ; t - - - - - . ~ ~  a platform controller 
Data Target folder 
1 TARGETMENSURATION I €"lJV+ 
GI Target nomination .................. J....*........*.*.... 
I WEAPON-TARGETPAIRING f LAWS LAWS is not part of the - ....................................... 
PrinciDal Sensor System Results 
These principal results are syntheses of the system component results that follow. They refer to 
performance of the system within the JFE rather than performance of system components. They 
are divided into areas of interest. 
4.3.2. I 
The ISR anchor desk provided an important new capability for local collection management, 
making it possible to deal with TCTs more expeditiously. The Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM) 
was a useful tool but it needs to be modified to make it a collection management and execution 
aid. The desk allowed parallel sensor, target location and identification, and weapon target- 
pairing processes. The result of having the JFE as an overarching capability was a more rapid 
process than is normally obtained by sending less processed information to component 
commanders. 
JFE Sensing of Targets within the TCT 3 Dwell Time 
E01-2,3,4,5 E03-2,3,7 E05-2,3,4,8 
The JFE concept improves dynamic response to emerging threats, such as TCTs, through 
centralized management of assets. The time scales of information available to this function need 
to be modified to match the pace of its operation. Examples are a dynamic target list rather than 
an AGM, an IT0 and Modernized Information Data Base (MIDB) that are refreshed in time-step 
response with the tactical situation. 
The JFE needs a complete tactical picture in order to perform its function. This may be beyond 
what would normally be provided by a COP. For example, JFE needs projected tracks of 
sensors. It also needs cradle-to-grave information about threats, including those which haven't 
been adequately mensurated nor designated as targets, and the results of BDA. 
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Doctrinal changes, such as the inclusion of the 32 and 53 watches in the JFE and improved 
interoperability should be explored. This would allow real-time fusion with sensor information. 
Real-world operations precluded the assignment of the intelligence staff for Foxtrot. Possibly as 
a result, responsibility for collection planning was not clear. 
4.3.2.2 JFE Coordination of Joint Assets, Interactions with IT0 planning and dynamic TCT 
Because it can be a focal point, considerable attention to ISR desk manning, responsibilities, 
TTPs, etc. are needed. A possible methodology is a sensor plan developed in parallel with the 
IT0 followed by ISR desk managing by exception. 
E01-2,3,4,5 E03-2,3,7 E05-2,3,4,8 
TTPs are needed for sensor control that is responsive to the dynamic tactical situation. It is 
unclear how control of sensors should change in a self-synchronized manner as tactical 
requirements change. Note that in Global-99 control/management of ISR was relocated twice 
during the course of the game. 
The ISR desk needs to treat tactical sensors as organic assets. In order to do this it needs access 
to the same platform information that is available to the JFACC and needs real-time coordination 
of those platform’s assignments. Two-way communication between the UAV sensor controller 
and the ISR desk reduced the nomination time-lines, implying an increase in efficiency of TCT 
prosecution. 
Easy to use, real-time communications are needed for the JFE to perform its function. As 
examples: Efficient communication paths (verbal, e-mail) between the ISR desk and the 
mensuration operators was an essential part of the process. Voice over IP was an effective 
method to communicate with UAV operators and vector UAVs to areas of concern. 
Additional doctrinal development is needed to identify the reinforcing roles of all search and 
prosecution participants. 
UAV pictures and location data aided targeting but command relationships and control doctrine 
need to be defined. 
4.3.2.3 
The ISR desk appears to decrease the time-line for that portion of the system from sensor to 
target nominations. For example, interaction between the ISR anchor desk and UAV control 
enabled tactical control of the sensor grid within a 10-min threshold (from LAWS data and 
interviews). 
ISR Desk Management, Processes, and the TCTprosecution time 
E01-2,3,4,5 E03-2,3,7 E05-2,3,4,8 
Experience gained during Foxtrot operations allowed the GISRS-M operators to build target 
information folders that could be more efficiently mensurated. 
There were bottlenecks at various points in the process, e.g. GISRS transmission via smtp taking 
30sec to 1 Omin or three GISRS workstations overwhelming the PTW+ station. This indicates 
that extending this configuration to handle a full tactical area will require careful examination of 
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information loads at the choke points. Balancing the number of GISRS-M, PTW+, and LAWS 
terminals and improving their interoperability is required to eliminate bottlenecks especially if 
the sensorhnformation process becomes more efficient. 
As an ISR desk becomes overloaded, areas of sensor exploitation could be cued in 
communications between the ISR desk and remote exploitation sites. 
Passing of target images from F-14 TARPS-CD pods to GISRS-M is a promising innovation for 
finding targets. This process was severely handicapped by poor experiment connectivity (does 
not diminish potential capability). 
4.3.2.4 Quality of Sensor Information 
The full system does not provide sufficient information to do an adequate assessment of TLE, 
which is necessary for improved targeting. This degree of centralized processing requires more 
information about the sensors and platforms than is normally provided. Real-time telemetry of 
this information needs to be provided with imagery. Fusing sensor data can require inclusion of 
this information. 
E01-3 E03-2 E05-2 
“None of the sensors provided a TLE adequate within the ROE to shoot on. They all had to go 
through the PTW+ for precision targeting. This resulted in a stovepipe process-a serial one if 
the target was coming from sensors.” (GISRS-M lead) 
Target mensuration is greatly aided by multiple resolution imaging. However, passing full 
images for all possible targets overloads the system. A decision process is needed that restricts 




Pass hyperlink references to images rather than the images. 
Resolve ambiguity and duplication at the ISR desk before passing nominations. 
Use the Attack Guidance Matrix and forward nominations based on priority. 
None of the sensors provided a targeting quality TLE, which required all imagery to go through 
mensuration before weapon assignment. To a large extent this was the result of simulation. 
Simulated images were pre-built in the STOW and injected into the JFE decision process later. 
These digital target images were of lower quality than would be expected from “live” images 
from “real” systems. Lining each image into a mensuration processing queue resulted in a highly 
serialized process, with possible bottlenecking and a slowdown of the TCT process. Improved 
information from the STOW sensors could result in an improved process by which some targets 
are of sufficient targeting quality to bypass portions of the mensuration process, resulting in 
more rapid prosecution of TCTs. 
4.3.2.5 Sensor and Platform Capabilities 
In FBE Echo near real time information was combined from JSTARS, UAV, Links 1 1 and 16, 
and LAWS. Fusion and an enhanced capability to conduct Full Dimension Protection as a result 
illustrated the power of Network Centric Operations (NCO). FBE Foxtrot furthered 
understanding of this capability however, there are also doctrinal and semantic deficiencies. 
E01-2,3,4,5 E03-2,3,7 E05-2,3,4,8 
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Sensor managers on platforms and UAV controllers need to observe sensor output in order to 
obtain quality information. They also need to be in communication with the ISR desk so that 
real-time coordination between sensor data and information requirements can be accomplished. 
Mobile targets require additional sensors including an organic MTI/SAR capability. 
Attention is needed with regard to image type, quality, and an accompanying information 
package that are required for this system to efficiently nominate targets. For example, P-3 
imagery needs to have longer dwell times in order to be useful. Passing images through a chain 
of workstations for processing can degrade them to the point where mensuration is not possible 
Need an airborne sensor with higher resolution for increased stand-off capability. 
Mobile targets require additional sensors, including organic MTI/SAR capability. 
Sensors for the asymmetric threats such as swimmers, jet skis, and rubber boats have not yet 
been developed beyond the human eye and ear, each of which is limited by darkness, high winds 
and waves, etc. The Air Force C130U has special capabilities for detection of humans that could 
potentially be added to the network. Further doctrinal development and connectivity is required. 
4.3.2.6 System Component Results 
The following results refer to specific components of the sensor system. They are: 




Sensor Control by the Platform 
Sensor Data (both data content and transmission pipeline) 
ISR Desk Control of Sensors 
Target Folder Data (both data content and transmission pipeline) 
Target Nomination Data (both data content and transmission pipeline) 
' 
In addition to results that apply to specific system components there are results that refer to 
supporting information. They are: 
GISRS-M Supporting Reference Material 
PTW+ Supporting Reference Material 
COPIssues 
4.3.2.7 Sensor Information 




System performed well, with some shortfalls. 
Additional rapid tactical reconnaissance is needed. TAWS can provide tactically 
important time critical information on initial strike Bomb Impact Analysis and on 
movement of forces. 
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Include EO, IR, and Radar in the TARPS pod. TARPS-CD contains only one sensor 
whereas the wet film version contains 3. 
Need increased resolution for higher over-flight and an increase in stand-off 
distances. 
0 Enhanced capability of sensors should include reliable automatic target recognition. 
0 Important characteristics to incorporate as capabilities: 
Ability for pilot to remain heads-out 
Feedback for camera operation 
Reliable operation during tactical maneuvering 
Ability to reset the camera after transient faults 
0 Significant capability improvements are: 
Increased coverage of the CD version 
Earth stabilization 
Sensor maintains performance during dynamic maneuvers 
Feedback of camera operation and image capture to the operator 
Specific recommendations to improve TARPS-CD capabilities are: 
1. Allow the capability to exchange the CD-261 for an IR or combined EOAR 
camera for night reconnaissance. 
2. Investigate multiple sensors by replacing the forward TV camera with a better 
sensor for imagery collection. 
3. Provide a better antenna (perhaps directional) and improve the location for better 
range and reliability. 
4. Decrease the delay between turning on the camera and image capture. 
5. Allow more operator adjustment for exposure. 
6. Provide the software for a file of imagery history for graphical depiction 
(preferably for use with PFPS). 
7. Incorporate a solid state recorder system. 
8. Increase memory for thumbnail analysis on the waterfall display. 
9. Provide software for stitching of thumbnails. 
10. Provide s o h a r e  for annotating images. 
1 1. Provide training for base station users and a technical representative for 




Exposure adjustment should be made from imagery seen in the cockpit rather than terrain type, 
and a wide range of shutter speeds rather than a single stop adjustment would be an 
improvement. 
Sensor Control by the Platform 
EO 1-3 E05-4 
The platform pilot needs a heads-up sensor display to enable controlling sensors while executing 
flight maneuvers. 
4.3.2.9 Sensor Data 
TARPS-CD wideband data link inoperative, data conveyed by physical transfer of digital tape. 
E01-3 E05-4 
High quality TARPS-CD data received at C5F. >1 hour latency due to data recovery, image 
screening on JFK (NAVIS ground station) and SIPRNET transmission. 
UAVs/P-3/TARPS must provide telemetry data stream (coordinate, TLE) 
Tactical imagery needs to include a North arrow and exploitation support data. 
Need better location for the omni-directional antenna for F-14 TAWS. A directional antenna in 
the nose could be used for long distance transmission. 
Provide a graphical depiction of the aircraft flight path on the imagery as a photo interpretation 
aid. 
The Common Data Link connectivity, as a self-contained, real-time imagery system does not 
meet expectations. Burst transmission of thumbnails through other established links could 
provide some capability up to 300 miles. 
Next generation sensor telemetry could include sensor pointing and location accuracy to yield 
target location error. 
Target Location Error is necessary for TCT, thus the ISR anchor desk must have the capability to 
compute it from sensor data. 
Target location error must be included in real-time video sources. 
F-14 LANTIRN acquired and imaged live targets and disseminated via FTI. In every case, 
received images at ISR were of too low quality for target ID. 
P-3 video provided sufficient resolution for target recognition. 
P-3 video could not be used for TCT nomination because of dweWdirection and location. 15-30 
sec of stabilized video needed for PTW+ mensuration, on the average only about 5 sec was 
available. 
P-3 video contained no telemetry nor location info to provide even rough localization of targets. 
Send the imagery to other strike or C2 aircraft. Would need to include the N arrow, coordinate, 
and a distance scale. 
Send a continuous stream of images to intelligence centers to analyze real time. 
Use JSTARS GMTI information as a means of cueing the TCT process. Fusion is a problem. 
Passing GMTI data as tracks followed by SAR NITF images could eliminate this problem. 
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4.3.2.10 ISR Desk 
Need automatic, continually displayed, target quality in GISRS. 
EQ1-2,3 EQ3-7,12,13 E05-4,8 
GISRS should bundle multiple target view images. 
Bundled images: permit the operator to choose the best image for targeting. 
Need reverse playback capability for photo interpretation. 
One operator can simultaneously monitor two streams of streaming video, but can only work a 
single feed for nominating TCTs. 
Locate an 8x8 video switch with the ISR anchor lead for expeditious changes from sensor-to- 
sensor and workstation-to-workstation. 
Real-time ISR assets resolved uncorrelated ELINT contacts through a display-centric fusion 
process. The Attack Guidance Matrix was used to fly UAVs to TCT/ high payoff activity areas 
in response to uncorrelated contact reports, resulting in a large number of successful cross-cued 
TCT prosecutions. 
A TTP is needed for direct coordination with reachback exploitation sites. 
Direct, automatic distribution of newly collected imagery from framing sensors to ISR 
situational awareness displays is a proven concept for TCT ISR support. 
Proven concept for TCT ISR support: Direct parsing and display of footprints associated with 
newly collected imagery from framing sensors to ISR situational awareness displays works. 
NITF images with 4-corner coordinates were parsed and an icon displayed the latest collection 
event on the ISR Situational Awareness display. 
ISR sensors can capture multiple targets on a single fiame or chip. Need a way to connect 
individual aimpoints with the original TCT nomination and tracking from cradle to grave. 
Summary of functional requirementskapabilities usedhdentified for the ISR anchor desk to 
support the TCT process: 
1. Directed exploitatiodanalysis support: 
Capability for designating and automatically disseminating ISR 
TCT nominations to ISR analysis nodes for additional time critical 
exploitatiodanalysis support. 
2. TCT target nomination interface providing the capability for nominating targets 




MIDBheference data (cued by other sources) 
NRT SIGINT 
GMTI 
3. Attack Guidance MatridSensor tie-up table. 
4. Dynamic Target List/LAWS mission status tracking panel 
5. Real-time collection steering support 
6.  ISR rout plan formulation/display/monitoring 
7. On-line MIDB data query is based on geographic coordinates of the ISR situation 
awareness window. 
4.3.2.11 
Need ability to talk to the aircraft sensor operator 
ISR Desk Control of Sensors 
E01-2,3 E03-7,12,13 E05-4,8 
ISR management needs to cue/direct time sensitive exploitation of tactical imagery when 
bandwidth precludes forwarding raw imagery. 
Need coms so TCT ISR can cue areas of exploitation emphasis at decentralized exploitation 
nodes. (a TTP) 
Two-way coms between with the UAV sensor controller resulted in decreasing the time to 
nominate TCTs and increased the number identified and prosecuted. 
ISR anchor needs for control of the sensors for TCT 
Sensor telemetry must include position and pointing. 
Need the same information as a ground control station. 
tactical control of real-time sensing from UAVs should be a TTP 
0 Can provide warning to pilots of potential danger with respect to target sites. 
Sensor TTPs cannot be generalized but must be specifically tailored to the capabilities of 
individual sensor platforms. 
Voice Comms are a tremendous facilitator for TCT when sensor control and TCT cell are not co- 
located. IVOX adequate at times, infuriating at others. Collaborative Virtual Workspace during 
JEFX was considerably more reliable and useful. 
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4.3.2. I2 Target Folder Data 
Target nomination package transmission too slow, now 2-l Omin. 
E01-3 E03-2,3,4,7 E05-2 
Moderate to poor qualityhesolution imagery data: GISRS digitization, then frame grabbing, then 
bitmapping, can render imagery unusable. 
Reference imagery included with target nominations from GISRS to PTW+ is a necessary 
component and needs improvement. 
GISRS to PTW+ nominations sometimes included multiple aimpoints. 
It would be better to disseminate hyperlink references to an image rather than the images. 
GISRS transmitted to 4 different smtp mail hosts, with a wait time of 30 sec to 10 min. This 
bogged down the nomination process. 
ATI.ATR target nomination needs to handle multiple coordinates and multiple pictures, a folder. 
4.3.2. I3 Target Mensuration 
Precision mensuration not accomplished in near-real-time at C5F due to operator and 
workstation workload conflicts, and due to integration difficulties with the TIGER software 
application on the JTW. 
E01-3 E03-2,3,4,7 E05-2 
PTW+ was not fed with national imagery. Necessitating estimation of target location. 
More PTWs needed for this size operation. 
Need a quality double-check on the mensuration process. 
Single PTW+ client workstation insufficient for a targeting cell. Nominations from 3 GISRS 
workstations overwhelms it. 
TCT nominations should remain local until ambiguity is resolved and check with other nodes for 
duplicate nominations 
Visual Target Aids attached to ATLARs: were of extremely poor quality, occasionally missing 
(thus no mensuration possible), and must be annotated to eliminate errors. 
4.3.2. I4  Target Nomination Data 
LAWS and other operational systems need to be able to process and retrieve ISR analyst 
narrative comments. 
E01-3 E03-2,3,4,7 E05-2 
Manual typing of ATLARs produces errors, and transmission via Eudora e-mail resulted in 2-3 
increase in transmission time. Need self-populating interface. 
4.3.2. I5  
Collection Manager should link to IT0 to determine green status for collection plan. 
GISRS-M Supporting Reference Material 
E01-3 E03-2,3,4,7 E05-2 
Need a Sensor Guidance Matrix providing ROE for matching ISR info to a TCT. 
ColIection Management Planning TempIate was needed for the host command. 
Tracks vs Targets: Use the Attack Guidance Matrix for screening TCT nominations to reduce 
overload of the operations system. 
4.3.2.16 PTW+ Supporting Reference Material 
Classify targets according to the location accuracy needed for the weapon type to be used against 
them. 
E01-3 E03-2,3,4,7 E05-2 
Digital Point Precision Database (DPPDB) and NTM need to be collected and loaded on PTW+. 
DPPDB age and image resolution were significant detractors from PTW+ performance. 
NTM imagery to PTW+ must be in primary formats, not IDEX exploited and without full 
exploitation support data. 
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5.0 RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS 
5.1 RELATIONSHIP TO SUPRESSION OF ENEMY COASTAL DEFENCES 
In this Joint Experimentation context, Rapid Decisive Operations refers to using highly mobile 
forces for land attack. The basic concept is that, if highly effective force can be applied 
surgically, and if there is timely, accurate information for monitoring and making rapid 
decisions, victory can be achieved with minimal damage. FBE-F dealt with naval forces clearing 
a littoral area. It was a test of naval capabilities to support access. Access is a critical part of 
naval support of the land battle. Thus, the coastal access experimentation in FBE-F is a direct 
test of a portion of Rapid Decisive operations. Also, the main purpose of access experimentation 
was to develop methods for reducing the timeline, a direct concern of Rapid Decisive 
Operations. 
There were no land forces played in FBE-F, and no strike against high priority targets other than 
that needed to suppress coastal defenses. Thus, the FBE-F results appropriate to this Joint 
Experimentation Objective are Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Mine Warfare (MIW), and 
those results which have been presented above for Time Critical Targets. The concept tested for 
ASWMIW was parallel operations, using organic assets, to rapidly gain access to the littoral 
area. 
5.2 ISSUES ADDRESSED BY FBE-F 
Issue 1. What are the information requirements available to the JFC? Question not understood 
in this context. 
Issue 2. What are the information generating assets available to the JFC? Results were 
obtained for sensors, processing of sensor information, and reference databases. 
Issue 3 .  How is the information for the JTF managed, coordinated, and distributed? 
Information management results were obtained for a centralized Joint Fires Element and an 
Effects Coordination Board. 
Issue 4. Were Critical Information Requirements (CIR) identijied for the JTF? Results were 
obtained for sensor management information, ocean environment information, and mine 
location. 
Issue 5. How quickly were CIRspassed? No information obtained. 
Issue 6 .  How were the CIRsJiltered so the CJTF only received info critical to decision making? 
No information obtained. 
Issue 7. Whatplanning, decision, and execution support tools were used by the JTFstafl No 
results were produced for decision support tools. Various systems were used by operators to 
process and disseminate information and those results are included. 
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Issue 8. What % of the CONPLAN was developed by planning tool technology? No information 
obtained 
Issue 9. How didplanning tool technology speed the execution of the plan? Speed of planning 
execution was not a factor in this experiment. 
Issue 10. What percentage of the JTF was comprised of standing forces and augmentees? No 
information obtained. 
Issue 1 1. How did the time required for assimilation of augmentees aflect the JTF’s ability to 
conduct operations? No information obtained. 
Issue 12. Beyond current doctrine, how should the JTD be organized for combat operations and 
for the best C2? The results obtained are for a centralized management configuration. The 
performance of that configuration is evaluated but no recommendations for best C2 configuration 
are made. 
Issue 13. What was the capability of the JTF? What capability was required beyond current 
doctrine? Needed capabilities for Effects Based Operations are addressed in that section. 
Issue 14. How does the JTF best conduct rapid decisive operations? (Were enemy’s coastal 
defense centers of gravity identiJedattacked?) Attacks were against coastal targets of 
immediate interest to gain access rather than centers of gravity. 
5.3 FBE-F MINE WARFARE 
In order to assist the JFMCC and MIWC in executing their mission, FBE-F attempted to 
highlight the effect of future capabilities and gain some insight into a mix makeup of organic and 
dedicated MCM forces in the 2005 timefiame. The foundation of the experiment was the tactical 
data link exchange between experimental mine countermeasures tactical systems (mainly 
through simulations), legacy mine countermeasures systems, and a command and control 
network to tie the two together. The need for a high degree of situational awareness for units 
operating in a dynamic environment makes this a necessary requirement. Through networking, 
display and management systems the following operational capabilities were evaluated: 
Tactical data link capabilities to support timely exchange of MCM tactical information 
between the on-scene tactical commanders and assigned MCM forces. 
Automated MCM planning, evaluation and execution decisions support tools and 
automated information management and reporting capabilities interfaced with host 
platform core C4ISR capabilities. 
Automated capabilities to develop, maintain and display a common MCM tactical 
picture, with the capability to integrate it with the rest of the maritime picture into the 
CJTF display. The MCM picture includes mine and mine-like contact locations, mine 
threat and danger areas, gaps in potentially mined areas, Q-routes, breakthrough and 
clearance status, and the location and status of MCM forces. 
5.3.1 MIW Ouestions of Interest 
Organizational 
0 How did the JFMCC/SCC/MIWC interface with each other and other warfare commanders 
for the tactical control of platforms with organic MCM capabilities? 
0 How did having organic MCM capabilities affect the Battle Group Commander's response in 
multiple threat situations and conflicting mission requirements? 
0 In a multi-threat situation, was the SCC, with the MCM mission assigned, able to effectively 
direct MCM forces, including organic MCM assets, clearly and with no ambiguity as to 
intent? 
0 To what extent did Warfare Commanders cooperate with the MIWC to support MIW mission 
when conflicting mission tasking requirements were present? 
Architecture 
Do automated MCM planning, evaluation, and execution decision support tools provided 
sufficient support for Distributed Collaborative Planning (DCP) for the MIWC? 
Was the MEDAL/GCCS-M connectivity suficiently robust to provide a near real-time 
Common Tactical Picture (CTP) between the MCM units and the SCC/JFMCC? 
Did the CTP provide sufficient situational awareness for the SCC to make knowledgeable 
tactical decisions based on mine threats depicted on the shared CTP? 
0 Was the MCM force'able to maintain communications connectivity? 
How well did an integrated LINWGCCS-M CTP support protection of MCM assets? 
Environmental 
0 What was the impact of having in-situ environmental data on the concurrent MIWIASW 
mission? . 
Was NAVOCEANO SIPRNET connectivity sufficient to support expeditious transfer of 
environmental and bottom topography data exchange? 
0 Was the NAVOCEANO reach-back and quick turn-around of real-time data into data base 
support products tactically useful for forward-deployed MI W/AS W units? 
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5.3.2 MIW Result 
5.3.2. I Parallel Operation Implications 
FBE-F indicates that the MCM force must be able to conduct operations in parallel within the 
JFMCC campaign to gain efficient control of the seas. 
E01-2 E03-13,14 
Unencumbered maneuver, particularly in an environment of mining in the Straits of Hormuz 
(SOH), cannot be achieved until the risk of mines is reduced. 
Early exploration operations to find out where the mines are and where they are not is valuable 
input to parallel operation decision making sequence and should effect a timeline reduction in 
some capacity. 
However, the emphasis on opening a Q-route and providing a path of communication for ships 
and merchants falls short of providing unencumbered maneuver in the waters surrounding the Q- 
route (i.e. surface ships can not conduct ASW operations from inside a Q-route). 
Therefore, an aggressive assessment of the enemy's intent with regard to mining coupled with a 
continuous ability to assess the movement of submarines and surface ships is critical to knowing 
where the mines could be or equally important, where the mines are not. 
In essence, for - m e  MCM capable forces to sufficiently effect a timeline reduction, a counter- 
mine campaign strategy (pre-penetration phase) should be a process that begins early when 
indicators warrant. 
It should be noted that this preliminary MIW penetration phase should also embody parallel 
operations. For example, submarine forces could contribute to an enhanced penetration 
capability by conducting concurrent organic MIW, ASW, and SOF missions during the pre- 
penetration phase. 
Hence, it is important for the MIWC and SCC to cultivate a relationship and share relevant 
information at the Warfighter commander level so that each maintains the appropriate situational 
awareness. 
An effective C2 process between warfare commanders similar to the structure exercised during 
FBE-F is important for information exchange and cross-pollination of the two disciplines. 
Although a common operational picture should be tailored to each commanders need, in a 
decentralized environment, it would be beneficial during parallel operations, for the SCC to 
access the MIW picture and for the MIWC to access the ASWNSW picture so that each is 
cognizant of the complete battlespace. 
5.3.2.2 Organizational Relationships 
FBE-F provided an opportunity for analysts to evaluate the organizational influences on the 
developing JMAC scenario. 
E01-2 E03-13,14 
38 
Although co-locating the MIWC with the JFMCC and Sea Component Commander (SCC) on 
the same platform is contrary to network centric operations, centralizing the decision making 
process did provide opportunities to observe the interaction at various staff levels across this 
continuum. Close interaction between these key decision-makers was important and productive 
for parallel MIW/ASW operations. 
However, without robust distributed collaborative planning tools, decentralizing the decision- 
making is a difficult task. 
In the organizational structure implemented for the experiment, the MIWC was positioned to 
identify requirements and advise the JFMCC on the critical MIW related local battle space 
issues. MIW is a time consuming warfare area, especially early in the conflict. Hence, the 
MCM force in JMAC must be able to conduct operations in parallel with the JFMCC campaign 
plan to gain control of the seas. It is important that the MIWC help focus JFMCC attention to 
the various phases of this critical operation. 
Of equal importance throughout the developing scenario was the role of the SCC, who was 
primarily focussed on situational analysis and providing the JFMCC with information required 
for AS W/US W decision making. 
The organizational structure during this experiment created a dynamic that encouraged a 
continuous interaction between the MI WC and SCC that proved to be quite beneficial. With 
both working as subordinate warfare commanders to the JFMCC, the speed of command in 
resolving support and supporting requirements was achieved. 
A common operational picture (COP) plus the effective C2 process established between the 
MIWC and SCC staffs enhanced the relationship of the two organizations. 
Also, situating both MIW and SCC staff watch-standers in close proximity enhanced the utility 
of the common situational awareness and provided an environment for dynamic information 
sharing. 
In addition, during the experiment, it was apparent that the GCCS based MEDAL and LAWS 
components utilized to display the COP have the potential of offering unique warfare 
management tools to each warfare commander yet still provide a common situational awareness 
understanding required by each during parallel operations. 
5.3.2.3 
Force protection is fundamental to mounting an MCM campaign in parallel operations with other 
enemy suppression efforts. 
MIW Force Protection in the JMAC Scenario 
E03-12,14 
The low densityhgh demand of MCM assets early in the JMAC conflict significantly raises the 
value of each MCM tool. 
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Given that unencumbered maneuver is denied to the CRUDES MCM force protection package 
due to the threat of mines, surveillance and armed response between the threat and the MCM 
asset is essential if moving vulnerable MCM forces beyond the reach of CRUDES was required 
during FBE-F. 
Data indicates that armed helicopters (i.e. Apaches) offer such an avenue of protection for 
surface assets early in the conflict and essentially permit MCM exploratory operations to be 
undertaken throughout the Q-route area with reduced risk to the maritime asset. 
Also, submarines appeared uniquely versatile and effective in supporting simultaneous ASW and 
MIW missions by reducing the requirement for defense against enemy surface and subsurface 
threats. 
Cross-service sharing of force protection assets for MCM operations is a force multiplier that 
offers maritime assets typically tasked with this force protection role an opportunity to conduct 
other parallel tasking during mine sweeping efforts. 
Additionally, a maturation of tactics for the employment of organic sensors will be required to 
optimize exploratory coverage and limit risk during this phase. After the location presence of 
mines is determined, maneuver area for force protection can be expanded and the reliance on 
armed helicopters will diminish. At that point, CRUDES assets can fully assume force 
protection as the Q-route is opened and MCM effort focuses on expanding the maneuver area. 
5.3.2.4 
FBE-F indicated that the primary requirement for MIW forces is an almost real-time 
environmental database from which tactical planning decisions can be made as well as precise 
sensor performance predictions for a specific unit. 
Environmental Implications for MIW Operations 
E03-3 E05-6,8 
The primary means of transfer and display of tactical oceanographic aids was through SIPRNET 
and MEDAL, and the products that were required include in-situ Bathymetric data, Bottom 
Characteristics Database, Surface Sediment Type database, Currents, Master Contact Database, 
Acoustic Imagery Mosaics, and Mine Warfare Pilot Information. 
Although the experiment C41 architecture could not support the reach-back network for the 
MCM unit during the FBE, the effort did provide a clearer definition of the types and size 
requirements needed for shared databases required to support MIW. It was evident that a robust 
and redundant communications network architecture is essential for reach-back capability. 
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5.3 FBE-F ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 
FBE-F was used as a building block for developing a Distributed Collaborative Planning (DCP) 
CONOPS between the MOCC, AIP P-3, and surface ships. FBE-F explored the applications of 
DCP methodology to AS W search plans in support of coordinated multi-sensor ASW operations 
against submarine threats in the littorals. The experiment examined methods of sharing a 
Common Tactical Picture (CTP) among all of the ASW forces, with the CTP including: 
a common view of acoustic predictions based on high fidelity models, 
databases, and 
in-situ environmental measurements. 
This effort was conducted in conjunction with SHAREM 13 1 and Arabian Mace. 
During the experiment, the Sea Combat Commander (SCC) in conjunction with the ASW 
module performed the following: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) Developed CTP aids 
(4) 
(5) 
Prepared plans to conduct paralleI AS W and MIW 
Developed a Network centric approach to ASW 
Conducted distributive collaborative area ASW planning 
Examined underwater engagement zone (UEZ) 
FBE-F focused on developing a search plan methodology with the goal of developing and 
maintaining a force vice platform optimized search plan using DCP tools to provide the best 
utilization of available AS W resources to achieve campaign mission objectives. Characterization 
of DCP includes: 
Force vice platform level forces 
0 Shared operational situational awareness 
0 Synergistic employment of AS W force sensors 
0 In-situ measured and reach-back access to area environmental information 
0 Balanced processing and bandwidth 
0 Dispersed organizational structure 
Exploration of CONOPS to develop and maintain a multi-sensor, coordinated AS W search plan 
using DCP to optimize area search under rapidly changing environmental and tactical conditions 
was also a primary ASW focus during the experiment. 
In addition, examining the use of advanced fusion techniques, shared high fidelity models and 
associated environmental data bases, and networked communications to increase situational 
awareness of the undersea battlespace were focal points of data collection efforts. 
5.4.1 AS W Questions of Interest 
Did the force optimized search plan developed via the Distributed Collaborative Planning 
(DCP) methodology yield a higher probability of detection (Pd) compared to the aggregated 
Pd of the independently developed platform search plans? 
Did the force optimized search plan developed via DCP methodology provide a greater 
sensor coverage for the volume of interest significantly minimizing or eliminating gaps that 
an adversary submarine could exploit? 
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Did in-situ environmental data allow the SCC to develop and maintain a more accurate 
search plan (sensor lineup), and provide a greater confidence in implementation of the same 
plan developed with historical environmental data? 
Did the evaluation of time-series in-situ environmental data yield insight that permitted the 
SCC to further optimize the force integrated search plan to increase the Pd of the adversary 
submarine? 
Did Concurrent MIW and AS W operations reduce the time that would have been required if 
sequential operations had been conducted? 
Did Concurrent MIW and ASW operations subject the mine sweep assets to any higher ASW 
threat than sequential operations? 
5.4.2 ASW Results 
5.4.2. I 
Parallel AS W and MI W operations conducted to improve mission execution timelines, proved 
feasible compared to traditional serial operations. 
Parallel ASW and MIW Operations 
E01-2 E03-4,12,13 
During FBE-F, collocation of the SCC and MIWC was important to the development of parallel 
operation plans for the JFMCC. The lack of a robust and redundant communications 
infrastructure would have significantly impacted this relationship if the Commanders were at 
geographically separate locations. 
The dynamic working relationship between the SCC and MIWC during FBE-F enhanced both 
' Commanders intimate knowledge of the operations area (environment and bathymetry), and 
intimate knowledge of adversary submarine operations/tactics. These were significant factors in 
measuring the force protection requirements during parallel operations planning. 
It is important to mention that accounting and planning for the priority of SCC and MIWC force 
protection requirements at the JTF level is critical to the success of parallel operations are to 
become feasible. Without the appropriate priority, operations will default to serial. 
Netted sensor effects that allow the SCC and MIWC a robust understanding of the battlespace at 
the beginning stages of planning is essential to force protection planning for parallel operations. 
Appropriate Joint planning Tools that allow the Commanders to understand all resources 
available to evaluate all force protection options is important. 
5.4.2.2 
The experiment objective to examine ASW collaborative sessions between the SCC, USS John 
Young, PATRON Bahrain, and an in flight AIP P-3 was not achieved to the level of robustness 
Distributed Collaborative ASW Search Planning 
E01-2 E03-7,12,13 E05-4 
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desired. Principal factors contributing to this included communications degradation, and 
experiment execution shortfalls. 
Although the experiment did not identify the methodology to yield a higher probability of 
detection (Pd) compared to the aggregated Pd of the independently developed platform search 
plans, limited collaboration between nodes still generated findings that are important to 
understanding the maturing DCP methodology concept. 
It is critical that a DCP methodology or process with appropriate TTP's fit within a disciplined 
planninghattle rhythm scheme. 
The SCC's ability to display a near real-time COP, with in-situ sensor performance data from 
each ASW node is essential. 
The ability to display a force search plan and have supporting computational data that identifies 
the advantages and disadvantages of the plan implementation is important. This allows an 
understanding that helps optimize the search plan to eliminate the potential gaps or holes that an 
adversary submarine could exploit. 
The near real-time ASW COP also becomes essential for parallel operations planning, 
particularly for force protection planning aspects. 
5.4.2.3 In-Situ Environmental Data 
The ability of collaborative ASW nodes to pass ASW sensor performance predictions based on 
in-situ environmental data to the SCC was important to the development and maintenance of a 
force level search plan. 
E03-4 
. 
In addition, the sharing of in-situ environmental data was a critical contribution to the SCC in 
maintaining a netted sensor effect situational awareness that supported parallel operations 
planning with the MIWC and JFMCC. 
Although up-to-date environmental data may not always have a significant advantage over 
historical data, small differences may be useful and should be exploited. Therefore, a Erequent 
updating of the in-situ environmental data should be an integrated part of Distributed 
Collaborative Planning (DCP) and the operations that follow. 
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6.0 COMMON RELEVANT OPERATIONAL PICTURE 
The CROP is a very complex system and obtaining definitive results experimentation is quite 
difficult. It is a mixture of systems, people, pipelines, processes, information, information 
display, etc. etc. The results reported here address a number of aspects, including the C41 
architecture. A network analysis is presented in an Appendix. 
6.1 ISSUES ADDRESSED BY FBE-F 
Issue 1. Did the CROP enable improved synchronization of Joint operations? Synchronization 
is addressed mainly with respect to protection of MIW forces and management of sensors for 
strike operations. 
Issue 2. Is the information in the CROP accurate/securedassured and available in the time 
required by the user? Recommendations on information content are scattered throughout this 
report. Security and accuracy are not addressed. 
Issue 3. Did the CROP enable rapid, highly informed decisions? The CROP experimentation 
dealt mainly with information content rather than speed. 
Issue 4. How should information be presented to the commanders in order to provide them with 
the greatest degree of battlespace awareness possible while also focusing them on those critical 
areas that require their immediate attention and action? FB E-F experimentation dealt with 
information presentation for tactical control of sensors rather than commander’s situational 
awareness. 
Issue 5. How will conjdence or the estimated degree of accuracy be represented in the CROP? 
N o  information obtained. 
Issue 6. How should information be input into the CROP in order to insure that it is valid? 
There is information on what should be in the crop but none that directly addresses validity 
Issue 7. How will the conflicting information be adjudicated? N o  information obtained. 
Issue 8. How will near-real-time information on the adversary and the environment be fused 
with baseline information fiom interactive databases and with own fiiendly force information? 
There are a number of results on fusing sensor and target information, and on the need for fusion 
of updated real-time intelligence information. 
Issue 9. Is GCCS being used to generate a common picture? Yes. 
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6.2 C41 ARCHITECTURE 
6.2.1 FBE-F Observations and Issues 
E05-All 
One definition of the Naval C4ISR Architecture is that it is the network providing the 
infrastructure on which Network-Centric Operations (NCO) are conducted. The NWDC 
Capstone Concept for NCO is taken as the defining document here. According to it, NCO has 
the objective to "enable the Navy after Next to decisively win in the littoral and on the high 
seas". NCO " derives power from the robust, rapid networking of well-informed, geographically 
dispersed warfighters to create a precise, agile style of maneuver warfare and overpowering 
tempo.. .to sustain access and decisively impact events ashore". The Naval C4ISR Architecture 
supports command and information relationships that allow NCO of the Navy and Marine Corps 
and related Joint elements. 
The FBE's are testable excursions from today's Navy, so it is not surprising that NCO can not 
fully be executed in the FBE. But FBE has shown significant steps toward NCO. Future 
implications and implementations have become clearer through the FBE process. Architectural 
issues and deficiencies have become obvious in the FBE's. The architectural deficiencies 
include: 
Doctrinal (no commandinformation relationship specified but found needed), 
Interoperability (relationship implied but not feasible), 
Connectivity /capacity /timeliness (relationship enabled partially, slowly etc) 
Semantic (relationship implemented but not understood) 
Noise level (relationship implemented but overwhelmed by competing inputs) 
Some of the architectural deficiencies in FBE-F are mentioned below. Unfortunately training 
deficiencies may mask, or falsely indicate, deficiencies of an architectural nature. Some of the 
deficiencies below may only indicate lack of training in the existing architecture or its 
experimental extensions, which only once again indicates the crucial role of training in NCO. 
6.2.1.1 C41 Deficiencies 
E05-All 
In FBE-F, although many new concepts were investigated, architectural deficiencies were found 
in areas of parallel mine and AS W warfare, integration of operations with collection 
management, targeting across weapons types, and NBC efforts. 
In FBE-F the timeline for clearance of straits was to be reduced through synchronous 
antisubmarine and mine warfare. C4ISR deficiencies were minimized by the co-location of the 
MIWC and the SCC. There are severe bandwidth capacity constraints in reaching the mine 
warfare ships, which prevent the COP from being distributed to them. The COP which, as a 
work-around was distributed via GCCS because of SIPRNET problems, was, not surprisingly, 
judged unable to support synchronous operations because of time latency and accuracy 
deficiencies. 
US Army Apache helicopters were successfully vectored to support mine warfare ships by the 
SCC. Doctrinal and IFF deficiencies should be addressed. 
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The ARCENT Deep Operations Coordination Center (DOCC) was remotely integrated into the 
fires effort and fired simulated ATACMS missions but additional doctrinal, interoperability, 
connectivity and semantic deficiencies were identified. 
Special Forces units were involved in mission planning but their full utility was encumbered by 
doctrinal and information deficiencies. 
Effects-Based Operations (EBO) in FBE-F were hindered by lack of simulated feedback that 
could have been provided by simulated ELINT and SIGINT that might have quickly indicated 
the relative success of fire missions. The role of the Effects Coordination Board and the location 
of its functions changed during the experiment, perhaps indicating a need for additional 
doctrinal development. 
The concept of an Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM), borrowed from the US Army, was explored 
to aid in EBO and in reducing the timeline for TCT. This is a promising concept but depends 
upon accurate capability to estimate target location error and system response time as well as a 
stable assessment of target priorities . Additional testing and doctrinal development is needed as 
well as Joint interoperability. TCT suffered from lack of visibility by all participants into the 
status of Blue response since a sample showed that only about half of TCT designated targets 
were attacked. 
The concept of a Joint Fires Element (JFE) was perhaps the most promising innovation in 
Foxtrot. It consisted of a sensor grid (ISR cell with feeds from national , theatre and organic 
sensors) supported by a GISRS-M terminal, an information grid (targeting cell with MIDB target 
data base) supported by a PTW+ terminal and an engagement grid (fires coordinator) supported 
by a network of LAWS terminals. In particular GISRS-M provided an important new capability 
for local collection management that makes it possible to deal with Time Critical Targets (TCT) 
much more expeditiously when combined with LAWS and the PTW+. Connectivity to the UAV 
controller was particularly important in tracking of moving TCTs. 
The AGM was useful to the GISRS-M operators but adaptation to a collection planning and 
execution aid is desired. Doctrinal changes such as the integration of the 5-2 and J-3 watches and 
improved interoperability should be explored. Balancing the number of PTW+, LAWS and 
GISRS-M terminals and improving their interoperability is required to eliminate bottlenecks 
when they are not co-located as they were in Foxtrot. 
Mobile targets require additional sensors including an organic MTI/SAR capability. Real-world 
operations limited the assignment of the intelligence staff in Foxtrot. Possibly as a result, 
responsibility for collection planning was not clear. 
Passing of target images from F-14 TAWS-CD pods to GISRS-M is a promising concept for 
finding targets that was severely handicapped by poor connectivity. RPTS for passing images to 
the cockpit is also promising but defeated in Foxtrot because of connectivity. P-3 images need to 
have a longer dwell time on the target as well as location information incorporated with the 
imagery. Image quality was sometimes degraded in passing through the chain of workstations. 
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Simulated NBC events were handled in FBE-Foxtrot. The GAO observers felt that NBC was 
well integrated into the exercise and were impressed with the Collective Protection System. 
Reachback was demonstrated. A doctrinal difference between the Services and additional 
interoperability needs work. 
In ASW, Distributed Collaborative Planning (DCP) was accomplished but it was found to be 
difficult and time-consuming and required a strong leader, preferably on an AS W platform. 
Much was accomplished by UHF voice rather than high bandwidth means. Improved hsion and 
connectivity is still needed. 
6.3 COMMON RELEVANT OPERATIONAL PICTURE RESULTS 
The participants in FBE Foxtrot strongly stated that the CROP supplied to them in Foxtrot was 
not adequate to support targeting of land attack missions. This raises three related analytical 
questions of consequence: 
E05-All 
0 Was the CROP in Foxtrot unusually poor? 
Does the CROP ever contain adequate information to support targeting? 
Should the CROP be enhanced or should other means provide targeting quality info? 
It is asserted here that although the CROP was unusually poor in Foxtrot because of restricted 
equipment availability and displaced geometry. 
The CROP is a joint situational awareness tool and may never be adequate for total support of 
targeting. Target information is applicable to small subset of the objects that are relevant to 
situational understanding and targeting has a much higher quality of information with regard to 
accuracy of location, latency etc. A special set of targeting folders and/or a targeting net is 
necessary to support targeting and is dependent on the sensor and weapon combination being 
employed. Targeting support and authorization are likely to remain the responsibility of joint 
level commands for some sensor fi weapon combinations with other combinations necessary to 
unit survival being localized and tightly integrated. 
The CROP can be of use in supporting targeting with information concerning the situation 
surrounding the target, which may be difficult to put in the target folder or on the targeting net. 
Many participants in the JFE expressed strong feelings that the CROP did not provide adequate 
information support for targeting of TCTs. Most of them seemed to be concerned with latency 
and incompleteness and inaccuracy of the picture. Others have suggested that the CROP (or at 
least the Land Attack TCT Common Tactical Picture (CTP) if it were to exist) should have 
additional information that it does not now have such as: 
1. Sensor data: sensor location, target location error, footprint and pointing data 
2. Full TADIL information and track history for each target 
3. Imagery: video from UAV with telemetry info and NITF images 
4. Related near-real time SIGINT and possibly COMINT, MASINT 
5. GMTI track (JSTARS) info and position location info (tags) concerning targets. 
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Some conceptions of a targeting-oriented CTP include the addition of information concerning the 
firing status of friendly units, some representation of the priority of the targets and even 
confirmation of authority to fire. 
Although all of the above information would be useful in a Joint Fires Element, clearly these 
requirements go far beyond the current capability of the CROP. The CROP is first of all a 
situational awareness tool. As such it must cover a broad area such as a theatre and is literally a 
picture in order to enhance comprehension. It therefore has a limited level of detail and less than 
instantaneous latency. It is a joint and often a coalition service that must be available to those 
with only Secret clearance or often even less. 
Historically at sea the CROP is closely related to the tactical air picture with all tracks of ships 
and aircraft: friendly, neutral, unknown and hostile/potentially hostile. Because of the cognitive 
objective of the CROP, it is usually screened by a human operator for clean-up of dual tracks and 
the categories listed in the previous sentence which are based on many inputs for identification. 
Often only this operator (FOTC) is allowed to add tracks, change categories, see highly classified 
inputs etc. The CROP as seen today is simply not a targeting tool. Targeting requires additional 
tools as such as target folders, sensor links and targeting nets. To ask the CROP to perform these 
functions is to overload it and restrict its dissemination. 
During FBE-F the CROP was severely limited by the real operational situation which did not 
allow direct connection to the tactical link pictures. In addition, the MIREM and SHAREM 
exercises were positioned at a distance fiom the areas of interest to Foxtrot so that a virtual 
displacement of locations was necessary for the Foxtrot scenario, which made correlation to 
actual locations difficult. As a workaround, LAWS was able to display an 
extractiodmodification of the GCCS-M picture. It is well known that the GCCS picture 
(although defined by some to be the CROP) has notoriously bad latencies and often does not 
contain all traffic: air, surface and sub-surface but only selected units of high interest. Moreover 
there was some differences between the LAWS CROP aboard the Kennedy and the one in 
Bahrain because LAWS had different servers and these were not totally synchronized. Thus the 
CROP used in Foxtrot was not even a particularly good situational awareness picture. 
However, even the best CROP will not adequately provide all the information necessary for 
targeting. Situational awareness concerns thousands of objects, some of which may be 
conjectural but important. Targeting focuses on a much smaller number of objects but in much 
more detail. As an operational level, CROP situational awareness tool simply cannot be expected 
to have the focus, latency and dissemination for targeting. Targeting requires extremely short 
latencies (at least for some targets), very accurate location and firm identification of just those 
objects that may be considered for attack. 
It has sometimes been suggested that a Common Tactical Picture (CTP) might be developed that 
is the tactical equivalent of the CROP but more inclusive of localized targeting information and 
with short latencies. For AAW this would describe some aspects of the Cooperative 
Engagement Concept (CEC), for example. However compared to the Land Attack picture, CEC 
has certain advantages of a localized geometry with small number of objects with relatively good 
identification (IFF), small number of participants on the net, precision sensors (SPY phased- 
. 
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array radars) and very high bandwidth line-of-sight communications. An equivalent CTP for 
land attack is simply not technically feasible or affordable because of the larger number of 
objects, greater distances, diverse sensors, and lack of bandwidth. It is not likely that a CROP or 
even a CTP will soon be able to provide all the information required by land attack targeting. 
The CROP or perhaps eventually a CTP can provide important background information for 
targeting. Because of its wider perspective, the COP can enable additional identification 
information (launch area of a missile for example). It can provide an understanding of the 
location and status of friendly units which might provide targeting quality information or fires or 
BDA, the potential for fratricide and collateral damage, downwind fall-out casualties etc. Before 
engagement the CROP can provide significant help in collection management prioritization and 
interpretation for IPB. It can serve as a way to pass important sectorization decisions and serve 
as one basis for collaborative planning. 
If the CROP can not practically provide a11 necessary targeting information, how can the 
information needs of targeting be met? A combination of IPB and dynamic targeting folders, 
direct sensor- weapon threads and perhaps some specific targeting nets is likely to be crafted for 
specific land attack scenarios rather than a general purpose broadcast of all targeting information. 
The reasons for this, in general, is that the targeting information is specialized by type of weapon 
and is often restricted in its releasability/dissemination both for classification and simply because 
of geographical relevance and sensitivity. Moreover, the authorization for attack of some 
potential targets and use of some of the weapons is likely to be reserved to specific levels of 
command which may desire to limit visibilip into their operations, for security and other 
considerations. 
The information to support TCT targeting and weapon assignment depends upon the 
combination of target type and weapon type that are being paired. Although having all the 
information necessary for targeting (all types of weapons might facilitate the most efficient 
pairing of weapons and targets) for TCT, it is much more important to be able to quickly make a 
feasible pairing with the information in hand than to wait for all information on which to base an 
optimal choice. 
Two target types most relevant to TCT are moving (or relocatable) versus fixed. Fixed targets 
can haye an electronic target foider prepared in advance that contains all of the required location 
and mensuration, collateral damage and other limitations concerning ROE. All that is required in 
real time is the time-critical status of the target and the location of friendly or neutral units. A 
CROP could provide this (if it could be injected with minimum latency) in addition to the target 
folder. 
For moving targets, the task is much lengthier because the interpretation, location, identification 
and mensuration must be established and the assessment of collateral damage and ROE must be 
performed after the detection of the target. This information is not possible to file ahead of time 
so an electronic target folder must be built before the target can be authorized for attack (some 
portions could be done in parallel). Moreover there may be a long period between when the first 
sensor is alerted and the actual detection of a potential target since Automatic Target Recognition 
(ATR) is still relatively ineffective. Therefore moving or relocatable targets are quite difficult to 
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target within the usual TCT thresholds of between 5 minutes and a few hours, almost regardless 
of the weapon being used. 
From the sensor standpoint, often TCT sensor provides some kind of imagery: video from a 
UAV, national SAR or EO imagery. This generally allows rapid identification and reasonably 
accurate location but may require mensuration. Other times the TCT sensor is only an IR launch 
warning or SIGINT event or HUMINT / MASINT report. It is anticipated that JSTARS like 
capabilities will provide TCT over land and that distributed ground / water sensors will also 
provide detection (and identification in some cases). Generally a fusion of this information or 
correlation with imagery is necessary before the target location and identification will reach 
acceptable completeness for attack. 
From the weapon and weapon platform standpoint, the usual response to a TCT is to vector an 
aircraft already in the area to make final identification and destroy/suppress the target with 
whatever armament is on board. This requires almost no information beyond an approximate 
location and description (some information about defensive activities in the area would also be 
desirable). On the other hand if the weapon at hand is a missile that cannot be controlled once it 
is launched (Tomahawk or ATACMS) then very precise information regarding location and 
identification must be available. Gunfire support may fall somewhere in between in information 
required. The 16 sensor-weapon threads planned for Foxtrot show in detail the information 
required for each pairing. It should be possible to identify the expected time for these 16 
evolutions for comparison against the TCT thresholds. 
Inspection of the LAWS data from Foxtrot reveals that no missions were performed within the 
specified time window and that very few missions were executed within the usual TCT 
thresholds. In addition only about half of the TCTs had missions generated. 
In the case of a moving or relocatable TCT with short thresholds, the only hope for successful 
execution is that an imaging sensor is under the control of (or in direct support of with very good 
connectivity ) the JFE fires planners (LAWS in Foxtrot). In Foxtrot a simulated UAV was 
available to the GISRS-M operators and the UAV sensor display was available locally. It was 
therefore possible to locate, with some degree of accuracy, and to identify the TCT. Because 
LAWS had sporadic information on status of friendly firers, it could begin to assess firing 
options while the target was being mensurated and a reasonably rapid firing assignment that was 
likely to be feasible could be made. 
Authorization of higher levels was not necessary in Foxtrot simulations and firers were supposed 
to report back via LAWS when performing the simulated execution. Thus the firing loop could 
conceivably be closed in a reasonably short period. In effect the Video from the UAV plus its 
controls became a targeting net supporting LAWS. 
Targeting nets for TCT, in order to provide identification and short latency, will need to have 
imagery support directly from the sensors and a close degree of sensor platform control of the 
sensor. They must also have very tight connection to fires. But for effects-based prioritization, 
re-tasking of strike platforms and deconfliction, the targeting net must include a node with broad 
understanding of the current status of the operations and with authority not only to direct fires 
but to re-task platforms that are performing lower priority missions. This must be a fairly 
powerful node with quick access to responsible command levels. It must be supported by a good 
CROP as well as the much more restricted targeting net(s) and have extensive intelligence 
support from national sources probably through a Joint Intelligence Center. In a large-scale joint 
or coalition operation this node will have to have be at the JTF level and have the commanders 
personal blessing because of the necessity of intervening in on-going missions in order to 
respond to TCT as well as high priority for intelligence collection and sensor management. 
One of the demands for responsive intelligence collection and interpretation is that for any type 
of TCT target and weapon it is important that BDA be obtained in order to decide when to stop 
firing. Because TCT are so important, re-strike will be necessary until confirmation that the 
desired effect on the target has been reached. The planning of BDA should occur with every fire 
mission pairing. Otherwise it is likely that the BDA will be delayed to provide useful 
information for restrike decisions and many weapons will be wasted. 
6.3.1 
The following are some specific recommendations with respect to CROP configuration for 
Sensor Related Common Relevant Operational Picture Issues 
E01-2 E03-2 E05-All 
sensor management by the ISR desk. 
Incorporate a means for generating and displaying 
situational awareness display. 
SR collection routes in the ISR 
Immediately pass track reports to operational nodes for "see and avoid" while TCT 
nomination is ongoing. 
The ISR desk needs to know from Operations the status of TCT nominations as a driver 
to collectiodprocessing refinement. 
The CROP could allow analysis and use of imagery by other forces prior to aircraft return 
to the carrier. 
At all stages of the targeting process, there should be available a target 
managernenthtatus function that shows priorities, target flows, and situational awareness. 
. 
Specific experiment ISR sensors should input data into the CROP via TCP/IP gateway. 
Need 1 OOmb ethernet minimum for builddistribute CROP. 
Need non-actionable targets in the CROP. 
The ISR desk needs a real-time CROP containing the following to support the TCT 
process: 
Video from UAV and P-3 
Tactical Data Link information on fliendlyhostile force locations 
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NITF imagery from tactical, theater, national sources 
TCT nominations 
Uncorrelated near real-time SIGINT information 
JSTARS (APY-6)/GMTI track information 
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7.0 FBE-F ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
E01-1,2 E03-4,7,12,13 
Organization design: Over the course of FBE’s it has been learned that by bringing decision 
makers, operators and staffs together with sufficient C2, planning tools and situational awareness 
through a COP, organizations that are adaptive may evolve. Organizational experimentation is 
therefore a large dimension of the overall experiment. Much of what is understood from FBE 
experimentation is not explicit, but the result of interactions between participants, processes and 
technology. Organization change in general includes many dimensions, and understanding 
relationships between them. 
What follows in this section are highlights from observations, interviews and analyses, arranged 
by principle experiment organization areas. The intent is to surface many different areas of 
interest. Some of the commentary is related to experimentation in general, which is of interest to 
fhture experimentation. For many of the participants it was difficult to separate experimentation 
from capabilities. In other words, much of what was critiqued by participants was related to the 
design and execution of the experiment, which was difficult to separate from larger issues of 
capabilities implied in the experiment. It is at the level of capabilities expressed or implied in 
these organization interactions that analyses hopes to understand what was most important from 
the experimentation process. 
Organization structure: Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) (COMUSNAVCENT, C5F) was 
OCE for the experiment operations. Experiment control was exercised by Maritime Battle 
Center, in conjunction with a C5F exercise, ARABIAN MACE. Directly under the CJTF were 
the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) (principally naval forces, including 
an ASWC and MIWC), a Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC) (principally U.S. 
Army ground, ATACM, MLRS and Army Aviation units) and a Joint Forces Air Component 
Commander (JFACC). 
7.1 JOINT FORCES MANTIME COMPONENT COMMANDER 
General: The Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander was aboard the CV. Of the three 
joint warfare commanders, the JFMCC held the largest responsibility and the preponderance of 
forces. Although tactical air (TACAIR) was coordinated through the JFACC, the assets were 
part of the forces reporting directly to the JFMCC. In addition, the Surface Component 
Commander (SCC), Anti-submarine Warfare Commander (ASWC) and the Mine Warfare 
Commander (MI WC) were collocated and coordinated planning directly with the JFMCC. 
Multiple roles and responsibilities that merged joint warfighting with largely naval JMAC 
operations required additional organization design to couple JFMCC to deliberate strike planning 
and production of an Integrated Task Order (ITO), effects-based targeting as part of Strike 
operations, and to TCT processes. 
Organization relationship: The role of the Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting (GAT) ashore 
was to coordinate JFMCC efforts with the JFE, represent the JFMCC at the ECB and the JTCB 
and in all other domains. A liaison officer from JFMCC was assigned. Difficulty arose from a 
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lack of direct interaction between the LNO and the modeling and simulation which were part of 
the battle space that required coordination. 
Organization relationship/authority: (GAT) set up ashore did not overcome a command and 
planning barrier which resulted from concerns by the JFE that although they were working with 
the GAT, in actuality they were speaking to the JFMCC. In other words, the GAT ashore carried 
the weight of the JFMCC. This was potentially a good situation except in the condition in which 
the GAT was not adequately linked to the JFMCC’s intentions and concerns. There is evidence 
that this was the case early in the experiment, but that the situation improved as the experiment 
and connectivity continued. 
C2/organization relationship/synchronization: Improved connectivity was noted between days 3 
and 4, producing a potential for JFMCC/JFE coordination which shifted perceived responsibility 
of the JFMCC GAT ashore directly to the JFMCC. This resulted in a very close coupling 
between JFMCC and his warfare commanders, and the planning and execution planning cycle 
being conducted ashore in the JFEBires cell. This is evidence of synchronization, and of 
organizational learning. This also highlights that the GAT role need not be institutionalized 
throughout the life of the operation, but be phased in and out of the ops as the organizations 
involved develop the competencies to engage strategic and tactical problems in a distributed 
environment. 
Organization relationship/synchronization: “We (JFMCC) think our contribution was very 
important to understanding interactions between deliberate planning and dynamic TCT 
operations. We think we had a much better understanding of how to do it, and that overall our 
planning execution synchronized the operation to actually fit very well within the JFE 
organization. We had good coordination with the JFACC and we think we delivered a much 
stronger assessment of the JFE product to the CJTF.” 
Organization change/adaptation: Organizational change about day 5 in which functions of JFE 
ashore were reversed, becoming a GAT cell afloat in which the JFMCC would become strike 
lead. 
Synchronization: Coordination effort between planning, battle rhythm, and execution enabled a 
Unity of effort at the JFMCC level. “When the JFMCC came to the table with the other 
components and the CJTF at the morning (VTC) meeting, the staff already had prepared for 
higher authority what JFMCC had planned, what the status of operations in the last 24 hours was, 
and the proposed scheme of maneuver for the next 24 to 48 hours. With improvements in the 
COP what developed was OUT own method for interacting with the staffs, watch captains and the 
infrastructure ashore. The tight decision loop could be a model for what the CJTF will expect 
out of hture battle groups in successive CPX’s and experiments.” 
Organization relationship/design: A problem was noted with regard to continuity of 
requirements and missions that would have coupled JFE and JFMCC: an LNO from JFMCC was 
not included in the JFE strategy cell. “We really didn’t have a JFMCC interface or insight into 
the kind of direction we wanted to go (which was) sort of a main effort for the JTF.” This caused 
the Strategy cell to “extrapolate” and to bridge their interpretation of commander’s intent with 
JFMCC operations. Result was a discontinuity between CJTF intent, strategic planning within 
the JFE Strategy cell and operational planning by the JFMCC. End to end chain of intent to 
targeting was therefore not possible. 
Insighflecommendation: One concept that emerged was the possibility of a “Joint Force Fires 
Commander” (JFFC) based on preponderance of forces, operationalized by a JFEECB. In FBE 
F scenario this would have been the JFMCC, supporting the CJTF and supported by the JFACC. 
This was tried in the last two days of the experiment and worked well. In this case the GAT 
would be collocated with the JFMCC and strike planning would continue either ashore or afloat 
as the situation dictated. This is especially important at the beginning of the campaign, in which 
there are large numbers of TTLMTLAM followed by ERGMLASM and TACAIR. If this is 
phase 1, then continuing with a second phase may include redistributing responsibility for GAT 
and ECB along with a JFE, all still working for a JFFC. In a third phase, which is synchronized 
with the parallel operations necessary to the conflict, JFFC may become the JFACC, with 
JFMCC supporting and the associated JFEECB becoming part of this staff. In the littorals (and 
JMAC type missions), this is the likely case scenario. Handoff between JFMCC/JFE and JFACC 
is analogous to the CATF to CLF handoff in an amphibious operation. JFACC is an established 
Joint doctrine, and this notion fits within that notion, but also establishes a Navy role for a JFE- 
like function when first on scene as part of a land or littoral campaign. 
7.2 JOINT FORCES AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER 
As a result, the experiment JFACC was stood up with the minimum personnel and capability 
necessary to keep the experiment moving. Additional requirements for integration of JFACC 
functionality into the effects-targeting process added another dimension to JFACC organization 
capability. JFACC processing capability was necessary to developing the Master Air Attack 
Plan (MAAP), and integrating the Master Surface Fires Plan and Master Land Attack Plan, 
which were constructed by the other components and integrated by the JFACC. This validated a 
JFACC-like capability, necessary to building coordinated and synchronized fires plans for targets 
assigned in the IT0 by components and warfare commanders. In a Navy littoral scenario in 
which the Navy is responsible for access, this capability will be necessary. As demonstrated in 
FBE F however, the capability can be met by a much smaller organization than the fully manned 
JFACC. As access is accomplished and greater number of joint forces arrive in theater to 
support infiastructure building, the role of the JFMCC-centric JFACC capability would move 
easily to the fully functioning JFACC. 
Organization desigddoctrine: Another consequence of the scaled-back JFACC is that a GAT 
(Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting cell) for JFACC was found to be useful. A similar 
organizational capability is also necessary for Naval Surface Fires mission processing. During 
the final two days of the experiment a GAT-like capability, which included some JFE function 
was set at the JFMCC. This essentially provided JFMCC authority to employ direct support 
aircraft in his AOR for prosecution of tactical operational time critical targets. 
Organization relations: Commentary made (reiterated many times) that the relationships between 
JFACC, GAT and ECB were blurred. Participants did not understand the difference between 
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these organizations, and most felt that what they were doing was equivalent to the same activities 
they had previously done in other organizations that simply were called different names. 
Organization design: Several participants in FBE Foxtrot noted the need for a "Guidance, 
Apportionment and Targeting (GAT)' Cell to support the use of Naval Fires by the Joint Fires 
Element (JFE). It is believed that the functions performed by such a cell would allow the JFE to 
complete the detailed assignment of targets to naval fires in a shorter time and more confidence in 
their integration with other fires for joint effectiveness. 
Historically a GAT cell is a shortcut means of providing / interpreting the joint commanders 
intentions, apportioning resources to efforts and generating a target list. Doctrinally these are 
each lengthy processes that are performed according to joint doctrine through a Joint target 
Coordination Board and the AT0 generation process. There is no GAT cell in joint doctrine but 
one did perform very important planning and monitoring functions in the Gulf War. 
Naturally the same guidance, apportionment and target development processes that are 
appropriate for predominately aviation- delivered munitions (which have traditionally included 
both Naval aviation sorties and Tomahawk strikes) may be appropriate for Naval fires of other 
types such as ERGM, LASM etc. During Foxtrot the JFACC cell performed some of these 
functions for aviation sorties and generated an ATO. They may have been referred to by some as 
the GAT cell at times. The term may also have been applied to the JFE itself by some 
participants, particularly when the JFE was moved in part to the USS Kennedy, but others 
remained in Bahrain. There was no GAT cell formally. 
These circumstances alone could explain the perceived "need for a GAT", but is likely that in 
addition it is also due to the focus of Foxtrot on pursuit of Time Critical Targets (TCTs) by 
Naval forces, primarily non-aviation. Therefore, there is currently no doctrinal methos for 
dealing with TCTs. Since, in examples as the Gulf War, TCTs were dealt with primarily by the 
assignment of SCUD CAP aircraft that would loiter in an area waiting for targets to appear, the 
activity was largely handled on an exception basis by the JFACC. Because Foxtrot focused on 
the non-aviation resources to respond to TCTs, it is not surprising that there was a perception of 
the need for a cell (or set of processes) that would ensure that the JFEs actions to pursue TCTs 
are in accordance with the commander's guidance, do not conflict with other uses of the Naval 
resources, and strike an appropriate, not simply a feasible, set of targets, i.e. the GAT processes. 
For example, it would be desirable to have an authority to approve the assignments by the 
LAWS operators of weapons to targets (or at least someone at a higher level to discuss the issues 
that might be involved in a timely manner). A GAT cell, if it existed and had doctrinally defined 
functions and authority, could provide such support. The guidance, apportionment and targeting 
processes have traditionally focused on pre-planned operations and the ATO. When TCTs 
become important and the AT0 is impacted, there is no current approved doctrine for how this is 
to be handled. In fact the Joint doctrine status board reports that the development of Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for Time Sensitive Targets is being separated from the draft 
publication JP 3-60 Doctrine for Joint Targeting as JP 3-60.1 JTTP for TST. 
Therefore there is no doctrinal method for dealing with TCTs currently. Since in the past, such 
as the Gulf War, TCTs were dealt with primarily by the assignment of SCUD CAP aircraft that 
would loiter in an area waiting for targets to appear, the activity was largely handled on an 
exception basis by the JFACC. Because Foxtrot focused on the non-aviation resources to 
respond to TCTs, it is not surprising that there was a perception of the need for a cell (or set of 
processes) that would insure that the JFEs actions to pursue TCTs are in accordance with the 
commanders guidance, do not conflict with other uses of the Naval resources, and strike an 
appropriate, not simply a feasible set of targets, i.e. the GAT processes. It would be desirable to 
have an authority to approve LAWS operators assignments of weapons to targets (or at least 
someone to discuss the issues that might be involved at a higher level in a timely manner). A 
GAT cell with doctrinally defined functions and authority could provide such support. 
Lacking a doctrinal GAT, what coordination point would be appropriate for the JFE? For a JFE 
primarily concerned with TCTs, it would make sense for it to coordinate with the JFACC TCT 
cell if it is in existence. This would de-conflict duplication of attacks. If a JFACC has not been 
established or is internal to the JFMCC, coordination of the JFE becomes trivial unless extensive 
USMC, US Army or Special forces are involved and or exposed to the fires pursuing the TCTs. 
Lacking a JFACC and with extensive participation of the other Services, it might be advisable 
for the JFMCC to establish a cell for allocating Service efforts and coordinating / authorizing 
attacks on specific TCTs. It might be confusing to call this a GAT, but it could be so named. 
7.3 JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER 
The Joint Forces Land Component Commander included primarily U.S. Army forces stationed in 
the immediate AOR, which would be available in the 2003 time frame of the experiment. 
JFLCC was set in Kuwait, and used the Army’s Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) as 
the primary means for integrating and coordinating operations, synchronizing with other joint 
warfare commanders and the CJTF. 
“What we were trying to do is integrate Army capabilities into the digital fires network that we 
set up among ships, from headquarters here, and try to prosecute missions using Army land- 
based assets in a mostly Naval environment.” 
Organization structure/joint: The DOCC is doctrinally rigid, and operates on a prescribed set of 
inputs to their processes, and produces a set of specified products. Language is very important to 
the operators and planners in these processes, and there were ambiguities in the language used to 
plan and coordinate between other warfare commanders and the DOCC. One observer noted the 
distinction between USN “nightly intentions” intentions type of direction, contrasted to the 
expectation for more direct and dynamic Commander’s Intent. The result was some ambiguity 
about the CJTF’s intentions at the DOCC level. 
Organizatiodfeedback: Feedback from Army missions was difficult to inject back into 
JFEIJFACC planning. An example of this was the attack guidance matrix. “The attack guidance 
as a device was there, but there were problems: One, constructing it, and two, it was difficult to 
use because the process to disseminate information was not mature. Elements within the AGM 
were fed back piecemeal through their LNO (liaison officer) so that the strike cell could go ahead 
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and do what they needed to do.” (this comment is specific to production of an attack guidance 
matrix to be used in prosecuting land-based targets). 
Organizatio1dC2: One intention of the organization structure in this experiment was to “flatten” 
C2 and roles. There was some impact of this structure, as evidenced in the comment; “we 
(JFLCC) did some things you normally don’t see. Most of it was in simulation. But, normally 
you don’t see elements within the JFMCC reaching through and coordinating fires with the 
Army guys. The network allowed them (commanders) to flatten the command structure. Of 
course, we weren’t firing missions without the approval of the JFE, especially time-critical 
missions. But, we were using a very flat command and control system to effect coordination 
between elements. In that, it worked quite well.” 
Another indication of this was the coordination of Army Apache helicopters in a MIW defense 
role. 
7.4 EFFECTS COORDINATION BOARD 
This section describes effects Coordination Board (ECB) relationship to the experiment, 
considers future weapons systems within a maritime battle management context, how to use the 
ECB in the conduct of Effects Based Warfare, and how to stand up a JFE and ECB as part of a 
Navy-centric CJTF. 
The following is a collection of individual observations/opinions. No attempt has been made to 
correlate them with other facts to test their validity. 
ECB is really a GAT: “I’ve been on every ECB for’the last three years in the real world. It is 
called the Strategic GAT cell at JFACC, and that’s exactly what we do.” According to this 
officer the mission of the GAT was subsumed within the ECB, but when the long range weapons 
such as TLAM and TTLAM, LASM and ERGM were also employed, then the role of ECB as 
GAT became more apparent even though it may not have been called by this name. Interesting 
to note that the TLAM was characterized as a precision Air-to Ground weapon under this 
definition. 
Guidance was a problem in Desert Fox, and is reiterated as a problem in the experiment. Effects 
based targeting is highly coupled to understanding evolving commander’s intent. 
IntelligenceFeedback: Although still a problem, commander’s intent was somewhat better than 
Desert Fox. Another area of concern in the experiment was a lack of realistic intelligence that 
would normally be a part of the decision making process for prioritizing targets. This is an 
understood artificiality in the experiment (expected), however, this also points out the association 
between GATECB and intelligence providers. This coupling is another kind of feedback. 
LASM/ERGM/TTLAM relationship: “We have a lot of Tomahawk Knowledge here. Also, to 
use the other weapons you have to get closer.” Reason for the high early usage of 
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TLMTTLAM. “They (planners and targeteers) don’t have a lot of true knowledge of what 
LASM and ERGM can do.” 
Parallel OPS in Strike: Point about paralleling strike ops means that some sequential events also 
have to take place. For example, use of 300 TTLAM the first few hours of the attack to suppress 
enemy SAM sites and associated C3, followed by the B-2’s, B-l’s, B-Xl’s, F-18’s, F-15’s etc. 
that are in parallel at that point with the ERGM and LASM which can now get in close enough to 
be used. According to these respondents, there was very little of this thinking occurring in the 
Strike process. 
Parallel OPS and tools/ feedbacMSA: “We (ECB) had no idea where anybody was, or how they 
were operating or what they were doing, unless we walked into the JOC and took a picture.” 
This comment is also about the need for feedback with regard to the tactical picture and effects. 
Judgment by this observer was that SA was low in the ECB. Characterized as “nonexistent” by 
another observer. Only potential for SA was via two laptops that were part of SIPRNET LAN. 
Other than electronic connectivity, SA was obtained directly through the morning brief.. 
BDA Feedback: Lack of BDA to ECB made it difficult for the ECB to understand contributions 
of planning to effects. 
Organizational relations: (Reiterated many times) The relationships between JFACC, GAT and 
ECB were blurred. Participants did not understand the difference between these organizations, 
and most felt that what they were doing was equivalent to the same activities they had previously 
done in other organizations that simply were called different names. 
Organizational ambiguity : Question around who does the function of “current operations.” 
Usually a “current operations” planning cell, however this function may be required to reside 
inside of ECB or other JFE structure. “It was schizophrenia that we had to deal with, asking 
continually ‘is that Current Ops or is that us?’ Because Current Ops does, indeed, need to 
involve themselves in the effects phase.” 
Relationship to definition of Effects: Information to the ECB came from the Strategic Plans 
organization. Example might be “hit mobile TELS because we want to neutralize a chemical 
weapons threat.” Planners in the ECB had difficulty making a distinction between this mission as 
an “effect” and as an “objective.” The distinction was important to the ECB because if the 
“effect” was to limit the chemical weapons threat, then the ECB’s role may have actually been 
better served by having them plan missions to maximize the effect, e.g., destruction of chemical 
weapons storage facilities. The requirement for an effect would have to be understood within the 
context of commander’s intent, which would support this mission unless the CJTF’s intent was 
to limit the scope of the conflict by not being overly aggressive. In this case there is a 
relationship between limiting effects and accepting additional risk, i.e., intercepting TEL’s or 
other potential WMD carrying weapon system. 
- BDA: “Did we achieve the effects we desired? We don’t know. All we did was fix some more 
targets and keep going.” 
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Organizational: ECB was essentially “a modified GAT.” (49) attitude of participants was that 
the responsibility for targeting should not be maintained in the ECB, but reside in the J-2 staff 
organization. 
Organization coordination: Coordination of target sets occurred between the ECB and J-3 “to 
ensure that our target set matched the CINC’s intentions.” Argument here is that this function 
remain with the 5-2 because intelligence manages and coordinates ISR functions, which can 
include targeting impacts such as human shields etc. (50) 
Experiment objectives were ambiguous: “There’s always room for improvement in doing it 
(targeting), but essentially what they tried to stand up here is not anything new or different.” 
(perspective of USAF officer trained as part of JFACC staff). Problem was also related to the 
design of the experiment in that other structures were necessary to test the organizational design 
intended. An example of this would have been the results of intel analysis collection 
management dissemination or target folder development made available to decision making 
processes in the experiment organizations like the JFE or ECB. What was provided were targets 
as place holders (usually from the simulation), however there was no real intel supporting these 
target sets, while many RFIs were initiated to produce the information that should have been 
included. 
Realistically, it would have been very difficult to recreate JIC functions for the experiment 
without actually having a JIC to do this. The outcome for all of this was an apparent mismatch 
of organizations and data which would normally have had a ieal part within a data-flow system 
to support the integration of functions represented in the JFE/ECB/JTCB and so forth. This is an 
important consideration in the development of experiment design. That is, the amount and kind 
of dak that supports the process functions that are being experimented with needs to be planned 
for, even if canned. 
CINC intentions: There may be a distinction between JTF intentions and CINC intentions, 
depending on the theater. In CENTCOM it will usually be the CINC who will establish 
intentions, although this is not the way the experiment was conducted. There may need to be a 
process of adjudicating CINC and CJTF intentions. 
Effects Based Operations: The Effects problem in the experiment was associated with a similar 
problem in GLOBAL 99 wargame. Difficulty was experienced with constructing an operational 
definition which could be synchronized with an organizational design. “The P G  would hand me 
something and say ‘here is an effect,’ to which I said, ‘this in not an effect. This is a task or 
something.’ I think we need to come up with a common definition of what an effect is and put 
that out to everyone so we can march in the same direction.” 
Negotiations of meanings took a lot of effort in the course of the experiment, and some meanings 
were never completely constructed to an operational level. Negotiated meanings was important 
to the experiment, and was at the root of an organizational event at day 3 in the experiment in 
which the experiment was put on hold. What most people thought of as training, or “bringing 
participants up to speed,” was really a mechanism of creating common understanding around the 
meanings of concepts and processes unique to the experiment and which were meant to set the 
experiment apart from “the normal way of doing things.” Getting at what was unique for the 
experiment was important to the participants and experiment planners, including the notion that 
all participants be part of the common experiment experience, or “claim to be a part of the same 
experiment,” and share a common understanding of experiment terms as well as a common 
understanding of processes within experiment areas (e.g., JFE). 
7.5 JOINT FIRES ELEMENT 
The following is a collection of individual observations/opinions. No attempt has been made to 
correlate them with other facts to test their validity. 
JFE organization relations: Relationship of the JFE to coordination of joint assets: First 2 days 
of the experiment the POV from JFMCC was that their function was one of response and 
observation. After the second day this perception shifted to one of a proactive planning role to 
develop parallel operations with MIW, AS W, Fires and Strike. Success in this role created a 
tendency for the JFMCC to seek a wider dynamic role using afloat assets. 
Communications: Improved connectivity was noted between days 3 and 4, producing a potential 
for JFMCC/JFE coordination which shifted perceived responsibility of the JFMCC GAT ashore 
directly to the JFMCC itself. This resulted in a very close coupling between JFMCC and his 
warfare commanders, and the planning and execution planning cycle being conducted ashore in 
the JFEBires cell. This is evidence of synchronization, and of organizational learning. This also 
highlights that the GAT role need not be institutionalized throughout the life of the operation, but 
be phased in and out of the ops as the organizations involved develop the competencies to 
engage strategic and tactical problems in a distributed environment. 
Organization change: There was an organizational change about day 5.  The functions of JFE 
ashore could be reversed; to become a GAT cell afloat in which the JFMCC would become strike 
lead. 
System relationships/ dialogue competence/ commander’s intent/ feedback system/ formal 
relations v. informal practice, Ops officer CCDG-5/ JFE Strategy Cell Chief. Description of 
process: Joint Planning Group provide “guidance” to JFE Strategy. JFE Strategy processed 
(using “numbers”) guidance into set of tasks, including a list of “6 priorities” as part of this 
process. Further processing by JFE Strategy to turn tasks into target sets. Also possible to 
construct target sets that would need to be developed into tasks. Processes and products aligned 
“to meet CJTF intent.” List of targets, vetted against priorities would then be passed to the 
Effects Coordination Board. System feedback in the form of dialogue between Strategy Cell 
Chief and the ECB Cell Chief, with little to no direct coordination with the JF’G. There was a 
formal relationship to the JPG, and Strategy Cell was represented at formal meetings, however a 
dialogue was not engaged. 
Problem noted with regard to continuity of requirements and missions that would have coupled 
JFE and JFMCC: an LNO from JFMCC was not included in the JFE strategy cell. “We really 
didn’t have a JFMCC interface or insight into the kind of direction we wanted to go (which was) 
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sort of a main effort for the JTF.” In the words of the Strategy Cell lead, this caused the Strategy 
cell to “extrapolate” and to bridge their interpretation of commander’s intent with JFMCC 
operations. Result was a discontinuity between CJTF intent, strategic planning within the JFE 
Strategy cell and operational planning by the JFMCC. End to end chain of intent to targeting 
was therefore not possible. 
Dynamic Commander’s intent had very little impact on JFE Strategy processes. “The original 
guidance we received was pretty much the same guidance we stayed with throughout.” 
Organizational relationships: “I think probably the weakest link (in the system) was between us 
and the JPG. In retrospect we needed one of their guys with us and vice versa.” Perceptions of 
the JFE Strategy cell’s job description changed as the experiment progressed. “I think we 
became more of a future ops cell instead of a strategy cell. I think the JPG should be looked at as 
the place where hture ops are developed in line with strategy.” In other words, lack of feedback 
and clear roles contributed to a sense of ambiguity about the system role for the JFE Strategy 
cell. This could be rectified by trading LNO’s between JFE and JPG, and by developing a 
competent dialogue around the system requirements of both organization components. 
Role perceptions: Other members of the JFE Strategy cell (US Army) did not understand 
differences between JFE and Army’s Deep Operations Control Center (?) (DOCC). This 
furthered sense of role ambiguity and has implications for employment of JFE as part of ajoint 
operation, synchronization at the level of JFE and Army doctrine, for instance. 
Impact of the technology: Technologies did not have a big impact on the way that Strategy 
performed its perceived role. Only difference in this person’s view, from what the normal 
process would be and the one used in the experiment was that instead of the results of processes 
going to the JFCC (Joint Fires Center), they went to the Effects Coordination Board. 
Organization problem: The JFE Strategy cell was developing Fires missions based on a “Fires 
CONOPS” which are not “doctrine.” Planning for Fires missions was separated from the 
information that was being generated about the fires missions that would normally have been 
required to do the missions. “The JPG was planning one thing and then the JFE Strategy cell 
was over here. (also) “we were handed some guidance, some bullets (from the JPG?), but we 
didn’t know what the underlying intentions were.” . 
TTP Requirement: Although the experiment was stopped for an afternoon in order to conduct 
group training of participants, the training provided an overview of what the objectives were, but 
did not explain what was being done to attain those objectives. 
System feedback: Strategy is essentially a futures exercise. Projections are made about the status 
of the operation in the future and some predictive model is used to make a forecast, which can 
then be used to modifL strategy. These tools were not available in the experiment, so from this 
interviewee’s perspective, strategy could not be effectively “played.” In other words, feedback 
was not available for Strategy to conduct modifications. In addition, decision making was 
similarly described in the ECB as “swag-ing it.” 
Organizational relationships: Only way for the Strategy cell to make information based 
assessments was to bring in the (C5F?) Intel officer, and “he would tell us in his opinion what he 
thinks our effects would have been on them based on how they typically employed themselves 
and defend themselves.” “If we had a different guy we would have gotten a different opinion.” 
Lack of feedback was observed to impact the information processes in the JFE. The AT0 cycle 
did not run for sufficient time so that there could be feedback from the previous iteration. 
Organizational coupling through LNO’s: The recommendation here is that to be effective the 
ECB, JFE and JTCB all need to trade senior level LNO’s. A problem with this however is that 
the concept that all of the LNOs will sit around a table and apportion their resources to each 
other is “apportionment by altruism.” However, as this officer pointed out, “they (his 
commander) don’t send me to give things away, they send me to get things.” 
Air space control authority and weapon-target pairing need to be coupled. In the experiment this 
coordination was done at the JFACC-component level with the JFE because they were all 
collocated. If the JFE is not collocated with the JFACC, after the effects-based order goes to the 
components to construct their master plans, and consolidation occurs in the ITO, then this 
assumed coordination with JFE needs to be formalized in a feedback process between them. 
This feedback will be necessary for synchronization. 
Early in the experiment (first few days) there was poor connectivity and situational awareness of 
what was happening with the JFE ashore from the point of view of JFMCC and personnel 
embarked on the carrier. 
JFE organization relationships/ feedback: Strategy cell was more responsive to CJTF intentions 
than JPG direction. CJTF intentions were more direct, with little change, and because of the lack 
of clear direction with the JPG, it was natural for the Strategy cell to fall back on the most 
consistent and useful direction, effectively cutting out the JPG from the tacit system 
relationships. This is a discontinuity in the JFE system. “We knew the direction the commander 
wanted to go in, so that’s what we based our assumptions on.” “Combat assessment and those 
kinds of things didn’t play in this at all, either.” In other words, without BDA as feedback, or 
without JPG guidance, the only way for JFE Strategy to conduct its role was to use static CJTF 
guidance. From the Strategy cell point of view, therefore, the only part of the experiment that 
was experimental was the employment of a variety of weapons types that would not ordinarily be 
part of their decision making process. 
7.6 ASWC AND MIWC COLOCATION WITH JFMCC 
The MIWC and the ASWC were co-located with the JFMCC on board the carrier. Interview 
data and analysis of parallel operations conducted between the MIW and ASW forces engaged in 
the problem of clearing the straits and providing access indicate that there was higher than usual 
(as defined by participants) synergy, coordination, cooperation and effectiveness of maritime and 
joint forces that might be at least partly credited to enhanced collaboration. 
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“Collaboration is a meta-capability that lies at the heart of new forms of competitive advantage 
in industries experiencing the disintegration of traditional industry boundaries and simultaneous 
demands to act in both centralized and decentralized ways.” (Liedtka, Academy of Management 
Executive, 1996 Vol 10 no. 2) Although this quote comes from the business environment, the 
case can certainly be made that the role of information and requirements to push “operational 
and tactical” decision making to lower levels is relevant there as it is in the military. In a 
network-centric environment the potential for collaborative interaction increases, and the notion 
of adaptive centralized and decentralized activities which co-evolve within a battle space 
problem is self-evident. 
“The art of building and sustaining collaborative relationships is a fundamental prerequisite for 
competitive success.. .” (ibid.) This is especially true in the dynamic battlespace environment. 
Success at achieving collaboration is not guaranteed by technology. In FBE Echo the ASW 
Distributed Collaborative Planning (DCP) tools employed were sophisticated and capable. 
Connectivity between nodes was good. Data from this experiment revealed that the difficulties 
experienced in conduct of the ASW planning problem were related to organizational issues and 
protocols about the use of DCP tools. For example, use of DCP tools in a hierarchical 
environment tends to flatten hierarchical roles which can lead to ambiguity with regard to chain 
of command and OPCON in general. Although this is an intended result of network-centric 
capabilities, without organization-wide understanding of a role for collaboration, dynamic- 
collaboration may not be achieved. This was the case in FBE Echo. 
Close coordination between the MIWC and the ASWC (and their coordination with the SCC and 
JFMCC) was successful in FBE Foxtrot. Two warfare commanders meeting together and 
experiencing the same information at the same time in a communal environment allowed them to 
engage in collaborative roles which are understood in face to face communications. These 
communications are sets of routines and protocols in which the two warfare commanders have a 
great deal of competence. While it certainly could have been otherwise, collaboration between 
MIW and ASW, towards a common goal, and with overlapping resources was highly successful 
and produced a decrease in the mine-clearance timeline. 
. 
. This does not point to a requirement for co-location, as much as it indicates a need for further 
understanding of collaboration and tools for collaboration. From the point of view of the MIWC, 
“(In spite of) the best connectivity in the world, when you can’t go face-to-face, you miss a lot. 
Whereas, when you are co-located you are “connected” simply because you are there. An issue 
that may be reasonably trivial standing alone tends to be resolved before it becomes a bigger 
issue.” Users of DCP technology often assume that the technology itself is a mimic of human 
interaction and includes the complexities of human collaboration. Evidence however, indicates 
that besides the technical capability, connectivity and necessity to engage in problem solving, 
there is a specific competence to collaborative practice not necessarily emergent in current 
doctrine, technology or practice. 
This collaborative or “dialogic” competence is evident in successful face to face collaboration, 
but just as it is possible for participants in collaborative practice to have low dialogic or 
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collaborative competence in face to face interaction, it is certainly likewise possible to 
demonstrate this in a network centric environment. 
In short, what has been demonstrated to date in past FBEs and reinforced in FBE Foxtrot is that 
collaborative roles are increasingzy important in a network-centric and distributed environment. 
Technologies to engage in collaborative practice exist and are improving. These need to include 
a capability for users to tailor information to their specific needs, while also having access to a 
shared picture that may include multiple domains. Hence, a common data structure that may be 
tailored at each node is called for. Besides the technologies which provide apotential for 
collaboration, greater understanding of the elements to competency in collaborative practice is 
necessary. 
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8.0 EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS IMPLICATIONS 
E01-1,2 E03-2,3,4 
Fleet Battle Experiment Foxtrot included an Effects Coordination Board (ECB) as part of the 
Joint Fires Element (JFE). In general, the purpose of this organization was to provide a means 
by which Commander’s Intent for attaining force objectives could be included in the 
development of an Integrated Tasking Order (ITO), and in prosecution of time-critical-targets 
(TCT). Executing the JFE concept highlighted some difficulties with regard to notions of 
“effects” in general, which should be explored further. 
8.1 HIGHLIGHTS FROM FBE-F 
1) Definition of Target Guidance Matrix was not linked to dynamics of the battle problem. In 
other words, effects at the weapon-target pairing level were not necessarily reflective of an 
“effects” vetting process. 
2) Effects coordination was very difficult without adequate and timely feedback from previous 
tactical events. 
3) Integrating consequences of effects into a larger operational and strategic view of shaping the 
battle-space was not understood at nearly all levels of the JFE and associated organizations. 
4) JFE did however provide organizational structures that were a “first cut” at deepening an 
understanding of the means by which “effects-based” processes might be employed. 
The statements above are not offered as evidence that effects-based planning failed in FBE 
Foxtrot. In fact there were successes. The point here is that the experiment highlighted some 
wider deficiencies in the notion of “effects” as a basis for organizing forces and advancing a 
campaign. 
8.2 CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES 
First, there is a semantic difficulty. This arises from what becomes a circularity of distinctions in 
defining the class of “effect” apart from that of “objective.” The distinction is an important one, 
but is also one made more difficult by including different perspective levels. In other words, 
what might be called an “objective” at one operational level (e.g., the CJTF) may also become an 
“effect” within a more strategic view. One person’s effect therefore can be another’s objective. 
The semantic difficulty arises fiom another problem-lack of a commonly understood means to 
make the distinction fiom a non-contradictory definition of “effect.” 
A second difficulty arises from the impact of coordinating differences in first, second, third and 
limited to describing first-order effects, but also secondary, tertiary and so forth. Coordination of 
I so forth, levels of effect. Similar to “branches and sequels,” planning based on effects cannot be 
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potential relations between these different levels of effect may include notions of complexity far 
beyond current doctrine and organization structures. 
A third -conceptual notion that is not yet integrated into Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is that 
of its control functionality. A principle of control theory is that a “regulator” or system of 
regulators must have the same or greater degrees of control as the system being regulated. 
One must think of EBO as a control system, where fundamental principles show us that, for 
proper control, you must have the correct time constants and degrees of freedodcontrol. For 
EBO this means that you need to design the system so that sensing, information, decisions, and 
the expected reactions you will be monitoring are all matched in time, space, and 
organizationally. In addition, you have to build in the required feedback loops (and the TTPs to 
go with them) so that the system can actually be responsive, producing what some people like to 
refer to as a self-synchronizing organization. If the response time for a portion of the 
organization is out of sync with the rest, or with what is required, or if required 
feedbackhesponse is missing, EBO cannot be effective. It takes a significant amount of thought, 
effort, and testing to produce a dynamic organization of the type needed. 
8.3 IMPLICATIONS 
1) FBE Foxtrot explored processes related to the tactical level of “effects-based targeting.” An 
organization was defined to operationalize this concept. Effects at an operational and 
strategic level will likewise require congruent organization (synchronicity of actions). 
2) Sensor management of battle-space and national assets in FBE Foxtrot did not include 
adequate real-time BDA, essential to associating effects between tactical and operational 
levels. Inclusion of this system element will require additional asset management control by 
the JFE, and likely increase the number of sensors and associated C4I. 
3) A Coordinated and shared Situational Awareness (or Common Operational Picture) must be 
integrated into effects-based processes. 
4) The battle-space must be understood as a complex and dynamic system. In order to 
implement EBO it will be necessary for “planning” to identify expecteddesired primary and 
secondary effects. We cannot at this time reliably identifl tertiary and higher order effects. 
Both levels of effects should be presented and promulgated in a document such as the IT0 as 
guidance for an effects control board. Such planning guidance should also include directed 
flexibility, such as “if this effect is accomplished then that change in operations is implied,” 
which is really a sophisticated prioritization scheme that is effects based (note that the 
decision to think of producing such planning guidance gets us beyond the semantic 
discussion of what we mean by the effects; it will be defined as needed for a specific 
operation). 
8.4 THE ROAD AHEAD 
The - first requirement for moving forward in this concept is to devise a coherent and logically 
consistent set of system elements that together define “effects” within context of tactical, 
operational and strategic operations. 
A second requirement is to define organizational and doctrinal implications. 
The - third requirement is to include the two requirements above in planning future war-games and 
FBEs. 
A fourth requirement exists; to determine what tools are necessary that will allow notions of 
“effects” to be implemented in the dynamic battle-space. 
When EBO is discussed it is most often in the context of Blue goals and operations We have 
made the point above that one has to be clear about the level of the effects, strategic, operational, 
tactical, or some combination. It is important to recognize that a parallel consideration has to 
take place concerning Red intent; what are their strategic, operational, and tactical goals. 
Attention also needs to be paid to matching Blue and Red levels of intenueffects. 
Consider the following example. If Red intent is to achieve the strategic effect of disrupting the 
support of our coalition partners, a near term operational goal could be to deny Straits access for 
14 days. They could reason, probably correctly, that a disruption of that length of time would 
put tremendous pressure on the coalition. Our operational goal could be to clear the Strait in 10 
days and one or more effects could be associated with it. But, what is our strategic goal in 
countering the Red strategic goal? Clearly, it is to preserve the coalition and to preserve our 
influence in the area. One of the effects associated with this is certainly to restore the flow of oil. 
There are others. The point is, that if one is to properly consider actiodcounter action, goals and 
effects considered have to be at the same level if one is to properly assess capabilities and 
consequences. 
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APPENDICES 
A. FBE-F EXPERIMENT DESCRIPTION 
FBE-F was conducted 30 Nov through 8 December 1999 in the COMFIFTHFLT (C5F) Area of 
Responsibility (AOR). As an overarching principal, the focus of this experiment was to gain 
insights that will lead to improved future combat readiness and interoperability of U.S. forces 
through application of future concepts, doctrine, and technologies to an existing USCINCENT 
CONPLAN. Specifically, FBE-F focused on defining future warfighting capabilities required to 
conduct SLOC/ASLOC access mission requirements within the expected future context of this 
AOR. Future requirements include domains of C2, technological, doctrine/TTP and 
organizational relationships. FBE-F extended maritime dominance to a littoral environment. 
Conceptually the hypothesis is that new warfighting concepts (doctrine, TTP and organizational) 
supported by technology advances, permit the Navy to enter and remain in the littorals 
indefinitely. This is accomplished by combining maritime forces with Joint Forces to provide 
intelligence, fires, Command and Control, logistics support, and protection of forces afloat and 
ashore. Technology multipliers in FBE-F explored maritime dominance enabled by an improved 
common operational picture (COP). Improvements to the COP included improved access and 
processing of target information in support of responses to Time Critical Targets (TCTs), 
enhanced situational awareness (SA) of the undersea waterspace of interest to MIW and ASW 
forces and SA of force protection against air, coastal missile, artillery and asymmetric attacks. 
Insight was also gained by redefining boundaries of operational warfare commanders and their 
co-location with the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) and Surface 
Component Commander (SCC) onboard a flagship. 
The operational “engine” for FBE Foxtrot execution centered on the complex requirements for 
Joint Maritime Access and Control (JMAC) in the Arabian Gulf. JMAC defines a capability for 
joint forces to conduct synchronous (vice serial) operations, using concurrent warfare concepts in 
AS W and MI W, coordinating joint assets in a maritime operation and enhancing multi-mission 
tasking. Central to all of these roles is the capability of the Joint Task Force (STF) to respond to 
immediate threats and conduct synchronized operations, while simultaneously employing 
capabilities of a Joint Fires Element (JFE). 
Data observers/analysts were responsible for coordinating the collection of data across multiple 
experiment themes (i.e. MIW, ASW, JFE, NBC, 10). The data collection team combined subject 
matter expertise with observations to capture immediate insights surfaced within the dynamic 
experiment environment. These insights included implications for organizing in a variety of 
various command conformations and some aspects of human factors involved in decision 
making. Each data collector provided a brief of daily impressions that were used to develop a 
general assessment for each experiment focal area. 
Analysis in this complex experiment had many requirements for data collection. First was the 
requirement for data to be used in future study. Secondly observers noted events and data which 
were important to expanding notions of parallel operations within each of the primary 
experiment themes that had been defined as specific experimental questions. Thirdly, there were 
unintended consequences, or innovations that were unexpected but occurred as the experiment 
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progressed. Collateral data, such as logs, communications and contextual material necessary to 
telling the “ s ~ o I - ~ ’  of FBE Foxtrot were also collected. 
Experiment Theme 
Joint Maritime Access Control (JMAC) was the central theme behind Fleet Battle Experiment 
Foxtrot. JMAC is that activity which assures Friendly Force access to littoral areas by 
neutralizing, destroying, temporarily degrading, or avoiding enemy maritime access denial 
systems andor forces by any means. 
The objective of JMAC is to enable joint military operations in the littoral which might 
otherwise be delayed, denied, or limited in effectiveness, or subjected to an unacceptable level of 
Friendly Force losses because of enemy maritime access denial. Access Assurance includes all 
Challenging Chokepoint Denial Threats 
methods that prevent or inhibit the enemy maritime access denial systems from accomplishing 
their mission. It includes methods that destroy, degrade, neutralize, or avoid enemy systems. 
The choice of operations method to apply in each situation is determined by enemy system 
characteristics and vulnerability. 
The JMAC scenario developed for this experiment included an enemy closure of a critical 
maritime strait in order to prevent logistics shipping from getting through to support engaged 
land forces. In this situation, the critical operational issue was rapid opening of the strait to meet 
force objectives, and to sustain it open for sufficient duration to permit unimpeded transit of 
commercial and military shipping in support of the campaign. In order to achieve JMAC 
objectives, synchonized operations across various warfighting areas (i.e. MIW, AS W, Fires) 
were initiated. The experiment C41 architecture was configured to provide each Warfare 
Commander with the Common Operational Picture (COP) required to maintain complete 
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situational awareness of the battle-space as the events materialized. The ultimate objective was 
to reduce the timeline required to re-open the strait by having the individual warfare commanders 
take advantage of the COP thus allowing each to understand the battle space and proceed with 
the mission in their respective focus area in parallel fashion rather than with a more traditional 
sequential Concept of Operations (CONOP). Although the concept of conducting parallel vice 
sequential operations was the primary goal of the developed scenario, observations clearly 
illustrated, particularly in the MIW focus area, the vulnerability of this netted architecture and 
the significant impact it has when all assets do not have access to the COP. However, although 
the difficulty in maintaining robust, network centric connectivity degraded the situational 
awareness of certain MIW assets, a clearer definition of requirements needed to support organic 
MIW was examined and should result in a better understanding for future parallel operation 
experimentation. 
A main aspect of FBE-F was to test a Strike Joint Fires Element. This system was tested in three 
phases. 
Phase 1 : In the Deterrence phase the S/JFE organizational role was to receive a Joint Prioritized 
Integrated Target List (JIPTL) that had been constructed in a collaborative process through a 
Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) and reprocess this Excel formatted information as 
weapons assigned to targets. This processing was conducted specifically at the JFE level, in a 
sub-element of the JFE, the JFE Strategy Cell (STRAT Cell). Here the initial weapon-target- 
pairing would take place, with “effects” considered, in order to make Effects-Based Orders to 
joint warfare commanders. The result of this process was that the Joint Maritime Component 
Commander (JMCC) and Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC) would use these 
directives to produce a coordinated Master Surface Fires Plan, and the JFACC would use the . 
same data to produce a Master Air Attack Plan. Both master plans were then used to create an 
Integrated Tasking Order (ITO) which would coordinate deliberate Fires missions of all warfare 
commanders. Mission planning included weapons expected in this theater in 2005 included the 
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Joint Stand Off Weapon (JSOW), Extended Range Gun 
Munition (ERGM), Land Attack Standard Missile (LASM), Tomahawk Land Attack Missile 
(TLAM) and its Tactical variant (TTLAM), the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), 
HARM Block V and the Standoff Land Attack Missile-Extended Range (SLAM-ER). 
Phase 2: The IT0 developed deliberate planning described in Phase 1 (beginning with IT0 A, 
and continuing in sequence to IT0 E through the time frame of the experiment) began execution 
in concert with the parallel operations of Joint Maritime Assured Access and Control (JMAC). 
Organizational roles JFACC, S/JFE and warfare commanders increased in complexity as 
execution of IT0 (Alpha) also required monitoring performance of execution while 
simultaneously planning IT0 (Bravo) and conduct planning preparatory to operations in support 
of JMAC’s mission to secure and open the Straits of Hormuz (SOH). Roles were distributed SO 
that JFACC was responsible for coordinating USAF and USN tactical air missions, JFMCC 
coordinated precision guided munitions (ERGM, LASM and TTLAM) and the JFLCC was 
responsible for ATACMS (the JFLCC conducted its responsibilities from the Deep Operations 
Command Center (DOCC) in Kuwait). Other process responsibilities of S/JFE in this phase 
included the buildup of a digital fires network concurrent with and adapted to changes in 
operations such that the execution of StrikeFires could be flexed across all platforms and 
. 
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warfare components. An enhanced TLAM process, coordinated via a digital voice network was 
also employed in this phase, with TLAM inventory reports being fed back to the Strike Cell. 
Although airspace deconfliction is an obvious concern as aircraft and long-range precision 
weapons are deployed together through common airspace against IT0 targets, real-time airspace 
deconfliction was not employed in the experiment. Instead, pre-planned strike missions were 
deconflicted through message traffic. 
Phase 3: Phase 2 was a transition to offensive operations, which were then conducted in Phase 3 
(the last 3 days of the experiment). System demands on S/JFE organization structure, processes 
and data flows increased to maximum levels of complexity. Concurrent with IT0 planning 
which was still ongoing in the deliberate and sequential process, warfare commanders were 
conducting mine-hunting and clearing operations (MIW), AS W, special operations with Joint 
Special Operations forces and response to Time Critical Targets through processes within JFE. 
In this phase a variety of organization relationships, command and control, ongoing deliberate 
planning, parallel operations by warfare commanders, targeting effects based upon CJTF 
guidance and adaptability in a time critical target environment were all combined in order to 
observe system reactions and adaptive capability. These interactions were of particular interest 
in the RE,  in the TCT rich environment. 
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El .O INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this document is to provide data collectors with: 
A description of the overall process of developing Fleet Battle Experiments and how this 
process is connected to data definition and collection 
Some definition of the “systems” perspective important when multiple processes and systems 
are interacting together. 
What constitutes data and how data is connected to experimental concepts. 
Role of analysis, apart from but related to, data collection. 
Differences between data and knowledge. 
A short description of a high-level view of what FBE Foxtrot is about. 
How data collection is to be coordinated. 
Guidelines for collection activities and reports of collection. 
Statements of concepts being examined, and related questions of interest. 
General approaches to data collection within each concept area. 
A method for logging data. 
Specific subjective questionnaires for use in each data collection area. 
El.  1 OVERVIEW OF FBE FOXTROT 
The purpose of FBE-F is to improve combat readiness and interoperability of US. forces 
through application of future concepts, doctrine, and technologies in an existing USCINCENT 
CONPLAN. Specifically, FBE-F will focus on the future warfighting capabilities needed to 
execute the SLOC/ASLOC access mission requirements. FBE-F seeks to leverage Navy efforts 
to extend maritime dominance to a littoral environment. FBE-F hypothesizes that new 
warfighting concepts supported by technology will allow the Navy to enter and remain in the 
littorals indefinitely with the ability to provide intelligence, fires, Command and Control, 
logistics support, and protection of forces ashore. In particular, FBE-F will explore maritime 
dominance enabled by a common operational picture. This includes the undersea picture, force 
protection from air and coastal missile and artillery attack as well as asymmetric threats, and 
time critical targeting and precision engagement against a Third World country setting. 
FBE Foxtrot is centered on the complex requirements for Joint Maritime Access and Control 
(JMAC) in the Arabian Gulf. JMAC must enhance the capability of joint forces to conduct 
parallel (vice serial) operations, use concurrent warfare concepts in the conduct of ASW and 
MIW, coordinate joint assets in a maritime operation and enhance multi-mission tasking. 
Central to all of these roles is the capability of the JTF to respond to immediate threats and 
conduct coordinated (‘synchronized”) operations, within a Joint Fires Element. 
Data collectors will be assigned to various locations and will be responsible for coordinating 
the collection of data across multiple experiment themes. It is particularly important in this 
experiment that data collectors combine personal expertise with observations to define 
immediate insights within the dynamic experiment environment. Each data collector will be 
required to present a brief of daily impressions, insights and recommendations for additional 
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informatiodexperiment execution. This report will be made daily at the end of experiment 
activity (approximately 1700). 
El .2 EXPERIMENT PROCESS 
Fleet Battle Experiments result from a negotiation between the Navy Warfare Development 
Center (NWDC) (which has engaged in a process of concept development), the Maritime Battle 
Center (planning and execution of the experiment), Fleet Commanders (as the Warfighter and 
owner of unique theater challenges), high-level innovators engaged in developing the 2 1 st 
century Navy, and technology developers and program managers (contract stakeholders). This is 
the short list. In actuality, there are many other people and organizations involved. All of these 
parties have some role in the development of the experiment, through the planning process and 
development of concepts. As with any complex plan, there are many compromises to the actual 
final experiment plan and its execution. 
Capturing experiment data and results is similarly complex, both in concept, planning and 
execution. In planning, analysts have to become familiar with the dynamic conceptual terr@n of 
the experiment. As an added challenge, it is necessary that as concepts are developed and 
coupled to experimentation, that there exist some correspondence between the intent of the 
experiment, the concept being considered in planning the experiment, and data collected in the 
conduct of the experiment. In general, this has meant that concepts have had to be re-defined as 
a set of questions, and that these derived questions have had to be retranslated to those elements 
of data which would suffice to expand “knowledge” about the question and therefore the concept 
being considered. 
For this reason, it is important that data collectors understand the “conceptual terrain” of their 
respective observation areas, and the related questions. Data collection instruments (observation 
sheets, questionnaires, etc.) for each area are focused in this way. 
Besides this concept-question-data instrument process, there are other very important data 
requirements. First, that the questions posed be refined through the experiment. That is, based 
on the conduct and results of the experiment, that questions surfaced as a result are captured for 
further exploration. Second, the role of innovation must not be neglected as a source of data. 
The data capture plan is a proposal about what might be important, based on what has been 
defined as relevant questions, and may be observed in what is thought to be the probable set of 
activities in the experiment. It is certainly possible that there will be a completely different set of 
activities, or “unexpected results,” and these are often the most relevant and important results of 
an experiment. Data collectors and observers must be sensitive to these occurrences, noting 
them with as much explanation as possible. 
As the experiment progresses and data continue to pile up, there is a general tendency to 
define the experiment in terms of the data, instead of the data in terms of the experiment. The 
intent of the FBE experiment process is ultimately to understand the “story” of what occurred in 
the experiment, in both a complex and a general way, and to use what is learned to further refine 
the concepts being considered as new FBEs are being planned. 
E1.3 SYSTEMS METHODOLOGIES AND ANALYSIS 
Analysis tests solutions. It doesn’t create them. The mindset should be that strategists 
hypothesize better strategies, tacticians conceive better tactics, and engineers dream of better 
hardware; after which we analysts test the hypothesis that the strategy, tactic, or hardware is (in 
the appropriate sense) better. In operations research it’s not “Let‘s analyze it so we understand it”, 
but “Let’s understand it so we can analyze it.” Wayne Hughes, NPS. 
“What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.” 
Werner Heisenberg. 
“According to the systems view, the essential properties of a (complex system) are properties 
of the whole, which none of the parts have. They arise from the interactions and relationships 
among the parts. These properties are destroyed when the system is dissected, either physically 
or theoretically, into isolated elements.. ..The properties of the parts are not intrinsic properties, 
but can be understood only within the context of the larger whole 
“Systems thinking is “contextual,” which is the opposite of analytical thinking. Analysis 
means taking something apart in order to understand it; systems thinking means putting it into 
the context of the larger whole.” Fritjof Capra 
Analytic efforts have had four evolutionary steps. First, counting things in order to keep track 
of numbers of occurrences within any one category. Second, relationship between different 
categories of entities described by simple statistics (e.g., averages). Third, a relationship 
between numbers of things in different categories when uncertainty is involved (probability) and 
finally (present-day) efforts to understand relationship of different categories of things, in a 
dynamic environment. The first three steps are largely numerical and reductive, however the 
final one is either quantitative or qualitative. 
Understanding a particular technology within a system usually means taking a measurement 
of something that the technology is supposed to do (cause and effect) and comparing that 
measurement against some standard of performance. This is generally a quantitative 
measurement, which makes sense, given its specific focus. However, when multiple 
technologies are combined in a “system,” which may also include those “carbon-based 
technology units’’ (people), distinctions about the portion of which any one of those technologies 
contribute to the system become blurred and complex. This complexity increases further in a 
dynamic environment in which these relationships shift as the environment itself changes. 
In complex experiments there is generally a continuum of data requirements related to 
differing objectives. For the technology manager with a specific program in the experiment, 
there may be a focused data requirement that is not concerned with relationships to other 
technologies. Concepts testing however, will likely include multiple technologies and systems. 
It is generally more difficult to make a single point data observation which adequately represents 
the system, although some performance may be inferred by a numerical measurement. For 
example, if the time to respond to a time critical target exceeds the dwell time of the target, this 
number represents a particular occurrence of system failure, yet tells the observer and analyst 
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very little about “why.” In fact, both are important. The first to inform the observer of a 
potential problem within the system, and the latter to tell the “story” of the system in a way that 
is relevant to the research question being asked. 
Analysis in the complex experiment also has a number of dimensions within a continuum. 
First, there is the collection of data for further study. In the process of data collection observers 
will note things which appear to be important with regard to the questions which are the basis for 
the experiment. A certain amount of inductive analysis takes place as the observer makes 
associations with what is happening. Secondly, apart from those data that are relevant within the 
context of known questions, there are occurrences which are not related to a question set, but 
which are nevertheless important. Innovations that are unexpected, but occur as the result of the 
dynamic within the experiment must also be noted. A third dimension includes collateral data, 
such as logs, communications and contextual material that one would want to have to tell the 
“story” about what happened in a complete and relevant manner. 
El .4 INFORMATION-BASED V. KNOWLEDGE-BASED DATA COLLECTION 
Data collection and analysis in past FBE’s have relied mostly on post-experiment integration 
and analysis. Some post-experiment analysis will continue (for example, in modeling and 
simulation and further development of explanation of specific experiment events). However, to 
the greatest extent possible the intent of the data collection and analysis effort in FBE Foxtrot 
will be to conduct as near real-time integration of data (information collected during the course 
of the experiment) as possible. Filling in the “story” of the experiment, in each area of concern, 
on a daily basis will provide a “knowledge” basis of the experiment for use in immediate reports 
of findings. 
E2.0 GENERAL INFORMATION 
E2.1 EXPERIMENT COORDINATION 
There are multiple requirements for coordination of collection, assessment and reports 
throughout the experiment. 
FBE Foxtrot includes three phases and parallel operations. Data will include context, which 
will change from day to day, dynamic interactions (results from interplay that is not scripted), 
and from a set of pre-scripted events that are close-hold within the red cell. 
Collection coordination will be especially important as targets are injected via the F2C2, into 
the sensor domain, to which JFE and strike will have to respond. In order that such information 
as time sensed, action taken, weapons paired and target engaged times may be determined, data 
collectors will have to be forewarned with regard to these interactions. Some of these type of 
events will be planned in a daily planning process by experiment control, while others will occur 
as a result of immediate interactions which present an opportunity to stress the multiple systems 
being observed. 
A controller circuit is proposed (voice) as one means to coordinate these type of interactions 
and provide an alert to collectors and other experiment control personnel. Local cell phones are 
another possible means for these communications, as well as a POTS line. E-mail, SIPR web 
communications etc will also be used. For each data collector the set of possible 
communications will be unique depending on the situation. It will be the responsibility of the 
data collection group or person at each site to maintain adequate contact with and stay abreast of 
the operations and activities that are the core of the experiment. Whether aboard ship, or ashore, 
it is absolutely essential to the success of this data collection effort that coordination be 
established and maintained throughout the experiment. 
Coordination of collected data is a second requirement. At the end of each experiment day 
there will be some requirement to forward observations, assessment and feedback to the analysis 
coordination group. Use whatever means are available to do this, in a preference order of word 
data files, web files (formatted web site for data collection), e-mail, phone, sneaker net etc. 
E2.2 OBSERVATION AND DATA REQUIREMENTS 
Data collection is a demanding task. This task requires that data collectors observe what is 
important as defined in questions specified for each area, as well as what might be important 
because it is seen to be important to what occurs as the experiment unfolds. 
In each section of this data collection package there is a set of questions that form a core of 
what has been defined as important within a specific area. Questionnaires, interview questions 
and electronic data are all important as the “evidence” from which an answer is proposed as 
“the” answer to any one of these core questions. 
Data collectors for all of the areas of the experiment must do the following: 
I 
1) Define the context in which observations are made. For example, if the data collector was to 
note was to note something with regard to delays in Time CriticaI Targeting, it is important 
to note the delay, and the situation which was present at the time of the observation (e.g., 
prosecution of IT0 targets, shift in commander’s intent, changes to the organization for TCT, 
equipmentlpersonnel problems etc.). This context is very important to understanding 
interactions in a complex way, but which may also be stated as the story of interactions. 
Part of the context is ground truth. This is especially important when a process (for example, 
targeting or ship position) is impacted by position. A second dimension to ground truth is 
time. Note time in all observations, as a way to track data (further explanation of data 
logging is found in section VII of this document). 
In addition to data that is collected through the data collector there is also data that is 
available through operational logs of different types, messages (e-mail included) and so forth. 
Not everyhng is relevant. Try to be specific in collecting documentation-it should help 
provide additional data to the observations the data collector is making, and the collector 
should be able to define why the information is important. Too much information can be as 
difficult an analytic problem as too little. 
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Use tape recording as .a means to help you fill in notes later. This technique works better for 
some than others. However, recorders will be available for data collectors. 
GPS recorders will also be available, and are recommended where unit track information is 
important for post experiment analysis. Some training is required for their use, and will be 
provided at the analysis briefing prior to STARTEX. 
2) Note variances. What this means is that as the flow of a problem becomes more and more 
routine, note those instances which are not routine, or which cause the system being observed 
to behave in a different way. 
3) Note changes in organization, and as well as you can, define reasons and consequences. 
4) Besides the basic set of questions and data sheets provided to you, adapt data collection to 
what you are observing. That is, if we aren’t asking the right questions, what are the correct 
ones? 
I 
5 )  Understand the system you are observing! Draw it out at the level you are observing it. 
Don’t simply repeat the system from the EXPLAN, but try to construct it as a diagram based 
on what is actually happening. 
6 )  Be familiar with the overarching data goals for the experiment, e.g., how is the timeline for 
parallel operations shortened with the organization being used in the experiment? Tying data 
directly to experiment questions will make the experiment a success, as long as these 
relationships are valid ones. 
7) Do not interfere with the flow of operations, as they are ongoing. It is impossible to be a 
totally benign observer, however if it is important to know something by asking a participant, 
try to do this in a way that does not interfere. Post event interviews are an excellent way to 
obtain the “deckplate” view from participants, and you should try to do this. Use a recorder 
when you are doing this, and immediately transcribe the relevant portions into daily notes. 
8) There is no way around this: Data collection is hard work. Some amount of preparation is 
required for each day’s events. In addition it is extremely important to put observations in 
perspective and make assessments as closely to the event as practicable. Don’t think you’ll 
get to it back in CONUS. Even if you do, much will be lost. 
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E2.3 REPORTS 
The data capture team is responsible for producing various reports throughout the FBE-F 
process. The following provides a general description of each: 
1. Daily reports: The requirement here is for some general statement concerning outcomes of 
events occurring in each data collection area. The information is intended for possible 
inclusion in the daily FBE Foxtrot report, and to aid in writing of the end-of-action 
Quicklook Report. 
2. Data reports: As each area of data collection builds a repository of information, this data 
needs to flow, as much as possible, daily to a central repository. As a practical matter, data 
needs to be collected into electronic form to the greatest extent possible and made available 
to the data collection coordinator and other analysts. The objective is to make as much of the 
data available to as many people as possible, as quickly as possible. 
3. End of experiment report: Each data area will be required to describe a set of possible 
conclusions pointed to through the data. This “first cut” at data reduction and explanation is 
critical for further examination of the data. These reports will be made directly to IJWA (Dr. 
Gallup) for collection and integration in a first impression report based on the data. 
4. Post experiment data working group: A meeting to discuss outcomes and explanations of 
data collection (fiom number 3 above) will be held at NWDC at the end of January (TBD). 
5. Final Report: A final report will be delivered fiom IJWA to NWDC in March of 00. 
E2.4 RESPONSIBILITIES 
(Refer to Section E4.0 - Personnel Matrix) 
3.0 CONCEPTS OF INTEREST 
E3.1 JOINT M A  RITIME ACCESS CONTROL (JMA C) 
. 
E3.1.1 Concept 
Joint Maritime Access Control (JMAC) is that activity which assures Friendly Force access to 
littoral areas by neutralizing, destroying, temporarily degrading, or avoiding enemy maritime 
access denial systems andor forces by any means. 
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The objective of JMAC is to enable joint military operations in the littoral which might 
otherwise be delayed, denied, or limited in effectiveness, or subjected to an unacceptable level of 
Friendly Force losses because of enemy maritime access denial. 
Challenging Chokepoint Denial Threats 
An example of a JMAC operational situation would be the case of an enemy closure of a 
critical maritime strait in order to prevent logistics shipping from getting through to support 
engaged land forces. In this situation, the critical operational issue would be the opening of the 
strait in time to meet force objectives, and to sustain it open for sufficient duration to permit 
unimpeded transit of commercial and military shipping in support of the campaign. Joint 
Maritime Access Control requires some operations to take place prior to opening, operations to 
protect forces while opening the strait, and sustainment operations. 
Access Assurance includes all methods that prevent or inhibit the enemy maritime access 
denial systems from accomplishing their mission. It includes methods that destroy, degrade, 
neutralize, or avoid enemy systems. The choice of operations method to apply in each situation 
is determined by enemy system characteristics and vulnerability. 
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E3.1.2 Relationship To Experiment 
FBE Foxtrot is centered on the complex requirements for Joint Maritime Access and Control 
( J M C )  in the Arabian GulJ: J M C  must enhance the capability ofjoint forces to conduct 
parallel (vice serial) operations, use concurrent warfare concepts in the conduct of ASW and 
M M ,  coordinate joint assets in a maritime operation and enhance multi-mission tasking. 
E3.2 JOINT FIRES ELEMENT 
E3.2.1 Concent 
Central to execution of JMAC is the capability of the JTF to respond to immediate threats and 
conduct coordinated (‘synchronized”) operations, within a Joint Fires Element. The JFE is 
centralized, and will engage in all warfare areas outside of the Integrated Task Order (ITO) 
cycle. The JFE is also closely coupled within many C2 systems supporting a variety of sensors 
and weapons systems. 
E3.2.1.1 Mission Concept 
Provide C2 and technologies to perform target sensing to weapons pairing of time critical 
targets. 
E3.2.1.2 Operations Method 
Conduct of parallel operations within the Straits of Hormuz (SOH) using joint forces in a 
naval operation. 
E3.2.1.3 Joint Fires Element (JFE) Objectives 
The objectives for the JFE, distributed within three phases are the basis for data collection: 
1. The development of a Joint Fires Element working directly for the JTF that will emphasize 
the use NSFS assets for deliberate and time critical targeting. 
2. Enhanced Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), Tactical Tomahawk Land Attack 
Missile (TTLAM), Extended Range Gun Munitions (ERGM), Land Attack Standard Missile 
(LASM) Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and 
Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) operations. 
3. Ability to turn sensor events and products into aimpoints. 
4. Establishment of a Joint Fires Network. 
5. Localization, identification, and prosecution of TCT’s. 
6 .  Targeting of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 
7. Improvements to the pre-planned targeting process. 
8. Simulation-based excursions for future weapons and munitions. 
The experiment will exercise the in theater architecture with theater organic and non-organic 
sensors. 
Exercise orchestrated sensor management and control 
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0 Evaluate operation of a JFE TCT cell 
0 Evaluate impact of many-on-many pairing vice first in first out (FIFO) operations 
0 Perform and assess “on-demand” aimpoint generation 
0 Apply a broader suite of weapons against TCT’s 
0 Evaluate advantages/disadvantages of unit level targeting. 
The sensor management objective would address the following areas: 
Communications for sensor re-tasking. 
Fusing sensor inputs in the C5F Strike Center 
E3.2.2 JFE Approach To Data Collection 
Joint Fires encompasses nearly all other warfare and operational processes involved in the 
experiment. It also includes elements of deliberate (ITO) and time critical targeting, as well as 
being integral to interactions with other warfare areas. 
The JFE is key to: 
Success of parallel vice serial operations 
Conduct of concurrent ASWMIW operations 




0 Effectiveness of multi-mission tasking 
Shortening timelines, conduct of parallel processing of information, integration of an IT0 
(vice ATO), management of tactical imagery, target-weapons pairing (LAWS and JCSE), 
integration of fires and enhancement of TLAWTLAM operations are all impacted by the JFE. 
Data collection in this area is obviously complex. Time is an important element in nearly all 
data collections in this area, especially as targets are identified as TCT’s and response of 
processing, target pairing and fire missions are required to occur within the dwell time of the 
target. 
Organization and processes of the JFE will be stressed in the experiment, to the point of 
possibly breaking down. It is critical for data collectors to understand the impact of operations 
on the JFE, and identify areas of sensitivity; in other words, what produces breakdown of the JFE 
system organization? As this occurs, how does the JFE respond in reorganizing itself to meet the 
operational challenge? 
. 
As the experiment progresses through each of the three phases data collectors for the Strike 
Center and JFE will maintain close contact and coordination with the F2C2 in order to conduct 
specific event-driven data collection. It is expected that data collection in this area will be nearly 
as dynamic as the system being observed, requiring extensive facilitation and post-experiment 
meetings daily to asses data collection and analysis efforts. 
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JFE Data collection will consider the following: 
1. The ability of C3 to breakout TCT’s from non-organic sensors and provide queuing to Joint 
Fires. 
2. Use of TDA’s to predict TCT operational areas of air assets to locate TCT’s. 
3. Ability of the sensor grid to locate deceptive targets and track during movement. 
4. Ability of the sensing grid to provide data required of sensor-to-shooter and sensor-to- 
weapon linkages. 
5. C3 capability with respect to maintenance of situational awareness. 
Qualitative data will be collected in the form of questionnaires and observations. Quantitative 
data will be obtained from data logs, collaborative logs, system logs (e.g., LAWWJCSE) and 
target time-stamps. 
Primary Measure: Targeting process occurs within “dwell time” of target. 
Supporting measures: 
1. Number of targets appropriately sensed and this information was provided to the JFE. 
2. Number of sensed targets determined to be hostile TCT by JFE process 
3. Ratio of these targets assigned to weapons system 
4. Ratio of targets destroyed within dwell time. 
Diagnostic measures 
1. Targets not sensed (investigate system failure) 
2. Targets sensed but delayed in reporting to JFE (investigate system failure) 
3. Targets sensed as hostile and not discriminated by JFE (investigate) 
4. Situational Awareness factors 
5. Targets not paired to appropriate weapons system (system failure, C2 failure) 
6 .  Targets paired but not destroyed within dwell time (system failure, C2, LAWS, 
JCSE). 
0 What are points of system sensitivity? 
Under what conditions do data streams from sensor to shooter overload the JFE? 
Does the system degrade gracefully or self-organize in response to failures at 
system-sensitive points? 
Time stamps: 
1. When was a target sensed? Considered within “thread” processes (See Annex I - 
Data Logging Forms and Instructions)? Assigned to a shooter? 
2. Time stamps related to GPS time? Autonomous GPS recording by NPS. 
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3. Simulated target event inject number must be associated with a track number used to 
“tag” information through RE.  JFE will not know that this is a data event. 
Electronic data collected through AARS (After Action Review System) will not be 
employed in this experiment. Coordination must be employed through 
OPFOFUExperiment Control, with data collectors. Independent events, across the 
range of TCT “threads” will be defined for each day’s range of events. 
Context: 
1. Define for each event the tactical, C2 and organization context in which that event 
takes place. For example, that there are multiple targets being considered by the JFE 
at a particular time and the processes in use at that time. (Observation data) 
2. Orange injects/ White Cell inputs 
- Observers and data collectors will need to know schedule for injects. 
- Coordination. Changes to event injects need to be communicated to 
observers. 
- Define dwell time for target event for later use in analysis 
3. Groundtruth 
- Part of experiment context. 
- GPS electronic logs where available. 
- ADS1 for track data (needs to be turned on and data turned over--APC) 
- More important in later reconstruction and simulation efforts 
3. System observations 
- System sensitivities. That is, points of system failure which degrade 
the JFE to where it is not clear that it can meet its goal of sensor-C2- 
shooter within target dwell time. (observations and participant 
questionnaires/interviews) 
- Collaborative logs; collated event logs and planing logs from JFE and 
ships 
4. C2 and technology status 
- Distinctions, by event of sensor--system (target pairing etc)--shooter 
- Technology status is part of context 
- Description of architectures, as dynamic C2 “networks” (NPS 
Networks proposal) in NCW (Observations and network analysis). 
5 .  Organizational change (self-organization of processes and C2) 
- Responses to change in the tactical environment 
- Responses to increase/decrease in ITO/TCT loading 
- Responses to failure modes 
E3.2.3 JFE Questions of Interest 
Did the JFE perform sensing of targets (discriminating those of time critical significance 
within an environment of less time-sensitive targets), pairing of targets with suitable weapons 
systems, and oversee mission completion all within the TCT’s “dwell” time? 
Did the JFE concept enhance the performance of parallel operations necessary to establish 
Joint Maritime Assured Access of the OPAREA? 
Is employment of a JFE an enhancement of concurrent ASW and MIW operations, as well as 
of multi-mission tasking (organic AS WMIW)? 
What are the impacts of a JFE organization in coordination of Joint Assets for maritime 
operations? In a related question, what are the results of dynamic interactions between 
deliberate (ITO) planning and conduct of dynamic TCT missions? 
In what ways is the JFE organizationally sensitive to system conflict and degradation? Does 
the JFE have the capacity for dynamic self-organization in a time-sensitive environment? 
Did the decision-makers at LAWWJCSE have enough data to make a reasonable decision 
(i.e. friendly force location, no hit targets, target surroundings for colIateral damage 
assessments, WMD possibilities, etc.)? 
Did the use of GISRS-M in managing sensors help reduce the TCT prosecution time? 
What method was used to quickly and easily get information to higher authority, if required, 
and decisions of higher authority relayed back to the operators for execution? 
Did changes made to the TLAM process, specifically the use of MDS 4.X in planning and 
LAWS in dissemination and execution, improve the responsiveness of TLAM? 
E3.2.4 JFE Data Collection Instruments: 
See Section ANNEX I & 11 for the complete set of FBE-F Data Logging Forms and Subjective 
Observation Forms and Questionnaires 
E3.3 MINE WARFARE 
E3.3.1 MIW Concept 
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In order to assist the JFMCC and MIWC in executing their mission, FBE-F is attempting to 
highlight the effect of future capabilities and gain some insight into a mix makeup of organic and 
dedicated MCM forces in the 2005 timeframe. The foundation of the experiment is the tactical 
data link exchange between experimental mine countermeasures tactical systems (mainly 
through simulations), legacy mine countermeasures systems, and a command and control 
network to tie the two together. Through networking, display and management systems the 
following operational capabilities will be evaluated: 
0 Tactical data link capabilities to support timely exchange of MCM tactical information 
between the on-scene tactical commanders and assigned MCM forces. 
Automated MCM planning, evaluation and execution decisions support tools and automated 
information management and reporting capabilities interfaced with host platform core C4ISR 
capabilities. 
Automated capabilities to develop, maintain and display a common MCM tactical picture, 
with the capability to integrate it with the rest of the maritime picture into the CJTF display. The 
MCM picture includes mine and mine-like contact locations, mine threat and danger areas, gaps 
in potentially mined areas, Q-routes, breakthrough and clearance status, and the location and 
status of MCM forces. 
The objective of the MCM experiment is to exhibit a capability to conduct a seamless 
transition of MCM capabilities and responsibilities from in-theater forces to follow-on forces. 
The addition of future systems will incorporate capabilities to gain insight into MCM capabilities 
in the 2005 time frame and its impact on the CONPLAN timeline. Overarching considerations 
for the FBE-F MCM experiment are the fielding of efficient C4ISR capabilities to support the 
objectives of the FBE. The mix of legacy and new systems are tailored to provide a fused, 
integrated, almost real time MCM picture, timely situational awareness for the total force, and 
tailored MCM mission planning and evaluation tools for the MCM Wdighter as well as the Sea 
Combat Commander (SCC) and the JTF staff. 
E3.3.2 Approach to data collection 
MIW in FBE Foxtrot has several dimensions. First, structured analysis of MIW capabilities is 
being conducted by MIREM. Second, the experiment, apart from MIREM will explore the 
conduct of mine warfare as an organic operation, and in parallel with other warfare areas. The 
objective is to greatly reduce timelines for mine warfwe as part of an overall JMAC initiative in 
the SOH. The implications for data gathering then, are that what is intended to be learned here 
relates to the use of new technologies (such as RMS and MEDAL) and procedures (organizing 
other warfare assets to become part of the mine warfare effort4rganic MIW) within a timeline 
that includes other warfare operations. As the MIW experiment continues data collectors should 
note (as defined in the questionnaires provided in this document) those factors which contribute 
(positively or otherwise) to the conduct of MIW. 
E3.3.3 MIW Questions of interest 
0 Was NAVOCEANO SIPRNET connectivity sufficient to support expeditious transfer of 
I environmental and bottom topography data exchange? 
Organizational 
0 How did the JFMCC/SCC/MIWC interface with each other and other warfare commanders 
for the tactical control of platforms with organic MCM capabilities? 
0 How did having organic MCM capabilities affect the Battle Group Commander’s response in 
multiple threat situations and conflicting mission requirements? 
In a multi-threat situation, was the SCC, with the MCM mission assigned, able to effectively 
direct MCM forces, including organic MCM assets, clearly and with no ambiguity as to 
intent? 
0 To what extent did Warfare Commanders cooperate with the MIWC to support MIW mission 
when conflicting mission tasking requirements were present? 
Architecture 
Do automated MCM planning, evaluation, and execution decision support tools provided 
sufficient support for Distributed Collaborative Planning (DCP) for the MIWC? 
Was the MEDAL/GCCS-M connectivity sufficiently robust to provide a near real-time 
Common Tactical Picture (CTP) between the MCM units and the SCC/JFMCC? 
Did the CTP provide sufficient situational awareness for the SCC to make knowledgeable 
tactical decisions based on mine threats depicted on the shared CTP? 
0 Was the MCM force able to maintain communications connectivity? 
How well did an integrated LINWGCCS-M CTP support protection of MCM assets? 
Environmental 
0 What was the impact of having in-situ environmental data on the concurrent MIW/ASW 
mission? 
0 Was the NAVOCEANO reach-back and quick turn-around of real-time data into data base 
support products tactically usehl for forward-deployed MI W/AS W units? 
Miscellaneous 
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0 Was water-space management a consideration of the SCC to prevent mutual interference 
between MCM and ASW forces? 
0 Were air-space control measures sufficient to provide deconfliction between air MCM? 
Are the future MCM capable forces sufficient to effect a timeline reduction compared to 
today's capabilities in accomplishment of the SLOC clearance mission? 
E3.3.4 MIW Data collection instruments 
See Section ANNEX I & 11 for the complete set of FBE-F Data Logging Forms and Subjective 
Observation Forms and Questionnaires 
E3.4 ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 
E3.4.1 ASW Concepts 
The ASW objective during FBE-F will be to conduct and experiment as a building block for 
Distributed Collaborative Planning (DCP) between the MOCC, AIP P-3, and surface ships. 
FBE-F will explore the applications of DCP methodology to ASW search plans in support of 
coordinated multi-sensor AS W operations against submarine threats in the littorals. The 
experiment will examine methods of sharing a Common Tactical Picture (CTP) among all of the 
ASW forces. The CTP will include a common view of acoustic predictions based on high 
fidelity models, databases and in-situ environmental measurements. This effort will be run 
concurrent with SHARE 13 1 and Arabian Mace. 








Prepare plans to conduct parallel ASW and MIW 
Develop Netcentric approach to ASW 
Conduct distributive collaborative area ASW planning 
Examine underwater engagement zone (UEZ) 
Coordinate employment of coalition ASW assets. 
FBE-F will focus on developing a search plan methodology where the goal of collaboration is 
to develop and maintain a force vice platform optimized search plan that provides the best 
utilization of available AS W resources to achieve campaign mission objectives. Characterization 
of DCP includes: 
Force vice platform level forces 
0 Shared operational situational awareness 
Synergistic employment of ASW force sensors 
0 In-situ measured and reach-back access to area environmental information 
96 
Balanced processing and bandwidth 
Dispersed organizational structure 
Exploration of CONOPS to develop and maintain a multi-sensor, coordinated ASW search 
plan using DCP to optimize area search under rapidly changing environmental and tactical 
conditions is also a primary ASW focus during the experiment. In addition, examining the use 
of advanced fusion techniques, shared high fidelity models and associated environmental data 
bases, and networked communications to increase situational awareness of the undersea 
battlespace will be a focal point of data collection. 
E3.4.2 Approach to data collection 
ASW in FBE Foxtrot will consist of analysis of ASW capabilities conducted by SHAREM. 
In addition to this formal and scripted evaluation the experiment will explore the conduct of 
ASW as an organic operation, and in parallel with other warfare areas. A principal area of 
investigation involves the use of collaborative tools to conduct planing for the execution of an 
ASW operation, using shared environmental data and with organic assets. As with the MIW 
experiment, the objective is to impact timelines as part of an overall JMAC initiative in the SOH. 
For data gathering then, what should be learned here relates to the use of collaborative 
technologies and procedures for sharing information in the conduct of planning and executing 
the ASW mission. 
E3.4.3 ASW Questions of Interest 
Did the force optimized search plan developed via the Distributed Collaborative Planning 
(DCP) methodology yield a higher probability of detection (Pd) compared to the aggregated 
Pd of the independently developed platform search plans? 
Did the force optimized search plan developed via DCP methodology provide a greater 
sensor coverage for the volume of interest significantly minimizing or eliminating gaps that 
an adversary submarine could exploit? 
Did in-situ environmental data allow the SCC to develop and maintain a more accurate 
search plan (sensor lineup), and provide a greater confidence in implementation of the same 
plan developed with historical environmental data? 
Did the evaluation of time-series in-situ environmental data yield insight that permitted the 
SCC to further optimize the force integrated search plan to increase the Pd of the adversary 
submarine? 
Did Concurrent MIW and ASW operations reduce the time that would have been required if 
sequential operations had been conducted? 
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0 Did Concurrent MIW and ASW operations subject the mine sweep assets to any higher ASW 
threat than sequential operations? 
E3.4.4 ASW Data collection instruments 
See Section ANNEX I & 11 for the complete set of FBE-F Data Logging Forms and Subjective 
Observation Forms and Questionnaires 
E3.5 NUCLEAR, BIOLOGIC, CHEMICAL (NBC) 
E3.5.1 Concept 
An NBC Battle Management Cell will be integrated into FBE Foxtrot, and remain in place 
with equipment, organization and SOP’S developed in the course of the experiment. “The goal at 
the end of FBE-F is an operational NBC cell for COMFIFTHFLT, capable of managing NBC 
Defense operations during peacetime and real-world operations.” 
E3.5.2 Approach to Data Collection 
Data collection will be primarily qualitative, with observers at specific sites for data collection 
of NBC events (see NBC Data Matrix). NBC events will be integrated into the experiment. 
However, as a real-world NBC event would be expected to have the potential for interrupting all 
other operations, NBC in this experiment will be conducted within a sechedule of events and not 
become a block to the conduct of the rest of the experiment operations. Also, while many of the 
NBC objectives are very specific and may appear to be autnomous from much of the rest of the 
experiment, NBC management will cross most of the rest of the experiment objectives and 
operations to some degree. Data collectors must therefore be aware of NBC events, and their 
potential for interaction and inclusion in each of the other experiment areas. For this reason, 
NBC events and possible elements of data collection will be briefed to data collectors each day 
and coordinated with the NBC Battle Mangement Cell. 




Develop C2 architecture for effective NBC Management Cell 
Document SOP for NBC Management Cell 
Maintain a shared and accurate NBC tactical picture 
Define and provide NBC interfaces to provide unitermpted information flow 
Assess NBC Analysis models for use in developing appropriate hazard areas from 
incident reports. 
Construct a dynamic inventory of personal and collective protection equipment, 
decontamination gear and medical supplies. 
Questions: 
0 Does engagement of the threat benefit from networked multi-sensor surveillance and 
response forces in a layered defense? 
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Evidence of this benefit within the NBC Battle Management Cell would consist of 
increased situational awareness using improved C2 for reachback, accessing threat 
developments with advanced sensors, and improved coordination of force protection. 
Is casualty management ashore enhanced using new tools for planning, event 
monitoring, clinical evaluation, clinical reference, patient stataus reporting, in-transit 
visibility, and information integration tools? 
Are civil-military opearations enhanced through the use of a NonCombatant 
management organization, including establishment of a virtual Joint Medical Center 
and Civil-Military Operations Center workspace? 
What are the limitations to using Counter-Proliferation Analysis and Planning System 
(CAPS) and Tactical Atmospheric Modeling System (TAMS) with the VLS plume 
evalutaion system as part of consequence management in a terrorist attack on 
petrochemical or chemical production facilities? 
E3.5.4 NBC Data Collection Matrix (Draft) 
Event name Event description Data required Data type Media 
Shipboard Bio Release of internal 
contaminant onboard 
uss x. BG Staff: 
Time of recipt of notification Observation Notes 
Time Admiral was briefed Observation Notes 
Questionslorders issued Observation Notes 
Requests for information Observation Notes 
Actions taken onboard CV Observation Notes 
(mail, notifications, etc.) Observation Notes 
Harbor dumping Dumping of toxic 
chemicals observed by 
harbor patrol Harbor area: 
Units on patrol in harbor Observation Notes 
Actions taken by harbor security Observation Notes 
Who was notified Observation Notes 
When Observation Notes 
What information was passed Observation Notes 
Assessment by harbor on impact Observation Notes 
Overwater contam. Release of toxic cloud Did ships in cloud react? Observation Notes 
How did the ships react? Observation Notes 
Who did they communicate with Observation Notes 
What was their primary source Observation Notes 













































All NBC events All events 
-for internal information (DC?) Observation Notes Ships NBC Cell 
Were squadrons notified? Observation Notes NBC Cell 
- helo Observation Notes Squadrons NBC Cell 
-- MCM Observation Notes Squadrons NBC Cell 
- Attack Observation Notes Squadrons 
When was notification received 
What system was used 
Did anyone refer to the web page 
Did everyone know about the 
web page? 





E3.6 INFORMATION OPERATIONS & C41 NETWORKS 
E3.6.1 Concept 
Of the FBEs instrumented for network data collection thus far, FBE-F will have the largest 
number of candidate users of shared media. This includes collaborative planning tools, web 
based intelligence services, and forwarded surveillance and targeting data from numerous 
experimental sources. The experiment will also include ASW, MIW, and Joint Fires components 
that will likely produce a distinct operational tempo not previously measured in the context of 
network bandwidth utilization. 
FBE-F will also provide the opportunity to introduce new bandwidth management 
techniques, such as the use of network packet shapers. At the very least, this experiment will 
employ additional refinements to data reduction and analysis tools, facilitating improvements in 
the presentation of reported results during and pursuant to the conduct of an event. 
E3.6.2 Approach to Data Collection 
FBE-F has the potential to provide one of the most complex environments instrumented for 
network data collection to date. Moreover, it represents a change in focus form previous FBEs, 
with regard to network data collection. While collaborative planning, web-based chat tools, and 
various Land-Attack support tools will continue to be evaluated in this context, FBE-F is likely 
to rely much more heavily on web-based capabilities, than previous such evolutions. Thus, this 
event has the potential to provide an excellent opportunity for the observation of extensive web- 
based tactical applications within an exercise environment. 
Network data collection will primarily be accomplished through the application of Notebook 
PC-hosted network analyzers. Network performance statistics will be collected through the use 
of network analyzers and specialized bandwidth management equipment. The network analyzers 
will be attached to key network “choke points”, where significant FBE-F traffk is anticipated 
and restrictions in available bandwidth are evident through a review of network design. These 
network analyzers will generate network capture files, which will then be translated via an 
analysis program to a file format exportable to MS Office products. Captured network statistics 
will be mapped to significant operational events through the use of observers and network data 
collection operators. Observers will coordinate closely with exercise participants, logging events 
of interest and annotating those entries with time stamps. Observers will ensure this information 
is conveyed to network analyzer operators as quickly as possible in order to facilitate near real 
time analysis for significant events. 
Other network performance statistics will be derived through the use of bandwidth 
management systems, capable of rendering periodic statistics as required to facilitate near real 
time monitoring in the field. These systems will provide clues as to the most productive areas 
(protocols, addresses, and applications) on which to focus subsequent data analysis effort. 
Moreover, these systems will also provide for the experimental use of bandwidth management 
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tools within the FBE environment, thus providing a potential means to optimize network 
bandwidth use for subsequent FBEs and ultimately Fleet operational use. 
The network bandwidth management system tentatively selected for FBE-F is known as the 
“Packeteer”, otherwise known as a packet shaping device. The Packeteer is designed to manage 
bandwidth through prioritization and by establishing a quality of service for subsystems that 
might otherwise be preempted by lower priority applications. Several distinct priority levels may 
be established, based on protocol, IP address, and application, rendering this tool a flexible 
potential solution for network centric warfare applications. 
Collected network statistics and results of bandwidth management experiments will be 
rendered graphically and inserted into both quick look and final report formats for dissemination. 
E3.6.3 I 0  Questions of Interest 
E3.6.4 Instruments 
See Section ANNEX I & II for the complete set of FBE-F Data Logging Forms and Subjective 
Observation Forms and Questionnaires 
E3.7 PRIMARY TECHNOLOGIES 
E3.7.1 Land Attack Warfare System (LAWS) 
The Land Attack Warfare System (LAWS) will provide an integrated land and sea 
engagement grid for the timely engagement of fixed and Time Critical Targets (TCT’s), fleeting 
surface maritime targets, and coastal defenses. The engagement grid will consist of PC-based 
workstations distributed ashore and afloat using SIPRNET and EHF communications. LAWS 
will interface to other systems such as JTSS, LPMP, GISRS-M, CAST, and GCCS-M, to receive 
situational data and target nominations. 
LAWS is designed to increase situational awareness, automate processes for weapon-target 
pairing, automate airspace deconfliction, and automate coordination between joint forces 
engaging TCT’s. FBE-F will provide the forum to evaluate LAWS to further determine how the 
system improves Fleet warfighting capability as it relates to TCT’s. 
E3.7.2 Joint Continuous Strike Environment (JCSE) 
The Joint Continuous Strike Environment (JCSE) Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration (ACTD) offers the opportunity to enhance our capabilities to engage Time 
Sensitive Surface Targets (TSSTs). JCSE promises to leverage our considerable investments in 
C4ISR and weapons platforms by reducing the C2 timelines needed to develop Joint and 
Combined targeting recommendations in a JTF environment to attack time sensitive threats, 
thereby improving our probability to engage fleeting targets. JCSE will deliver this automated 
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decision and coordination aid that analyzes the status and priority of time sensitive targets across 
the battlespace, and recommends weapon target pairings, with a speed and robustness that 
greatly outperforms current manual and stovepipe processes for engaging time sensitive surface 
targets. 
E3.7.2. I Joint Targeting 
Joint Force Commanders (JFC's) require common joint targeting procedures and a system to 
deconflict targeting operations, optimize target engagement, prevent duplication of effort, and 
reduce the potential for fratricide throughout the fluid, dynamic battlespace. This is especially 
true when joint force components have areas of operations that potentially overlap, as well as 
mutual interests and capabilities to strike targets of common interest. Each component has the 
ability to .view the battlespace with a multitude of surveillance and reconnaissance assets 
(organic, joint, and national). While each component may be able to engage a detected TSST, 
the most effective weapon may only be available to another component. Safe and effective 
engagement of these dynamic targets will only be possible with effective cross component 
coordination. 
E3.7.2.2 System Description 
TSST's represent a class of highly mobile and stealthy operational nodes that operate within 
U.S. decision cycles. JCSE is predicated on the ability to shorten key decision cycle processes 
through automation to produce an integrated, information-based solution to rapidly target these 
elusive targets. The targeting capability is a function of the following modules: 
Automated Target Prioritization (ATP): ATP takes guidance and continuously matches it with 
emerging targets as they are fed into the execution cycle fiom intelligence nodes to create near 
real-time target awareness by prioritizing potential targets in accordance with strategic guidance. 
Continuous Weapon Availability Monitoring: JCSE's approach to automating this function 
involves tapping all of the weapon status feeds for a given platform. 
Optimized Weapon Target Pairing: This JCSE function enables continuous opportunity based 
pairing by combining the output of Automated Target Prioritization and Continuous Weapon 
Availability Monitoring with identification and awareness of weapodtarget dependencies using 
weapon system performance and threat behavior models. 
Dynamic Airspace Deconfliction (DAD): DAD is a conflict resolution tool that interprets 
planned flight paths and airspace controls to determine existence and nature of airspace conflicts 
and provide possibilities for resolution. 
I E3.7.2.3 JCSE Relationship to FBE-F 
Recent assessments suggest the number of time sensitive threats will be greater than the 
number of static threats in fbture conflicts. JCSE will provide a system with four modules to 
speed up the coordination and decision processes and allow time sensitive targets to be 
effectively engaged. Automated target planning, weapon system and munitions availability, 
target and weapons pairing, and airspace deconfliction have been integrated in JCSE to provide 
the JFC the key tool to coordinate and effectively engage time sensitive targets. FBE-F will 
provide the forum to further experiment with this capability. 
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E3.7.3 Remote Mine Hunting System (RMS) 
RMS will provide surface combatants with a long endurance, low observable, off-board mine 
reconnaissance capability. RMS is an air-breathing, diesel-powered semi-submersible vehicle 
that deploys and recovers a variable depth sensor body from within the RMS hull. The system 
includes acoustic sensors for detecting, classifying, and localizing bottom, some close-tethered, 
and moored mines in the volume. The sensor body also includes an Electro-optic sensor for 
visual identification of mines. RMS is also equipped with forward-looking sonar (FLS), used 
primarily for obstacle avoidance. A mast-mounted video camera provides surveillance in 
support of surface contact avoidance. 
During FBE-F the RMS capability will be a simulated asset that will be injected into GCCS- 
M via the Mine Warfare and Environmental Decision Aids Library (MEDAL) software segment. 
This simulation will provide the MIWC with an organic sensor that is capable of sampling the 
environment for sound velocity and bottom reverberation to optimize sensor performance in-situ. 
MIW simulations will be initiated and monitored from the Mobile Integrated Command Facility 
(MICFAC) but will be incoporated in the Common Operational Picture for the Sea Component 
Commander (SCC) and the MIWC to utilize during the decision making process. 
E3.7.4 Mine Warfare and Environmental Decision Aids Library (MEDAL) 
MEDAL, is the integrated mission planning and evaluation tool for MIW forces. It is a 
software package that is integrated in the GCCS-M architecture to provide tactical MIW data 
management for the MIWC. The system permits automatic processing of contact and message 
data which allows operators to modify MCM plans in near real time. During FBE-F, the 
MEDAL segment will be utilized by all participating MIW assets and will provide the MIW 
COP. The results of this netcentric configuration and the MIW interaction with other parallel 
operations will be evaluated during FBE-F. 
E3.7.5 PC Interactive Multi-sensor Analysis Trainer (PCIMAT) 
PC Interactive Multi-sensor Analysis Trainer (PCIMAT) is a range dependant, acoustic 
modeling system that uses Navy Standard models and databases to predict and display the 
performance of sonar systems. It has the ability to exchange sonar predictions between ships 
and ASW Commanders. Data transfer using OPNOTES via OTCIXS to GCCS-M will be used 
to include updated ASW search plans into the Common Operational Picture (COP). This 
information will permit operators to conduct search coverage fusion and modifl plots for force 
sensor planning. In addition, it has reachback capability to ingest MODAS fields and JJYY 
message format environmental data to assist in search planning efforts. PCIMAT will be tested 
in FBE-F as a tactical decision aids which should lead to cooperative engagement by the 
combatants. It will be integrated on the following FBE-F platforms: JFK, John Young, AIP P-3, 
and at the MOCC (Bahrain). 
E3.7.6 Measure Interface Processor (MIP) 
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The MIP software can collect, process, and forward METOC data on the P-3 aircraft 
providing real-time in-situ METOC and acoustic information for personnel conducting AS W 
search planning. This data should enable critical and timely mission updates (i.e. performance 
predictions, etc.). System installations are planned for the AIP P-3 and the USS John Young and 
should provide the in-situ environmental data (temperature, noise) required to modify search 
plans. Data will be transmitted via UHF Line of Site (LOS) to participating assets. 
E3.7.7 Cooperative Agents for Specific Tasks (CAST) 
Cooperating Agents for Specific Tasks (CAST) is a DARPA funded R&D effort to apply 
cooperating intelligent agent technology to discover, correlate, and disseminate information from 
disparate, distributed data sources. A primary objective of CAST is to provide a system which 
will perform tasks on behalf of the operator with minimal intervention required from the 
operator. The operator provides a high level description of the required task and CAST launches 
agents to autonomously accomplish that task. The agents can persistently monitor distributed 
data sources for events of interest, combining and evaluating relevant data to alert the operator 
when such events occur. 
Stand-alone versions of CAST technology were demonstrated in FBE-D and FBE-E. These 
demonstrations consisted of applying agents to discover possible Indications and Warnings 
(I&W) of missile launcher activity. The agents were tasked at a high level by an operator to look 
for this data in a specific geographic region (specified by rubber banding a graphic map display), 
after which CAST launched agents to local and off-ship data sources to attempt to discover 
relevant information. The operator merely expressed interest in a "region of interest", CAST 
identified the appropriate data sources, tasked agents to persistently monitor those data sources, 
tasked additional agents to collect and combine as appropriate information from agents 
monitoring those data sources, and ultimately alerted the user of discovered events. During 
these FBEs, CAST agents were working primarily against textual data from relational data 
bases, goals for Foxtrot and subsequent FBEs include using other data types, such as imagery, 
from other data sources. 
CAST will focus on four specific areas during FBE-F under an overall objective of: 
"Applying Intelligent Agents to Provide an Intelligent Sensor to Shooter Link". The Foxtrot Fires 
Cell focus is on Imagery Based Targeting so the following CAST specific objectives focus 
primarily on improving imagery flow: 
0 Imagery Discovery and Dissemination 
Based on target nomination requests, CAST will send agents to discover and disseminate 
applicable imagery on the nominated targets. CAST agents will disseminate those imagery files 
in the required format (NITF or commercial) to appropriate systems (PTW+, CAST console). 




CAST will identify sensor cueing requirements based on target nominations. CAST will send 
agents to persistently monitor target nomination and Call for Fire (CFF) requests. Especially in 
situations where a target nomination is not answered by a CFF (which may indicate an un- 
assignable target - insufficient information, moving target...), CAST agents will attempt to 
obtain additional sensor information or send sensor cueing requests to attempt to resolve the 
target. This would alleviate the targeting officer from having to manually identify sensor data 
and requirements and subsequently generate sensor cueing requests. An operator could also 
initiate the requests by tasking CAST to send agents to retrieve sensor data or cue sensors as 
appropriate. 
0 ImageryBDA 
Subsequent to launches against a target, CAST agents will discover and retrieve relevant 
imagery on those locations to assist in BDA determination. CAST will monitor CFF requests 
and subsequently send agents to identifl and retrieve imagery from applicable sources. 
BDA from Other Sources 
Subsequent to firing upon a target, apply CAST agents to discover possible BDA I&W from 
data sources which are not traditionally monitored for BDA. 
An overarching objective is to provide a tool, which will require minimal operator 
involvement to launch the agents to identify, required information. CAST will monitor ongoing 
message traffic (eg. A target nomination via USMTF ATI.ATR messages, fire requests via Call 
for Fire messages). After the agents identify pertinent information, they will either take it to the 
required location andor alert the 
Operator as to the existence of the information. 
E3.7.8 TARPS-CD 
E3.7.9 PTW+ 
PTW+ is an integrated suite of applications that uses client-server technology (SUN server, 
PC client) to support the collaborative targeting process. The system is designed to improve the 
warfghting capability of the Fleet staff and/or subordinate platforms. PTW+ uses the AIP-P3 
imagery to generate an aimpoint that is fed into JCSE and LAWS. JCSE and LAWS performs 
weapon target pairing for the initial target location and the subsequent PTW+ supplied aimpoint 
is integrated to isolate the target. This system should expedite and improve the C3 process for the 
development and execution of Time Critical Targets (TCT's) and it will be evaluated in that 
capacity during FBE-F. 
E3.6.9 Global ISR System - Maritime (GISRS-M) 
E4.0 PERSONNEL 
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System Overview I 
The data you will be logging focuses on 
detection reporting 
information development decision making 
information transmission physical actions 
Our main purpose is to track information flow, the decisions that are made based on that 
information, and the physical actions which result. We wish to log the times at which these 
activities occur, which requires that you supply narrative observations about pertinent events, the 
times at which they occur, and check a box that we use to enter the data into a relational data 
base. 
We have a limited number of data loggers for FBE-F, which means that we can only log events 
which occur at a fairly high level in the operations system, not all of the details which occur 
throughout the system. In order to track information at this level and to match the data logging 
structure to the system, we segment the operations system into sensors and three types of 
organizations, shown below. The data logging forms you will use are matched to this 
segmentation. 
Information processing and the creation and dissemination of a Common Operations Picture 
(COP) is an important, even crucial, part of Netcentric operations. We wish to keep track of this 
process. You will note that we assume that this information processing is associated with the 
command functions. We presume that those logging command functions will also be logging 
information-processing activities. 
Each organization has several types of information associated with it, also shown below, which 
they develop for internal purposes and to send to other organizations. Of course, they also 
receive information fiom other organizations, but in the diagram we associate that information 
with the originating organiation. You will record when information is developed, sent, and 
received, and when decisions are made. In the case of those platforms, which take physical 
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Data Logging Forms 
The purpose of the following forms is to capture the times at which events occur. We need your 
description of the event, such as “tomahawk underway”, or “target identified”, or “sensor contact 
received”. Your description of the event is entered in the “Observation” column. Following that 
several columns that are to be checked to note the type of event, system information, etc. 
As an example of how this logging scheme is used, consider the launching of a weapon at a 
target. The following set of data entries could be recorded (among others associated with the 
event): 
Command center 1500 Transmit command to attack TEL with Tomahawk 
The tracWtarget ID and the Platform ID would be entered, 
Check the boxes Info Sent Assign Platform Engage 
The target ID would be entered 
Check the boxes Info Received 
Platform 1505 Received command to attack TEL 
Platform 15 15 Launched Tomahawk at TEL 
The target ID and the Weapodlaunch tube ID would be entered 
Check the boxes Engage 
Fires Cell 1520 Sensor report on TEL strike 
The target ID and the sensor ID would be entered 
Check the boxes Info Received 
Fires Cell 1522 BDA on TEL shows not destroyed 
The target ID would be entered 
Check the boxes Info Developed BDA 
Note that with a complete set of boxes of this type checked at all the locations which were 
involved with this target, it is possible to pull a “thread” through the archived data and 
reconstruct the full sensing through engagement sequence. This is the purpose of this system of 
data logging. 
The following are the data logging sheets and the explanations that accompany each. 
Operations Cell (Fires, ASW, MIW) 
Only the data logging form and codes for one cell is shown as all three are the same. 





short narrative of the event being recorded 
identification of the red or blue track 
identification of the platform assigned a mission or communicated with, 
or the command center from which instruction is received 
identification of the sensor from which a report is obtained 
INFORMATION 
Dev 
Rec information received 
Sent information sent 
Targ ID target identified (or lack of ID of injected target) 
Targ Pri target assigned a priority 
Weap Targ weapon type-target pairing assigned for effects 
Assn Weap specific weapon assigned to a target 
Eng decision to engage a target 
BDA battle damage assessment performed 
Assn Sens assign a sensor to an area or a target 
Assn Plat assign a platform to carry out an action 
Env environmental information 
Srch Plan search plan established or enacted 
Targ Inj injection of simulated target into the information system 
0 t h  indicate at column top the designation you are using 
information developed within the cell 
. 
Command Center (JFC, JFMCC, SCC) 
Only the data logging form and codes for one cell is shown as all three are the same. 






Rec information received 
Sent information sent 
Cmdr Int commander’s intent 
Cmnd Re1 command relationship 
Assn Plat assign a platform to carry out an action 
Red Int red forces intent, including projected impact of an attack or weapon 
Ops Strat current operations strategy 
ops stat current state of operations 
Eng engage a target 
Other indicate at column top the designation you are using 
short narrative of the event being recorded 
identification of the red or blue track 
identification of the platform assigned a mission or communicated with, 
or the command center from which instruction is received 
information developed within the cell 
. 
Common Operations Picture (information processed in the command center) 






short narrative of the event being recorded 
identification of the red or blue track 
identification of the platform assigned a mission or communicated with, 
or the command center from which instruction is received 

















status of the communications system 
status of the information system 
status of the Common Operations Picture 
identification of a track 
track lost or dropped from the COP 
tracks merged and ID confusion 
red forces intent 
location of a Blue platform 
status of Blue forces or platform 
battle damage assessment 
indicate at column top the designation you are using 
Platform 
This data logging sheet and instructions applies to all platforms that are responsible for 
actions such as launching weapons, deploying forces, etc. 
Time time at which an event occurs 
Observation short narrative of the event being recorded 
Track ID identification of the red or blue track 
Plat ID identification of the platform assigned a mission or communicated with, 

















status of a weapon magazine 
readiness status of a weapon or weapon system 
weapon is underway to the target 
forces launched 
acquisition of or tracking target 
THE FOLLOWING PAGE IS AN EXAMPLE DATA-LOGGING FORM 
FBE-F Data Logging Sheet (FBE-data-Fires) 
FIRES CELL DATA Data Logger 
Comments: 
Specific Location MESL Date 
WeaDon €4 Taraet Actions I I  
Track Plat 
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OBSERVER AND PARTICIPANT 
QUESTIONNAIRES & FORMS 
Subjective Observation Forms 
During an event of a Fleet Battle Experiment, there are a large number of ctivities ccurring 
simultaneously and the challenge is to capture that information which adequately enables the 
desired analyses. Subjective information, people’s observations, are an important part of this 
information. The following forms are used to capture these observations. 
These forms alert the observers to the types of information desired. We wish to have the 
information requested supplied, but do not expect that the forms include all worthwhile 
observations that you might make. Thus, we encourage you to supply any additional 
observations you feel will be pertinent to the experiments objectives. 
IN ORDER TO SAVE SPACE IN THIS REPORT, THE FOLLOWING FORMS ARE 
ABBREVIATED. E.G. THE DIRECTIONS AND OTHER GENERAL DATA WHICH HEAD 
EACH FORM ARE ONLY SHOWN IMMEDIATELY BELOW. THEN THE SPECIFIC 
QUESTIONS FOR EACH LOCATION ARE SHOWN. 
FLEET BATTLE EXPERIMENT FOXTROT 
EVENT 
DATA COLLECTIONSHEET 
(to be completed by the data collector during and aper the event) 
Date: Data Collector: 
Unifllatform: AS W Module 
Time (Zulu): 
Start Event End Event 
General Instructions: 
I .  Complete the Data Logging Forms. 
2. Distribute Questionnaires to key participants in your cell. 
3 .  Where possible, obtain copies of communications, activity, nav, etc. logs. 
4. Complete the Environmental Data Form. 
5. Record any comments/observations you think are relevant. 
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Unifllatform: AS W Module 
Specific questions: 
1 .  Were the Data Logging Forms and Questionnaires successfully completed so this event is 
adequately captured? If not completely successfid, to what degree were you successful and 
what problems were encountered? 
(THIS QUESTION IS #1 ON EACH FORM AND WILL NOT BE REPEATED) 
2. Did the use of PCIMAT benefit ASW operations? If so how, if not why? 
3. Did communications links meet the needs of ASW DCP? 
4. How did the concurrency of fire missions impact ASW operations? 
5. How did the concurrency of MIW missions impact ASW operations? 
6.  How did the availability of in-situ environmental data impact AS W operations? 
7. Will ASW DCP lead to a higher probability of target detection than conventional 
procedures? 
8. Were the search plans generated by the ASW module produced in a timely manner and take 
full advantage of shared data? 
9. How effectively does the ASW module communicate with the SCC? 
10. How effectively does the ASW module communicate with the MIWC? 
1 1. How effectively did the ASW module exercise CC over ASW assets? 
12. Was manning adequate? 
UniWla~orm: MI W Module 
Specific questions: 
1 .  What was the impact of DCP on MIW operations? 
2. Did communications links meet the needs of MIW DCP? 
3. Was the performance of MEDAL acceptable? If not, why not? 
4. How did the availability of in-situ environmental data impact MIW operations? 
5. Does MIW DCP lead to a higher probability of target detection than conventional 
procedures? 
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6. Were the search plans generated by the MIW module produced in a timely manner and did 
they take full advantage of shared data? 
7. How did the concurrency of fire missions impact the MIW mission? 
8. How did the concurrency of ASW missions impact the MIW mission? 
9. What was the impact of organic MCM on the allocation of MCM assets? 
10. Does the existence of a MIWC positively affect MCM relationships between MCM assets 
and other warfare commanders? 
1 1. How effectively did the MIW module communicate with the MIWC? 
12. How effectively did the MIW module exercise CC over MCM assets? 
13. Does the existence of a MIWC positively affect the response time to MCM tasks presented 
by subordinate units? 
14. To what extent did warfare commanders cooperate with the MIWC to support MIW missions 
when conflicting mission tasking requirements were present? 
15. Was the MIW module adequately staffed? 
16. Is the reach back response time to NAVOCEANO acceptable? 
17. Were the NAVOCEANO data tactically useful? 
.18. How well did an integrated LINWGCCS-M picture support protection of MCM assets? 
Unifllatform: JFE 
Specific questions: 
1. What was the impact of DCP on JFE operations? 
2. Did the JFE perform sensing of targets (discriminating those of time critical significance 
within an environment of less time-sensitive targets), pairing of targets with suitable weapons 
systems, and oversee mission completion all within the TCT’s “dwell” time? 
3. Did the JFE concept enhance the performance of parallel operations necessary to establish 
Joint Maritime Assured Access of the OPAREA? 
4. Is employment of a JFE an enhancement of concurrent ASW and MIW operations, as well as 
of multi-mission tasking (organic ASWNIW)? 
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5. What are the impacts of a JFE organization in coordination of Joint Assets for maritime 
operations? In a related question, what are the results of dynamic interactions between 
deliberate (ITO) planning and conduct of dynamic TCT missions? 
I 17. Compare the fire-target pairings produced by LAWS and JCSE. 
6. In what ways is the JFE organizationally sensitive to system conflict and degradation? Does 
the JFE have the capacity for dynamic self-organization in a time-sensitive environment? 
7. Was the JFE able to effectively communicate with higher authority when necessary? 
9. Did the decision-makers at LAWS/JCSE have enough data to make a reasonable decision (i.e. 
friendly force location, no hit targets, target surroundings for collateral damage assessments, 
WMD possibilities, etc.)? 
10. What method was used to quickly and easily get information to higher authority, if required, 
and decisions of higher authority relayed back to the operators for execution? 
1 1. Did changes made to the TLAM process, specifically the use of MDS 4.X in planning and 
LAWS in dissemination and execution, improve the responsiveness of TLAM? 
12. Did the Joint Fires Network perform satisfactorily? If not, in what ways was it inadequate? 
13. Did communication links meet the needs of the Joint Fires Network? 
14. Are TCTs serviced within their dwell times? If not, which step, or steps, in the targeting 
process were problems? 
15. Were specific weapon systems a problem in delivering timely fire? 
16. Were specific target types a problem in delivering timely fires? 
UnitPCatform: John F. Kennedy 
Specific Questions: 
ASW questions: 
1. What was the impact of DCP on ASW operations? 
2. Did communications links meet the needs of ASW DCP? 
3. How did the concurrency of fire missions affect the ASW mission? 
4. How did the concurrency of MIW missions affect the ASW mission? 
5. How effectively does the ASW module communicate with the SCC? 
6. How effectively does the SCC communicate updated ASW planning to the MIWC? 
7. Was manning adequate? 
MIW questions: 
1. Does the existence of a MIWC positively affect MCM relationships between MCM assets 
and other warfare commanders? 
2. Does the existence of a MIWC positively affect the response time to MCM tasks presented 
by subordinate units? 
3. To what extent did warfare commanders cooperate with the MIWC to support MIW missions 
when conflicting mission tasking requirements were present? 
4. How effectively did the MIWC communicate with the MIW module? 
5. How effectively did the MIWC communicate with the SCC? 
6. How effectively did the MIWC module exercise CC over MCM assets? 
7. Were the MIWC and SCC adequately staffed to support MIW? 
8. What was the impact of organic MCM on the allocation of MCM assets? 
9. What was the impact of DCP on MIW operations? 
10. Was the performance of MEDAL acceptable? If not, why not? 
1 1. Did communication links meet the needs of MIW DCP? 
12. How did the availability of in-situ environmental data impact the MIW mission? 
13. Is the reach back response time to NAVOCEANO acceptable? 
14. Were the NAVOCEANO data tactically useful? 
15. How well did an integrated LINWGCCS-M picture support protection of MCM assets? 
16. Was waterscape management a consideration of the SCC to prevent interference between 
MCM and ASW forces? 
17. Were airspace control measures sufficient to provide deconfliction between AMCM and 
other air assets? 
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Joint Fires questions: 
1. What was the impact of DCP on strike operations? 
2. Did the Joint Fires Network perform satisfactorily? If not, in what ways was it inadequate? 
3. Did communication links meet the needs of the Joint Fires Network? 
4. How effectively was unit level weaponeering performed? 
5. What was the interval between receipt of tasking and aircraft launch? 
Unifllatform: USS John Paul Jones 
Specific Questions: 
ASW questions: 
1. How did the concurrency of fire missions impact the ASW mission? 
2. How did the concurrency of MIW operations impact the ASW mission? 
MIW questions: 
1. How did the concurrency of ASW operations impact the MIW mission? 
2. How did concurrency of fire missions impact the MIW mission? 
3. How well did the crew handle organic MCM operations? 
4. Was manning adequate? 
5. Evaluate the impact of the RMS on MIW operations. 
6 .  What was the impact of DCP on MIW operations? 
7. Did communication links meet the needs of MIW DCP? 
8. Evaluate the impact of MEDAL on MIW operations. 
9. How did the availability of in-situ environmental data impact MIW operations? 
Joint Fires questions: 
1. What was the impact of DCP on strike operations? 
2. Did the Joint Fires Network perform satisfactorily? If not, in what ways was it inadequate? 
3. Did communication links meet the needs of the Joint Fires Network? 
4. How did the concurrency of ASW operations impact fire missions? 
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5. How did the concurrency of MIW operations impact fire mission? 
6. How effectively was unit level weaponeering performed? 
7. What was the interval between receipt of tasking and weapon fire? 
UnMPlatform: John Young 
Specific Questions: 
ASW questions: 
1 .  What was the impact of DCP on ASW operations? 
2. Did the use of PCIMAT benefit ASW operations? If so how, if not why? 
3. Did communications links meet the needs of ASW DCP? 
4. How did the concurrency of fire missions affect the ASW mission? 
5. How did the concurrency of MIW missions affect the ASW mission? 
6. Was manning adequate? 
Joint Fires questions: 
1. What was the impact of DCP on strike operations? 
2. Did the Joint Fires Network perform satisfactorily? If not, in what ways was it inadequate? 
3. Did communication links meet the needs of the Joint Fires Network? 
4. How did the concurrency of AS W operations impact fire missions? 
5. How effectively was unit level weaponeering performed? 
6. What was the interval between receipt of tasking and weapon fire? 
BATTLE EXPERIMENT FOXTROT 
EVENT: 
QUESTIOhNAIRE 
(to be completed by participants, post event) 
Date: Data Collector: 
Unit/Platjorm: Name of Subject: Duty of Subject: 
Where appropriate, questions may be answered with a numerical value in the range of 1 to 10 





5 .  




What DCP tools did you use? 
How effective were these tools? What problems if any did you experience? 
What were the impacts of DCP on the operations and effectiveness of your cell? 
Did communications links meet the needs of DCP? 
Did your cell have timely and adequate data to properly conduct its operations? If not, what 
were the specific deficiencies? 
How did the concurrency of operations affect the operation of your cell? 
Did your cell function well? If not why not? 
Was the manning level in your cell adequate? If not, how many and where were additional 
personnel required? 
Which other cells did you communicate with? Were communications easily established? If 
not, what were the specific problems? 
10. Were the cells with which you communicated responsive? If not, what specific problems 
were encountered? 
1 1. What is your perception of what worked well in this event? 
12. How could this event be improved? 
13. Additional Comments. 




Start Event End Event 
DateRime (Zulu): 
Measurement Location Long. 
Environmental Conditions 
Air Temperature (C): 
Lat. 
121 
Wind Speed (knots): 
Wind Direction: 
Percent Cloud Cover: 
Ambient Illumination (night): 
Visibility (Nautical miles): 
Humidity: 
Sea State: 
Sea Temperature (C) 
Sea Depth (meters) 
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